The cooperative trends in Sino-Japanese relations have been developing since the early stages of the post-Mao period, when extensive economic, societal, and diplomatic contacts became possible. Recent trends in Japanese security policy and in Japan's China policy have begun to elicit growing concern in the Chinese leadership. Chinese leaders must contend with what they perceive to be the emergence of a potential countervailing trend in Japanese foreign policy. One aspect of this trend concerns U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Chinese leaders clearly understand that U.S.-Japan security cooperation plays an important role in restraining Japanese military development. But should they conclude that the post-Cold War U.S.-Japan relationship is moving from maintaining the option for Tokyo and Washington of enhanced future cooperation against an unidentified threat toward contemporary strategic cooperation against China, Beijing would view U.S.-Japan security cooperation with considerable alarm. Beginning in early March 1995, following the release of the 1995 U.S. Defense Department report on the East Asia Strategic Initiative, China began to express doubts about the direction of the U.S.- Japan relationship. Among the various aspects of the Pentagon report that aroused concern in Beijing was U.S. interest in strengthening U.S.- Japan strategic cooperation and American interest in bolstering specific Japanese defense capabilities. Beijing expressed concern that in the post-Cold War era, now that the Soviet threat had ended, America sought expanded strategic cooperation with Japan. China wondered whether this new direction in U.S.-Japan relations was in response to the "China threat" and if it was aimed at "containing" China. [28] Then, in February 1996, in preparation for President William Clinton's April visit to Tokyo, White House officials reportedly sought to include, in a joint U.S.-Japan statement on security, a reference to Chinese military modernization. [29] This trend culminated in April 1996, when President Clinton traveled to Tokyo for a U.S.-Japan summit, signed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, and reached agreement on Principles for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation. The agreements called for greater Japanese military responsibility in the alliance, including (for the first time) responsibility in joint defense operations throughout Asia, suggesting to Chinese leaders that the alliance could promote rather than inhibit the Japanese defense build-up and be used against China. Chinese media argued that the agreement was a "dangerous signal" that Japan has been "brought into U.S. global strategy" and that the agreement will "strengthen coordination with the actions of U.S. troops" in Asia. [30] It "gives the feeling" that the two countries "work hand-in-hand to dominate the Asia-Pacific region." [31] The Chinese media also argued that the expansion of Japanese military activities "is bound to evoke the vigilance. . . against Japan's advance toward becoming a military power," and that in the long run, there is no doubt that the aim is to keep a close watch on China. [32] Coinciding with the initiative in U.S. policy toward Japan has been a corresponding Japanese interest in bolstering its relationship with the United States in response to the development in Chinese power. Although concern for the Chinese military is not as great in Japan as in the United States, Chinese economic and defense modernization has elicited increased Japanese attention. Chinese military maneuvers during the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis elicited increased Japanese attention to Chinese capabilities and led many Japanese to question the wisdom of reducing the U.S. military presence on Japan. [33] Coinciding with these developments is the prospect for U.S.-Japan strategic cooperation against Chinese security interests. In February 1996, Tokyo and Washington agreed to conduct a study on theater missile defense (TMD). Japanese sources also report that the United States, to heighten Japanese security concerns and encourage Japanese interest in cooperation with Washington on TMD, has shared with Tokyo strategic intelligence on China's nuclear capability. [34] The Chinese have argued that an East Asian TMD would be "clearly aimed at China." Should it be deployed, its primary effect will be to "render ineffective" China's limited second-strike nuclear capability, significantly enhancing Chinese vulnerability to U.S. military power and to potential Japanese nuclear capability. Chinese concern for the strategic consequences of TMD in East Asia have led Beijing to issue a warning that it would reconsider its commitment to participating in a comprehensive test-ban treaty should such a system be deployed. [35] China still sees considerable positive elements in U.S.-Japan cooperation. It is not opposed to the U.S.-Japan alliance or to the U.S. military presence in Japan. It has not concluded that the alliance is a net detriment to China's interests. On the contrary, Beijing still considers U.S. security ties with Japan a contribution to both Chinese security and regional stability, if only because the alternative-an independent Japan providing for its own defense-remains a far more daunting prospect. There is now simply greater Chinese ambivalence toward U.S.-Japan relations and uncertainty concerning the outcome of the new trend in security ties. The second disconcerting element in Japanese foreign policy is the new trend in Japan's China policy and the politics of policy making in Japan. Similar to the new dynamic in U.S. policy making, the demise of the Soviet Union reduced Tokyo's concern for Sino-Japanese strategic cooperation and opened the domestic debate in Japan over China policy. But perhaps even more important was the end of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) domination of Japanese politics in early 1994. Chinese leaders were not pleased with the emergence of true two-party politics in Japan. Needless to say, Chinese communists are simply more comfortable dealing with one-party governments. But more important, Beijing was apprehensive over the impact of enhanced electoral competition on Japanese foreign policy. China expressed concern that Japanese politicians would have to appeal to mass sentiment to win votes and that domestic politics would play a increasingly significant role in Japanese policy making. [36] Since that time, Tokyo's China policy has elicited increased public debate, constraining the flexibility of Japanese policymakers. Of greatest concern to China is the development in Japan of a "Taiwan lobby." In mid 1995, after President Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University in the United States, the Japanese government came under domestic pressure to allow the Taiwanese leader to visit Japan. Japanese opposition politicians pressed for the government to grant Lee a visa to visit Kyoto University, his undergraduate institution, or to invite him or Taiwan Vice Premier Hsu Lee-teh to attend the November 1995 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Osaka. China warned that any such visits would place the relationship "in the greatest danger" and Chinese President Jiang Zemin promised to boycott the APEC meeting should either Taiwanese leader attend. [37] Ultimately, Japan succumbed to Chinese pressure and Taiwan was represented in Osaka by Ku Chen-fu, head of Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation. Nonetheless, the trend in Japanese politics was clear. Throughout 1995, politicians from various political parties in Japan were calling for enhanced Japanese-Taiwanese diplomatic contacts. In response, Beijing criticized "pro-Taiwan forces" and warned the Japanese government to oppose any pro-Taiwan activities in Japan. When it seemed that a Japanese cabinet member might participate in a pro-Taiwan demonstration, Beijing made "solemn representations" with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. [38] Then, during the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, hard-line members of the Liberal Democratic Party, reacting to China's military maneuvers, demanded that the Japanese government freeze its yen loans to China. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has been accused of being "weak- kneed" toward China, but in response to the political pressure, the government was compelled to postpone its talks with Beijing over the third round of Japanese yen loans. Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda advised Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that in reaction to Chinese nuclear testing and its Taiwan policy, voices in Japan had called for a review of loan program. [39] When asked about the prospect that Japan might freeze the loans, China's foreign ministry spokesman responded that China "would like to send a very clear and unmistakable message to the Japanese side, which is that the issue of Taiwan is purely an internal matter of China which brooks no foreign intervention or interference of any kind." [40] Nevertheless, the "Taiwan issue" is now embedded in Japanese politics, adding an important element of uncertainty to Sino-Japanese relations. Japanese domestic politics have affected other aspects of Japan's China policy. Japan's response to Beijing's nuclear testing program has elicited Chinese concern. Faced with domestic opposition to Japanese acquiescence to Chinese testing, in September 1995 the Japanese government froze its grant aid to China. Although the amount of the aid was relatively nominal and China issued a low-key reaction, Chinese commentary pointed to domestic forces in Japan that opposed Chinese modernization and Sino-Japanese cooperation and expressed concern for the prospects for the relationship. [41] The recent tension between Japan and South Korea and Japan and China over disputed islands may also reflect the influence of Japanese domestic politics. In conjunction with its ratification of the Law of the Sea, the Japanese government is under pressure to formally establish a 200-mile economic zone around all Japanese territory. The prospect of such legislation has led to demonstrations throughout South Korea and tension in South Korean-Japanese relations. Beijing's apparent response to Japanese intentions was to send vessels to carry out short-term trial oil drills in the vicinity of the Diaoyutai Islands. In so doing, Beijing likely meant to reassert its claims to the islands while, more quietly than South Korea, warning Japan to avoid placing the dispute high on the bilateral agenda. [42] Japan's changing domestic environment will continue to contribute to Chinese apprehension and uncertainty over the Japanese foreign policy. Although Chinese leaders believe that Japanese policymakers and leading politicians continue to place importance on Sino-Japanese relations and wish to maintain cooperation with China, they also understand that Japanese domestic political instability is a potential source of policy change, insofar as Japanese policymakers could allow political considerations to determine policy. The Taiwan issue, economic relations and other bilateral issues could become hostage to Japanese partisan politics. [43] The combination of Japan's changing strategic relationship with the United States and the politicization of China policy in Japanese domestic politics creates an important element of uncertainty in China concerning the future of Japanese foreign policy, its implications for Chinese security, and for the course of Sino-Japanese relations. How Chinese foreign policy responds to these new challenges to Sino-Japanese relations will be critical in determining the course of the relationship and the politics of East Asia. More China's Japan Policy: 1990s Introduction Japan, Multipolarity, and the 21st Century Consolidating Cooperation New Directions in Sino-Japanese Relations Managing a Changing Relationship Conclusion and Endnotes Back to Table of Contents China's Japan Policy: 1990s Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com