China's impact on Japan's China policy falls into three categories. The first is Beijing's strategic response to Japanese capabilities and the trend in the bilateral balance of power. The second is Beijing's response to immediate issues in the bilateral relationship and to emerging trends in Japan's China policy. The third category comprises those Chinese policies not necessarily aimed at Japan but which impact Japan's China policy, including policy toward third parties. In each case, the implications of Chinese policy for bilateral relations and Chinese policy alternatives need to be addressed. China's most fundamental and long-term policy response to the Japanese challenge is economic modernization and, specifically, defense modernization. Beijing cannot but look at Japan's technological and military superiority over China and the prospect that the gap might actually widen before it begins to narrow without considerable apprehension. From this perspective, Chinese leaders express their true intention when they insist that China needs a peaceful international environment in which to modernize its economy and develop the foundation of comprehensive national strength. [44] The longer China can focus its scarce domestic resources on economic modernization, the more secure it will be if and when heightened tension returns to East Asian politics. But, while laying the economic foundation for national security, Chinese leaders have also decided that they must begin the process of military modernization. To wait to acquire modern weaponry and reduce China's strategic vulnerability until the security situation requires it would ensure Chinese strategic inferiority when the weaponry is needed most. This is as true for nuclear weaponry as it is for conventional weaponry, insofar as the long-term survival of China's second-strike capability is in doubt. Ding Henggao made this point when explaining why China needs to modernize its defense capability: The grim reality is that in a world characterized by turbulent international politics and fierce competition in military high-tech, a nation that fails to work hard to raise its level of defense S&T and upgrade its defense capability ... would find itself in a vulnerable position once war breaks out, with devastating effects on its national interests, national dignity, and international prestige. [45] What most concerned Ding was the long way that China's defense capabilities had to go to meet world standards: China's defense S&T has come a long way but still trails the best in the world. To master modem technology, especially to meet the demands of high-tech war, we must overcome many hurdles, including the shortage of funds, technology, and qualified personnel .... the situation ... compels us to work hard for several years to bring our defense S&T and weaponry to a level to meet the needs of future high-tech war. [46] This strategic imperative drives China's increasing defense budget, purchases of foreign weaponry (including advanced Russian aircraft and naval vessels), and nuclear testing. Japan, as much as any other country, could become China's strategic rival, posing a daunting defense agenda for China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). But China's strategic response to vulnerability also contributes to Sino- Japanese friction, insofar as it elicits Japanese fears of a "China threat," and the prospect of transformed Japanese intentions, leading Japan to adopt those very policies that China is trying to prevent. Embedded in China's response to the imbalance in the Sino-Japanese relationship is the potential for a self-fulfilling prophesy. It is not clear how China's defense policy can ameliorate this dilemma. China's 1996 budget calls for a modest (when adjusted for the inflation rate) 10 percent increase in defense spending. [47] Nevertheless, as long as China's absolute defense budget continues to increase by double-digit figures and the PLA seeks foreign weaponry to correct its strategic vulnerability, China's defense modernization efforts will attract attention in Japan. This puts the burden of maintaining stable Sino-Japanese relations and Japanese confidence in Chinese intentions on Chinese diplomacy. It also requires that Chinese leaders manage Sino-Japanese conflicts of interest with sufficient subtlety both to protect Chinese interests and not elicit Japanese apprehension. China's response to the recent developments in Japanese foreign policy and China policy has been to place increased pressure on Japan to reconsider its policy priorities. Much of this pressure is reflected in greater Chinese media attention to the potential for renewed "militarism" in Japan and to worrisome developments in Japanese foreign policy. In the aftermath of the Chinese government crackdown of the Beijing democracy movement on June 4, 1989, Chinese scholars and journalists were instructed not to write negative reports about Japan. [48] In 1995, that restriction was lifted and the Chinese media began an active campaign against a wide range of Japanese behavior. Most prominent was Chinese media coverage of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, which relentlessly attacked the atrocities of the Japanese occupation of China and ominously warned of the potential for revived militarism in contemporary Japan. But perhaps more important was Chinese coverage of Japanese military capabilities. Until 1995, with the exception of commentary on the size of the defense budget, there was a clear restriction against any coverage of Japanese defense policy. In 1995, for the first time, Chinese analysts discussed Japan's military capabilities and its advanced weaponry, including its nuclear program. In so doing, China was not only signaling Japan its concern for trends in Japanese defense policy, but also the risk of heightened Sino-Japanese tension resulting from "China threat" charges and corresponding changes in Japanese defense policy. One Chinese report observed trends in Japanese defense policy and warned that the "situation in Japan is somewhat similar to that in pre-war Japan. What road will Japan take? This question definitely cannot be ignored." [49] Chinese use of the media is a convenient and low-profile approach to general trends in Japanese foreign policy. More difficult for Chinese diplomats to manage are specific Japanese policy initiatives. One such issue is the territorial dispute in Sino-Japanese relations. The Diaoyutai/Senkaku dispute has existed since 1949, yet both countries have preferred to keep the issue off the bilateral agenda. Ideally, China would ignore form and focus on substance regarding the dispute, or simply respond with similar legislation, which it will likely do in 1996. Yet sensitivity to sovereignty issues seems to combine with succession politics to compel a more active Chinese response. Thus, Beijing dispatched a drilling vessel to the disputed waters. Using its media, it also quietly sided with South Korea in its conflict with Japan over the disputed island of Tokto/Take, thus urging caution on Japanese handling of the Sino-Japanese dispute. [5] Nonetheless, these were low-key responses. They did not involve either military vessels or public recriminations requiring a Japanese response. Moreover, because Japan has minimal interest in developing the waters around the disputed islands, this should remain a manageable issue. [51] Another issue requiring a Chinese response is Japan's increasing desire to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It is clear that China is opposed to Japanese permanent membership on the committee. China clearly prefers the current situation, in which it has the advantage over Japan regarding Security Council deliberations over regional issues. Moreover, Beijing cannot look forward to the prospect of U.S.-Japan cooperation in the Security Council. Thus, China frequently asserts that it is not yet appropriate to consider Japanese permanent membership on the Security Council. One discussion of Security Council reform went so far as to assert that "it is absolutely impermissible to grant the veto to newly admitted permanent members. [52] Beijing should be able to manage this issue, as well. China has not drawn any lines in the sand and there remains a wide-ranging and inconclusive debate on UN reform, suggesting that the issue may linger for awhile and that Beijing will not have to take the lead in resisting far-reaching reform. Equally important, should an international consensus emerge that Japan should have permanent member status with the veto, Beijing would most likely not stand in the way. Similarly, China appears to have acquiesced to growing Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping activities, despite the implications for Japanese receptivity to the use of military instruments in diplomacy. [53] Chinese leaders seem intent on preventing bilateral issues from disrupting Sino-Japanese cooperation. Although China continues to modernize the PLA, refuses to move off long-held positions (such as sovereignty over disputed territories and Japanese membership on the UN Security Council), and warns of the consequences of revived Japanese "militarism," it has maintained a low-profile on Sino-Japanese disputes. There is evidence that China understands the risks entailed in an overly contentious Japan policy. But what is less clear is whether China can manage the consequences for Sino-Japanese relations of third party issues and nonforeign policy issues. The factors affecting Japan's China policy are not limited to Chinese policy toward Japan and Chinese defense policy. China's mere size and proximity to Japan ensures that various aspects of Chinese politics and foreign policy will be contentious issues in Japanese politics and that Japanese policymaking will reflect the political considerations of Japanese leaders contending for power in an uncertain electoral environment. Moreover, many of these issues are not readily amenable to Chinese diplomatic management. China's human rights policies could destabilize Sino-Japanese relations. Renewed violent repression of dissent in China in the post- Deng period or even simply excessive authoritarian policies in Hong Kong after 1997 would likely elicit far greater public outcry and political and policy repercussions in Japan than did the June 4th tragedy. The Japanese public is increasingly disinclined to be tolerant of Chinese human rights violations, and Japanese politicians are increasingly disinclined to ignore voter sentiment in policymaking. Chinese conflict with third parties will also affect Japanese attitudes toward China. Taiwan's foreign policy and U.S. policy toward Taiwan, themselves susceptible to recurring domestic instability in all three parties, may well determine the trend in cross-Straits relations, eliciting additional mainland-Taiwan crises which could undermine support in Japan for cooperative relations with China and for restraint in Japanese defense policy. Insofar as Taiwan is the mainland's most important foreign policy issue, it will be difficult for Chinese leaders to moderate policy toward Taiwan to maintain cooperative relations with Japan. Should U.S.-China relations deteriorate due to heightened conflict over any of the numerous conflicts of interest in U.S.-China relations, Japan will come under increased pressure to cooperate with U.S. policy and to contribute to American efforts to "contain" China. Yet, U.S.-China relations are equally unpredictable and potentially unmanageable, influenced as much by American domestic politics, third party issues, and U.S. policy on a wide range of bilateral conflicts of interests as by Chinese behavior. Equally troublesome for Sino- Japanese relations could be conflict between China and the other claimants to the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Insofar as heightened conflict would suggest Chinese expansionism along the shipping lanes to Persian Gulf oil, support would likely grow in Japan for greater strategic cooperation with the United States. On the other hand, enhanced cooperation between China and third parties, which China does have considerable ability to control, could also influence Sino-Japanese relations. Of particular importance is Sino-Russian relations. The combination of potential Sino-Japanese conflict with ongoing Japanese-Russian rancor over the Northern Territories and lack of economic cooperation prepares Japan to see "collusion" in Sino-Russian relations. In this respect, Beijing must be sensitive to the effect of growing cooperation between China and Russia, including Russian arms sales to China and close ties between the civilian and military leaderships, on Japanese policymaking. Although less strategically prominent and of less immediate importance, Sino-South Korean cooperation has a similar potential to arouse anxiety in Japan. China and South Korea share distrust of Japanese "militarism" and for the trend in Japanese defense procurement policies. Beijing's decision to side subtlely with Seoul in its territorial dispute with Tokyo suggests that Beijing is aware of Japanese concern and that it is willing to insinuate greater Chinese-South Korean cooperation to pressure Japan to consider Chinese interests. Yet, incautious Chinese cooperation with South Korea could spur Japan to adopt strategic measures detrimental to Chinese security and Sino-Japanese cooperation. China can draw comfort from its cooperative political relationships with Russia and South Korea, but it must manage these relationships so as not to harm its equally important interest in Sino- Japanese cooperation. The danger in all of these potential developments is that Chinese policy on domestic or third party issues could elicit the very Japanese foreign policy that Beijing's bilateral Japan policy attempts to forestall. Yet, policymaking on all of these issues has its own domestic and bilateral dynamic. It requires policy-making sophistication and domestic political confidence to consider the multitude of crosscutting interests involved in "grand strategy" when making policy on such intrinsically important and politically sensitive issues as Taiwan, Hong Kong, human rights, Spratly Islands, U.S.-China relations and Sino-Russian relations. Moreover, many of these issues, such as the Taiwan issue and repressing domestic dissent, entail interests which Chinese leaders consider more important than stable bilateral relations with Japan and which entail a mixture of sovereignty and succession politics, thus reducing Beijing's incentive to consider the implications for Sino- Japanese relations of policy toward these interests. But whether Beijing is simply reacting or taking the initiative, its policy on any of these issues could derail Sino-Japanese cooperation. More China's Japan Policy: 1990s Introduction Japan, Multipolarity, and the 21st Century Consolidating Cooperation New Directions in Sino-Japanese Relations Managing a Changing Relationship Conclusion and Endnotes Back to Table of Contents China's Japan Policy: 1990s Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 1995 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com