Franco-German Security Accommodation

To Integrate or Not To Integrate

by Johnsen and Young

What Was the Question?

Defining and working to achieve a European security structure, therefore, has not been a neat exercise in logical policy making. Uncertainties over the future role and mission of the United States in Europe and the evident lack of consensus within the EC as to how political and defense areas should evolve have led understandably to a confusing state of affairs. Clearly, France and the Federal Republic need to be more open in their efforts to create European security structures, if for no other reason than to garner greater consensus among their EC and American partners. [56]

If not, countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, already suspicious of French and German motives in the security sphere, are unlikely to support any initiative that would risk diminishing NATO or alienating the United States.

Therefore, as European political and security affairs continue their confused evolution, how will France and Germany orient their policy to achieve the illusive goal of a European Defense Identity? While events and proposals will change with the times, a number of constants can be discerned. First, both France and Germany will continue to use "Europe" (however "defined" at the moment) as a vehicle to maintain close bilateral ties. Both countries have vital interests in maintaining this marriage of historic and geographic necessity. Second, whenever political and economic integration become stalled, the security "option" as a modality to maintain or further closer relations, or, at least, give the appearance of tighter bonds, will likely be used (e.g., the Eurocorps).

Finally, the easy options for European integration have long ago been adopted. Future options (e.g., monetary union, political union, defense identity) strike at the very heart of the concept of state sovereignty and are issues that many states are loath of compromise. While France and the Federal Republic may have national reasons to press ahead toward a still undefined European future, many other EC partners are unlikely to acquiesce. Hence, while officially denied and opposed by many in the EC, the "two-track," or "Europe ala Carte" option [57] for the EC may very well become the only viable alternative to meeting the objectives of EC members and other European states wishing admittance into the Community.

This issue lies at the crux of the future European Defense Identity, as well. Europe must reach agreement on the overarching concepts of political union before coherent policies on its European Defense Identity can be hammered out. If nations adopt the all or none approach to integration, it is unlikely that a political agreement will be reached. Thus, a rational defense structure will be difficult to fashion. On the other hand, the "Europe a la Carte" approach offers considerable flexibility and permits a gradual evolution of the political, and hence security, system.

Conversely, adoption of the all or none approach to political union will adversely affect the development of the European Defense Identity. Because nations are unlikely to agree quickly on such politically sensitive issues, the Franco-German imperative to foster the appearance of continued deepening of integration may drive nations to tinker with the security sphere before they agree on the political bases necessary to underwrite defense policy have been agreed. Such conditions argue for increasing confusion and frustrations over defense and security issues that would only complicate the process of political integration, as evidenced in the recent historical example of the Eurocorps.

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