Defined, Redefined, Undefined If striving to create closer political structures in the EC that are mutually acceptable to all member states were not complicated enough, trying to reach accord on European security structures has been even more challenging. No matter how EC countries contemplate future European security integration, the relationship between the United States and NATO must be addressed. With the significant exception of France (arguably based on interpretation, vice stated French policy), all EC states are convinced that NATO and the United States must continue to play a key leadership role in the maintenance of security and stability in Europe. Moreover, French reasoning behind their dissent from this consensus flows from an unusual, if not deterministic, rationale. As Claire Trean of Le Monde explains, France's current position toward NATO is based on two key assumptions. First, the United States is in the process of withdrawing from Europe and, therefore, the EC requires unified security structures to face an uncertain future. Second, it is simply inconceivable that the EC countries can discuss effecting political union without making provisions for creating an independent military capability. [22] This reasoning does not imply, however, that France favors the dissolution of NATO or the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Europe. On the contrary, French policy has long supported the political existence of NATO and a U.S. military presence in Europe. [23] French cooperation over the years and into the future is evident in many areas. [24] But French policy is currently at odds with NATO on two key points. First, the French believe NATO should be led not by "les anglo-saxons," but by the "Europeans" (read: "les francais"). Second, NATO should not enter into new activities which might detract from its most important mission, collective defense. [25] Thus, from this aspect, one can better understand French opposition to either the establishment in December 1991 of NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council and its mission of consulting with NATO's former Warsaw Pact adversaries, [26] or the expansion of NATO's mandate to include supporting humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. [27] Problem with Current French Policy The problem with current French policy toward NATO is twofold. First, as German commentator Guenther Nonnenmacher notes, "One has the impression that the French government thinks that relations between NATO and the EC are defined in the context of a zero-sum game. This is, perhaps, a fundamental error." [28] Second, according to French commentator Pierre Lellouche, French policy does not adequately support French national interests and fails to comprehend the changing European security system. [29] For example, it is incongruous for France to maintain an independent national defense policy while promoting increased European security integration and coaxing allies to expand defense integration. The apparent confusion within the French government concerning NATO compounds these discrepancies. This confusion stems in large part from the nature of the Fifth Republic, where the President exercises de facto control over foreign and defense policies. [30] Officials in the French military and Ministry of Defense have long endorsed closer ties with NATO, however, the Elysee (Presidential Palace) and, particularly, the Quai d'Orsay (Foreign Office) have opposed strengthened ties. In November 1991, for instance, Minister of Defense Pierre Joxe stated that French policy would seek to remove the ambiguity in France's relationship with NATO. The Elysee subsequently denied that Joxe's statement marked a change in French policy. [31] In more recent speeches both Joxe (to an official gathering of international security experts in Paris) [32] and Prime Minister Pierre Beregovoy [33] called for a greater degree of French participation in NATO consultative bodies. But again, the Elysee remarked that French policy had not changed. [34] Given the considerable ambiguity in French policy, it should be no surprise that despite the supposed close integration of Franco-German policies regarding European security integration, conflicts sometime occur. German officials continue to argue on a number of points that NATO must be maintained as a stabilizing influence in Europe, and, most importantly, a legitimizing vehicle for a continued U.S. military presence in Europe. [35] First, if for no other reason, a strong NATO and continued U.S. presence in Europe eases acceptance of Germany within an integrated Europe. Second, the NATO and U.S. nuclear guarantee, so long dismissed by France, allows the Federal Republic to continue to abjure obtaining nuclear weapons. [36] Third, German defense planning acknowledges that the Bundeswehr will have serious structural and capability limitations for many years to come, not the least of which are in the area of operational control structures. Thus, NATO and U.S. capabilities can compensate for German shortcomings. Finally, even the economically powerful Germans realize that it is simply financially unfeasible to expect the members of the Western European Union (the organization designated to become the security organization of the EC), to duplicate structures that already exist in NATO. [37] Despite being at odds with Paris over details of European integration, Bonn does not see any contradictions in its approach to supporting both the continuation of NATO and the creation of a European Defense Identity. This same opinion is not necessarily held by some in Washington who view recent Franco-German efforts, particularly the Eurocorps, with a great deal of suspicion. As a result, while Bonn, Paris, and their European allies have been discussing the creation of European security structures, apprehensive U.S. officials have been issuing d6marches criticizing the Franco-German initiative. These critiques stem largely from concerns that such initiatives will negatively affect NATO, the organization that gives Washington both an institutional pied a terre and leadership role in Europe. [38] Indeed, nowhere is the U.S. concern over the future course of the European Defense Identity or confusion over policy more evident than in the proposed Franco-German Eurocorps. Since Mitterrand and Kohl announced the initiative following their October 1991 summit in Lille, the Eurocorps has symbolized the Franco- German preoccupation with being seen in agreement in principle even when they diverge on details. Subsequent to the announcement of this formation, German officials have taken great pains to affirm that the proposed Eurocorps would not exclude NATO and that Bundeswehr contributions (all of three brigades and German contributions to the Franco-German Brigade) [39] will remain dual-hatted under NATO. Moreover, the Eurocorps will be available for NATO contingencies and will fall under NATO operational control. [40] The French position has ranged from the predictable "Quai d'Orsay' gloating that the Eurocorps represents the first step toward creating a true European defense structure outside of U.S. meddling, to more moderate voices, such as Joxe, who has long argued that the corps will fall under NATO command in the case of aggression. [41] Notwithstanding these contradictions in approach, Paris and Bonn have good reasons to propose this structure. From the French perspective, the creation of such a corps, based in Strasbourg, France, lends legitimacy to the continued stationing of the 1 st French Armored Division in Germany. This issue takes on added importance in the wake of Mitterrand's faux pas following the London Summit in 1990, where he speculated in public (apparently without consulting the Germans and after German officials had signalled they wanted French forces to remain on German soil) the total withdrawal of French forces from Germany. [42] Moreover, as a multinational European formation, the Eurocorps conforms to the Alliance's New Strategic Concept that recognizes future military contributions to NATO will be based on such multinational units. [43] For the Federal Republic, participation in such a formation is even more important. Given the strong pacifist feelings in Germany, a "European" body, detached from NATO and the United States, offers a strong legitimizing rationale to support the commitment of German forces in military operations outside the now tranquil Central Region. [44] For example, such a multinational formation could simplify German participation in LIN humanitarian or peacekeeping operations. Or, integration in the Eurocorps could be used to legitimate German participation in so-called "out of area" operations under the auspices of the WEU. Finally, the political left in Germany recognizes that cooperation in the Eurocorps reinforces the close political relations with France, a relationship the Social Democrats see as key to binding the Federal Republic to integrated Europe. Wider acceptance of the proposed corps centers around three principal sticking points. First, many of France's and Germany's European allies have expressed reservations that the corps could encourage American estrangement from Europe at- exactly the time it is least desired. For example, Britain's predictable opposition to this "European" initiative has found unwavering support from Italy and the Netherlands. [45] Second, while the Germans and French have averred that the corps would fall under NATO operational command and control in a time of crisis, exact conditions and circumstances have not been articulated. For example, the corps itself was initially presented by its supporters as a "European" military force, but with little explanation of the conditions under which political organization it would fall (i.e., EC, WEU, NATO?). [46] Clarification of operational command arrangements of the Eurocorps had to wait until the end of November 1992 following protracted negotiations at the Franco-German working group level. As of November 1992, the French and Germans have agreed, in principle, to the subordination of the Eurocorps to NATO. The exact details of the conditions and command arrangements remain to be negotiated between France, the Federal Republic and the Supreme Allied Command, Europe. [47] Third, should control of the corps pass to NATO, the French are not part of NATO's integrated military structure. This condition is no small matter since numerous interoperability problems could hinder close cooperation at the tactical and operational level. Moreover, considerable confusion exists within the French government surrounding the issue of "foreign" command of French forces which traditionally has been a politically sensitive issue in France. [48] Finally, Washington's reaction to the Eurocorps has been negative and confusing. Shortly after Kohl's and Mitterrand's announcement of the creation of the Eurocorps in May 1992, for instance, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, William H. Taft IV, stated that "Undermining the alliance's integrated military structure in the uncertain process of developing a European security identity would be the height of folly," without explaining how the Eurocorps might contribute to such a dire result. [49] Yet, at the same time, U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney stated that the United States would not object to the corps as long as it were subject to NATO. [50] This small episode manifests a larger problem; that is, the United States must come to terms with an eventual European Defense Identity. Nowhere is the contradiction in U.S. attitudes better summarized [51] than by Jenonne Walker: ... successive administrations have voiced support for European political as well as economic union, but also objected vehemently when European discussed security issues 'behind Washington's back.' Once some form of EC unity on security issues seemed possible, the U.S. tried to straddle that contradiction by a misguided focus on the organization charts so dear to bureaucratic hearts (e.g., opposition to a formal EC-WEU link) and by ultimately futile efforts to pin down allied agreement on the precise roles and responsibilities of NATO and the EC, including what could and could not be discussed outside of NATO. Moreover, Washington's strenuous objections to Germany over the Eurocorps, in particular, and the European Defense Identity, in general, have placed Germany in a most uncomfortable position. In short, Germany is caught in the middle between its two principal allies. On the one hand, the Germans must address considerable U.S concerns over the European Defense Identity, particularly perceptions that Franco-German initiatives may undercut NATO; ensure the retention of a U.S. military presence in Germany; and maintain the close relationship that has been carefully cultivated over the past 40 plus years. These concerns have resulted in the Germans taking steps to calm the United States that pull Germany away from France. On the other hand, the Germans must also satisfy their French allies. And, because of Franco-German differences over the details of implementing European integration and Bonn's craving to soothe French fears, Bonn is being pulled toward Paris. But, public comments made by otherwise reasonable French officials on the eve of the French referendum on Maastricht (e.g., Michel Rocard: the treaty must be ratified to save Germany from its "demons") have infuriated German officials. [52] That said, the truly historic rapprochement achieved since the 1950s between France and Germany means no government in Bonn would be willing to sacrifice its special relationship with Paris. [53] Thus, German policy appears to be all things to all people and, therefore, fully satisfies no one. But, so long as France and the United States largely define security arrangements in zero-sum terms, German policies will remain dominated by the need to play the "balancer" between its two principal allies, [54] and observers will likely continue to see mixed signals from Bonn. Thus, placing Bonn in a position where it must choose between Washington/NATO and Paris/European Defense Identity, therefore, is simply counterproductive. [55] If Washington continues to reduce its forces in Europe, and particularly in Germany, U.S. policy will be increasingly viewed as hypocritical. "Sniping" at the proposed creation of the European Defense Identity, while reducing forward deployed U.S. forces, will only erode support for U.S. policy issues in Europe (e.g., support of NATO). In sum, U.S. interests in the Federal Republic will suffer if the Germans perceive that the United States opposes effective European integration. More Franco-German Security Accommodation Introduction Paris's and Bonn's Conflicting Vision of "Europe" European Defense Identity To Integrate or Not To Integrate Implications for Washington Back to Table of Contents Franco-German Security Accommodation Back to SSI List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by US Army War College. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com