by Johnsen and Young
In and of itself, the establishment of the European Economic Community represented a significant historical achievement. More recently, members of the European Community (EC) have expressed an intent to build a more comprehensive foundation of European unity that looks toward complete economic union. Moreover, these nations seek a European political union that will further expand European integration. Naturally, discussions concerning political union have generated considerable dialogue over closer integration of security and defense policies. Progress toward these goals initially appeared to be
accelerating. The Single Economic Act (signed in July 1987), one
of European Commission President Jacques Delors' greatest
accomplishments, was implemented in principle on January 1,
1993. At the December 1991 Maastricht summit, the EC heads of
government agreed to the "Draft Treaty on Political Union" that laid
out the planned European political union.
[1]
Nor has cooperation been limited to economic and political
issues. At Maastricht, the EC heads of government also agreed to
the goal of establishing a common defense policy and the
development of the Western European Union (WEU) "...as the
defense component of the European Union..." [2]
Moreover, in May 1992 at their summit in La Rochelle,
President Mitterrand and Federal Chancellor Kohl formally
announced the creation of a joint multinational corps, which, in
time, could include other European participants. [3]
To many observers and officials, the combination of these
events indicated that the long elusive objective of European
integration appeared to be close at hand.
But events have proven otherwise as EC politics have
become rather messy, not to mention complicated, of late.
[4]
For example, prior to the Danish referendum on the
Maastricht Treaty in May 1992, the path toward greater
Western European integration appeared clearly set.
However, the [5] Danish electorate
rejected the Maastricht draft treaty in June.
This rejection, in the words of Daniel Vernet, Foreign
Editor of Le Monde, "...has brought into the open in many
European countries a situation their governments had been
trying to pretend did not exist: a crisis in foreign policy..."
[6]
Shortly thereafter, when President Mitterrand placed
the Maastricht Treaty before the French electorate, it passed
only by the narrowest of margins (50.95 to 49.05 percent).
[7]
Even the much vaunted Single Market may well not
function in practice (e.g., due to lack of consumer confidence
in product quality and efficiency), despite the implementation
of all the necessary legal instruments. [8] And, high German interest
rates (due to the ever escalating costs of unification) and low
British interest rates (to stimulate a lagging economy),
combined to force Britain and Italy out of the EC's Exchange
Rate Mechanism in September. [9]
Finally, the EC's inability to achieve consensus
on a means to halt the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia
underscored the difficulties inherent in crafting common
security and defense policies.
The obstacles to full implementation of these policies
raises the question: Where does European integration,
particularly in the realm of security, go from this inauspicious
point? This is not merely a rhetorical consideration, nor is the
outcome without implications for the United States. Since the
1950s, Western European political stability, consistency in
general political outlook, and impressive economic growth
have been, in large part, the result of European integration.
These conditions have supported U.S. interests in Europe in
the past and, undoubtedly, Washington will continue to have
a vital stake in the maintenance of stability in Europe. At the
same time, confusion over the future course of European
integration has had, and will continue to have, a direct impact
on U.S. and Western European efforts to reform its
integrated defense institutions to meet the new challenges of
post-cold war European security.
How the EC will overcome this recent rash of highly
publicized setbacks and reinvigorate its efforts to realize the
goal of European Union are open to question. However, what
one can contemplate with a high degree of certainty is that
Paris and Bonn will be at the heart of efforts to resolve these
dilemmas. The Paris-Bonn relationship has been the engine
that has driven greater European integration since the late
1950s and has provided a proven means to overcome the
long history of Franco-German conflict and discord. Yet, the
interesting, and exceedingly confusing aspect of this Franco-
German accommodation is the fact that the political necessity
to maintain the appearance of consensus on their overriding
objective of greater integration oftentimes papers over
fundamental differences on exactly how European Union is to
be achieved. Thus, the perception of agreement, particularly
when there is discord, remains a constant element of their
bilateral relationship.
This study analyzes the political aspects of this
important bilateral relationship, particularly in reference to its
implications for defense integration. Given space limitations,
the study focuses on the implications of Franco-German
relations on bilateral defense cooperation. While
acknowledging that political and economic integration are
critical to overall European integration, assessing security
cooperation is important for three crucial reasons. First,
efforts to expand bilateral defense cooperation have long
been a convenient vehicle to manifest publicly heightened
levels of cooperation during periods of discord in the
political and economic sphere. Second, despite the past
record of using defense cooperation to maintain momentum
in overall European integration, disagreements over the
particulars of security policy are currently running high. And,
third, the potential emergence of a true European defense
identity has become a major point of contention in
Washington's attempt to redefine the U.S. role and mission in
a post-cold war Europe.
More Franco-German Security Accommodation
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