Chinese management of its Japan policy is not only crucial to vital Chinese interests but also to regional stability. Japan has the potential both to contribute to Chinese economic modernization and security and to develop and use region-wide military, political and economic instruments to retard Chinese economic development and to undermine Chinese security. Heightened Sino-Japanese cooperation can underpin regional stability and economic cooperation, but heightened conflict has the potential to polarize all of East Asia into competing blocs, undermining the region's ability to continue its successful pursuit of economic growth and the development of regional stability with multilateral institutions of cooperation. Much is riding on Chinese policy and the course of Sino-Japanese relations.
To protect Chinese security and maintain Sino-Japanese cooperation, Beijing must weave together a wide range of potentially contradictory policies. Its defense policy is a necessary hedge against the possibility of deteriorated relations with a superior economic, technological and even military power. But China's defense budget and its acquisition of advanced foreign weaponry has the potential to elicit Japanese policy detrimental to Chinese interests. The burden rests on Beijing's bilateral Japan policy to have a countervailing impact on bilateral relations.
But, Sino-Japanese relations have become increasingly complex. The end of the Cold War and the decline of LDP dominance in Japanese domestic politics have undermined Tokyo's ability to take the long view of Sino-Japanese relations and to continue to shelve what had been secondary conflicts of interest. The resulting new points of friction, as well as enhanced U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation, have complicated bilateral relations and added an element of doubt to Chinese confidence in Sino-Japanese cooperation.
Complications in Sino-Japanese relations have elicited a more outspoken Chinese policy toward Japan. The Chinese media are once again covering trends considered counterproductive to Beijing, including alleged revival of militarism and Japanese defense spending. They have been critical of elements of Japanese policy toward China, including Tokyo's relationship with Taiwan, its handling of the yen loan program, and its policy on disputed territories. Nonetheless, Beijing continues to evaluate favorably the trend in Japanese foreign policy and its Japan policy reflects this. It has maintained a low-key approach to conflicts of interest, trying to caution Japan from adopting contentious policies, while trying to maintain cooperative relations. Its bilateral Japan policy reflects the cross-cutting pressures that Japan poses to Chinese interests.
If Sino-Japanese relations existed in a vacuum, relations would be relatively easy to manage. But there exists a wide range of external factors (ranging from Chinese treatment of dissidents and the Taiwan issue to U.S.-China and Sino-Russian relations) that could affect Japanese policy-making and redirect the relationship, despite Chinese intentions to maintain stable relations. China's control over the course of these issues is, at times, minimal. At other times, leadership incentive and/or ability to incorporate China's interest in stable Sino-Japanese relations into policymaking is minimal. And affecting the entire spectrum of issues is the fact that Japan is a democracy and Chinese leaders are celebrated for their inability to consider the implications of their own behavior for the politics of China policy in democracies.
Sino-Japanese relations do not exist in a vacuum. Chinese leaders will have to exercise considerable tolerance, patience, and sophistication to maintain cooperative relations with Japan in increasingly complex circumstances. Thus far, they have shown the ability to develop a Japan policy which responds to the numerous challenges to Chinese interests. Nonetheless, given the fact that the challenges will likely grow and relations with Japan will likely become more complex, China's Japan policy and Sino-Japanese relations must be considered one more factor contributing to the uncertainty of Asia after the Cold War.
Endnotes
[1] Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, March 18, 1996, in Daily Report, China, Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (henceforth
FBIS-CHI)-96-053, March 19,1996, p. 33.
More China's Japan Policy: 1990s
[2] Tang Tianri, "Nations Gear Up for the Next Century," Beijing, Banyue Tan, January 10, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-027, February 8, 1996, p. 4.
[3] FBIS-CHI-96-053, p. 33.
[4] Xue Mouhong, "The New World Order: Four Powers and One
Superpower," Beijing Review, No. 39, September 25-October 1, 1995, in FBIS-
CHI-95-188, September 28, 1995, p. 10.
[5] Chen Xi, "Peace and Development: Sign of the Times," Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, December 28, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-001, January 2, 1996, p. 1.
[6] Yan Xuetong, "Forecasting International Politics at the Beginning of the
Next Century," Beijing, Xiandai Guoji Guanxi Yanjiu, No. 6, June 20, 1995, in
FBIS-CHI-95-182, September 20, 1995, p. 3.
[7] Qian Qichen, "Unswervingly Follow the Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," Beijing, Qiushi, No. 12, June 16, 1995, in FBIS-CHI95-129, July 6,
1995, p. 2.
[8] Chen Peiyao's article, "The New Asia-Pacific Triangle of Dependence,
Constraint, Cooperation, and Competition," is discussed in: Shanghai, Guoji Zhanwang, October 23, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-241, December 15, 1995, p. 1.
[9] Tao Zhipeng, "A Year of Advance Toward Multipolarity," Beijing,
Banyue Tan, No. 24, December 25,1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-027, February
8,1996,p.3.
[10] Ding Henggao, "New Defense S&T Strategy to Emphasize Technology
Transfer to Civilian Use," Beijing, Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, No. 3, August 20,
1995 in FBIS-CHI-95-235, December 7, 1995, p. 36. See also Liu Huaqing's
comments in Beijing, Jiefang Ribao, December 23, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-008,
January 11, 1996, pp. 35-36.
[11] Ding Henggao, FBIS-CHI-95-235, p. 35.
[12] Da Jun, "Where Will Japan Go?", Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service,
December 7, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-235, December 7, 1995, pp. 4-5.
[13] For a comprehensive discussion of Japan's military capability, see
Norman D. Levin, Mark Lorel, and Arthur Alexander, The Wary Warriors: Future
Directions in Japanese Security Policies, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1993;
Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics, and
Strategy, Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992.
[14] For a Chinese description of the Japanese naval capabilities, see Da Jun, "Where Will Japan Go?"
[15] For discussion of the development of Japanese defense policy, see
Richard Samuels, Rich Nation/Strong Army: National Security and the
Technological Transformation of Japan, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1994; Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance
Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy, New York: Columbia
University Press, 1995.
[16] Liao Xinan and Sang Zhonglin, "A Potential Nuclear Power: Japan," Beijing, Bingqi Zhishi, No. 6, November 15, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-96-024,
February 5, 1996, pp. 4-6. For a discussion of ongoing Japanese plans to
stockpile plutonium, see Far Eastern Economic Review (henceforth FEER), Vol.
157, No. 9, March 3, 1994, p. 13.
[17] Steven Vogel, "The Power Behind 'Spin-Ons': The Military Implications
of Japan's Commercial Technology," in Wayne Sandholtz, et. al., The Highest
Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 55-80.
[18] Hong Kong, Cheng Ming, No. 195, January 1, 1994, in FBIS-CHI-94-016, January 25, 1994, pp. 4-5.
[19] These statistics are based on Japanese figures. Tokyo, Ayodo, January 26, 1996, in Daily Report, East Asia, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (henceforth FBIS-EAS)-96-017, January 25, 1996, pp. 10-11. For Chinese
figures, see Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, February 17, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-
96-034, February 20, 1996, p. 1; FEER, Vol. 159, No. 11, March 14, 1996, p. 63.
[20] Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1995, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1995.
[21] Shuichi Ono, Sino-Japanese Economic Relationships: Trade, Direct Investment, and Future Strategy, World Bank Discussion Papers, No. 146,
Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1992, p. 17.
[22] FEER, Vol. 156, No. 36, September 9, 1993, pp. 46-47; Beijing, China Daily (Business Weekly), July 11-17, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-13 1, July 12, 1993,
pp. 19-20.
[23] Beijing, Zhongguo Xinwen She, January 18, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-013, January 19, 1996, p. 32.
[24] Tokyo, Sankei Shimbun, March 14,1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-052, March 15, 1996, p. 7.
[25] Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, February 7, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-028, February 9,1996, p. 6.
[26] Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 30, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-96-001, January 2, 1996, p. 9; Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, January 16, 1996,
in FBIS-CHI-96-013, January 19,1996, p. 5; Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun,
January 17, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-95-015, January 23, 1996, p. 7.
[27] Tokyo, Ayodo, March 2, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-043, March 4, 1996, p. 43.
28. Chinese government analysts, interviews by author, Beijing,
1995.
[2] Tokyo, Mainichi Shimbun, February 14, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-
96-032, February 15, 1996, pp. 1-2.
[30] Chen Zhijiang, "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-A
Dangerous Signal," Beijing, Guangming Ribao, April 18, 1996, in
FBIS-CHI-96-079, April 23,1996, p. 2.
[31] Zhang Guocheng, "Japan's Constitution Is Facing a Test,"
Beijing, Renmin Ribao, April 23, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-083, April 29,
1996, p. 4.
[32] Yu Ming-shan, "Transforming into a World Security System,"
Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po, April 18, 1996, in FBIS- CHI-96-076, April 18,
1996, p. 5.
[33] Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun, March 14,1992, in FBIS-EAS-96-052,
March 15, 1996, pp. 3-4; Tokyo, Asahi Shimbun, January 19, 1996, in
FBIS-EAS-96-016, January 24, 1996, p. 13.
[34] Tokyo, Kyodo, February 23, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-037,
February 23, 1996, p. 5; Naha, Ryukyu Shimpo, March 10, 1996, in
FBIS-EAS-96-048, March 11, 1996, pp. 3-4.
[35] Liu Huaqing, "Evaluation and Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms
Control Policy," Beijing, Xiandai Junshi, November 11, 1995, in
FBIS-CHI-95-246, December 22, 1995, pp. 6-11.
[36] Chinese government foreign policy analysts, interviews by
author, Beijing, 1994.
[37] Tokyo, Ayodo, June 23, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-122, June 26,
1995, p. 1; Tokyo, Kyodo, June 24, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-123, June 27,
1995, p. 13.
[38] Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, September 21, 1995, in
FBIS-CHI-95-183, September 21, 1995, p. 1; Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao,
September 23, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-199, October 16, 1995, p. 4.
[39] Tokyo, Yomiuri Shimbun, April 1, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-065,
April 3, 1996, p. 14; Tokyo, Ekonomisuto, April 2, 1996, in
FBIS-EAS-96-064, April 2, 1996, p. 10.
[40] Tokyo, Sankei Shimbun, March 14, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-052,
March 15, 1996, p. 7; Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 17, 1996, in
FBIS-EAS-96-053, March 18,1996, p. 20; Tokyo, Kyodo, March 19,1996,
in FBIS-CHI-96-054, March 19, 1996, pp. 1-2.
[41] Gu Ping, "An Unwise Move," Beijing, Renmin Ribao, September
9, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-196, October 11, 1995, pp. 2-3; Hong Kong, Ta
Kung Pao, August 30, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-172, September 6, 1995,
pp. 13-14; Hong Kong, AFP, August 21, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-161,
August 21, 1995, p. 5.
[42] Tokyo, Kyodo, February 11, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-029,
February 12, 1996, pp. 5-6; Tokyo, Tokyo Shimbun, February 12, 1996,
in FBIS-EAS-96-031, February 14, 1996, pp. 5-6; Tokyo, Kyodo,
February 15, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-032, February 15, 1996, p. 3; Hong
Kong, AFP, February 15,1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-032, February 15, 1996,
p. 4; Tokyo, Kyodo, February 14, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-032, February
15, 1996, pp. 3-4.
[43] Zhang Guocheng, "Turbulent Political Situation in Japan," Beijing, Renmin Ribao, January 6,1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-010, January
16, 1996, p. 8; Chen Yali, "Relations with Japan Will Face a New Test,"
Beijing, China Daily, January 16, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-014, January
22, 1996, pp. 3-4.
[44] For a recent statements making this point, see, for example, Qiao
Shi's statement in Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service, January 23, 1996,
in FBIS-CHI-96-015, January 23, 1996, p. 2; Qian Qichen,
"Unswervingly Follow the Independent Foreign Policy of Peace," p. 3.
[45] Ding Henggao, "New Defense S&T Strategy to Emphasize
Technology Transfer to Civilian Use," p. 36.
[46] Ibid.
[47] See the report on the budget to the March 1996 National People's
Congress by Finance Minister Liu Zhongli in Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service,
March 19, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-062, March 29, 1996, pp. 25, 29.
[48] PRC government specialists on Japanese politics and foreign policy,
interview by author, Beijing. For an analysis of this period in China's Japan
Policy, see Allen S. Whiting, "China and Japan: Politics Versus Economics,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.
519, January 1992, pp. 39-51.
[49] Da Jun, "Where Will Japan Go?", p. 5.
[50] Chinese treatment of the South Korean-Japanese dispute is in Xu
Baokang, "ROK-Japan Dispute Over Island," Beijing, Renmin Ribao,
February 12, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-035, February 21, 1996, pp. 2-3.
[51] For a discussion of Japanese attitudes toward the dispute, see FEER,
Vol. 159, No. 10, March 7, 1996, p. 16.
[52] Zhang Jing, "Reform of the UN Security Council," Beijing
Review, No. 43, October 23-29, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-204, October 23, 1995,
p. 6; Chinese government analysts, interviews by author.
[53] After some effort to resist this trend, China was mute in response to the
first time Japanese troops served in a full peacekeeping role, which occurred in
the Golan Heights. Prior Japanese peacekeeping experience in Cambodia and
Rwanda was limited to medical and relief operations. New York Times,
February 13, 1996.
Introduction
Japan, Multipolarity, and the 21st Century
Consolidating Cooperation
New Directions in Sino-Japanese Relations
Managing a Changing Relationship
Conclusion and Endnotes
Back to Table of Contents China's Japan Policy: 1990s
Back to SSI List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Magazine List
© Copyright 1995 by US Army War College.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com