Chinese leaders share the global appreciation for the reduced tensions of the post-Cold War era. As much as any other country, China contributed to the positive outcome of the Cold War, and it welcomes the opportunity to end the high level military readiness and economic dislocations associated with the Soviet threat and to focus its scarce domestic resources on economic development. Nonetheless, Chinese leaders also share in the widespread apprehension that the current relief from high levels of international tension may be short-lived. They do not believe that power politics has ended or that there is any guarantee that there will be long-term stability in international politics or great power relations. As Premier Li Peng explained in his March 1996 Report on the Work of the Government to the National People's Congress, "The world ... is still full of contradictions. Hegemonism and power politics are the roots of instability in the world." [1] This attitude was repeated by a senior Chinese journalist, who explained that looking toward the 21st century, "all is not well in the world. Hegemonism and power politics will remain the principal barriers to ... peace and stability." [2] A key component of this perspective is the shifting relations among the great powers in the transition to a multipolar balance of power in East Asia. While acknowledging that the United States is the only superpower, Chinese policymakers understand that uneven rates of change among the great powers will gradually produce a more equitable regional distribution of power in the 21st century. Once again, Li Peng described well the Chinese perspective, arguing that "the world is developing toward multipolarization at an accelerating pace. [3] A retired senior Chinese diplomat observed that since the end of the Cold War, "the world has been moving with a dizzying pace toward multipolarity." [4] In this evolving situation, international conflict and cooperation will be determined by great power relations. "In a multipolar world, the single superpower and the many powers may cooperate when their interests collide, and clash when their interests conflict." [5] In the 21st century, the great powers "will engage in mutual competition, mutual restraint, and mutual cooperation." [6] Central to China's understanding of East Asian security in the 21st century is its assessment of Japan's likely future role in the multipolar balance of power. The Chinese perceive Japan as a rising power determined to play a major independent role in the regional balance. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen observed that Japan "is not reconciled to being only an economic power but hopes to play a major role as a big power in international affairs." [7] Chen Peiyao, director of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, argues that Japan aims to become the economic and political leader of East Asia and has started to compete actively with the United States for regional influence. [8] Chinese analysts also point to Japan's increasing effort to become a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council and its growing military participation in U.S. peacekeeping activities, including its participation in the UN intervention in Cambodia, as evidence of its political ambitions. [9] Compounding Chinese concern regarding Japanese intentions is its appraisal of Japanese capabilities. Japanese great power economic capabilities are well known. Japanese business has become the importance source of new direct foreign investment for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, displacing the American role as the primary source of industrial growth for such countries as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Japan also makes an important contribution to economic development and continued growth in Taiwan. Tokyo's regional economic influence can readily translate into political influence, potentially enabling Japan to influence the foreign policies of many East Asian countries. More significant, however, than Japanese economic influence is its potential military capability. Chinese leaders frequently point out that power in the 21st century will increasingly rest on comprehensive national strength, and that economic and technological capabilities are central to the development of such power. Yet, the implications of this analysis are not only that economic capabilities will play an increasing role in great power competition, but also that technological and economic capabilities will be increasingly important in determining the strategic balance of power and the outcome of military competition. Certainly, the display of U.S. capabilities during the Gulf War revealed the post-Cold War continued importance both of military power and of technology in producing such power. Thus, Ding Henggao, head of China's Commission on National Defense, Science, Technology and Industry, pointed out that: "The explosive growth of modern technology is having an increasingly profound impact on military affairs" [10] and that defense S&T (science and technology) "plays an irreplaceable role in boosting China's defense capability and comprehensive national strength." [11] Chinese leaders are convinced that military capabilities will play a decisive role in great power relations and that Japan, despite its relationship with the United States and domestic political and societal restraints on military activism, is well positioned to be a formidable military great power. Japan's military acquisition program makes clear that Japan "harbors a strong desire to play a bigger military role in the world." [12] Although Japan has not developed significant offensive capabilities, the steady increase in its defense budget since the late 1970s has produced a modern and formidable defense establishment. [13] Apart from the United States, Japan has more major warships than any other Asian country and any European member of NATO. It already deploys in Asia more submarines, escort ships and mine warfare units than the United States; indeed, after the U.S. Seventh Fleet completes its scheduled downsizing, Japan will have more major vessels in East Asia than the United States. Moreover, this is a new and modern navy, having been built in the last 15 years. Almost all of Japan's naval vessels are constructed and equipped with highly advanced technology, such as Aegis technology. Finally, Japan already possesses the technology to build, support, and manage aircraft carriers; it deployed aircraft carriers over 50 years ago during World War II. [14] Japan is also constructing an advanced air force. Based on the technology of the U.S. F-16C/D, Japan's FSX will be far superior to any aircraft that China can manufacture, and it will be at least as capable as any aircraft China can import from Russia or from anywhere else, but with the important advantage of domestic production. Japan is also purchasing Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft from the United States. Thus, Japan possesses or is developing advanced conventional naval and air capabilities based on weaponry and technology far superior to that which China possesses or can look forward to developing during the next decade. [15] Finally, China is concerned by Japan's determination to develop a sophisticated nuclear weapons program. Japan's interest in plutonium- based nuclear reactors and its advanced-technology civilian rocket program indicate Japanese possession of advanced strategic nuclear capability. One Chinese report noted Japanese stockpiling of plutonium and its acquisition of uranium enrichment, commenting that the only use of such minerals and technology is in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. It also observed that the capability of Tokyo's nuclear delivery systems rank Japan third, behind only the United States and Russia. [16] Tokyo has also been developing the technology to construct advanced non-strategic missile systems with various ranges and deployments. "Spin-ons" of Japanese civilian technology to military uses is an important source of potential Japanese strategic power. [17] This combination of Japanese economic resources and strategic potential creates heightened Chinese concern for Japan's future regional role. In many respects, Japan has the ability to "turn on a dime." Moreover, unlike policy-makers in the United States and other western countries, Chinese leaders give reduced weight to Japan's current reluctance to expand its military role in world affairs. While acknowledging that domestic opinion in Japan continues to restrain Tokyo's foreign policy options, Chinese leaders have a longer historical perspective on the role of domestic politics and culture on Japanese foreign policy. Japan's occupation of China during the 1930s and 1940s teaches that Japanese potential for domestic "militarism" can be as influential as "pacifism" and that such "militarism" can lead to regional instability with serious implications for Chinese security. Thus, as Chinese leaders look toward the 21st century, they must be concerned about Japanese intentions. Indeed, not too long ago most of the research analysts in China's Central Military Commission reportedly concluded that Japan will become a major military power and, in the context of continued Soviet weakness, that it will target its strategy and capabilities against China, "challenging China politically and militarily." [18] It is thus incumbent on Chinese leaders to develop a foreign policy toward Japan that consolidates the foundation of Sino-Japanese cooperation and that maximizes Tokyo's incentive to de-emphasize the military instruments of diplomacy. More China's Japan Policy: 1990s Introduction Japan, Multipolarity, and the 21st Century Consolidating Cooperation New Directions in Sino-Japanese Relations Managing a Changing Relationship Conclusion and Endnotes Back to Table of Contents China's Japan Policy: 1990s Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com