Franco-German Security Accommodation

Implications for Washington

by Johnsen and Young

"Europe" Calling

Despite the fits and starts of European integration and resulting frustrations, the United States must actively support the integration process. Put simply, the process will go forward whether the United States likes it or not. Therefore, from even a narrow assessment of U.S. interests in Europe, it is more profitable for our European allies to see a cooperative United States. Moreover, active U.S. support can be translated into future participation in an integrated Europe that will still allow the United States to make its voice heard. Opposition to European integration, whether overt or subtle, only risks U.S. exclusion from European decision-making bodies. And, after all, surely one of the most important interests Washington has regarding Western European security is for its European allies to maintain as much force structure as possible. If "justification" of forces require the creation of a "European corps," clearly the value of maintaining these forces in-being overrides the predicable ambiguity in any ensuing command and operational control arrangements.

One also should not forget that stability in Western Europe has been a long-standing U.S. interest, and increasing European integration over the past four decades has served that end quite successfully. Given the potential for instability in Central and Eastern Europe, the increased integration of Western Europe can only contribute to a larger, more stable Europe. Thus, support of integration initiatives in Western Europe will further overall U.S. interests in that critical region.

Similar logic applies to U.S. support of the European Defense Identity. Again, a defense identity will emerge with or without U.S. blessing. If the United States desires to exert positive influence over the development of the European Defense Identity, then it behooves the United States to provide de facto support to bolster its long held declaratory policy of support. Carping from the sidelines about the details of the emerging security identity will only alienate key allies and damage long-term U.S. interests in the region. If the United States is to influence the development in ways that support U.S. interests (or at least does not harm them), then the United States must support the efforts of its European allies to establish a coherent and capable defense identity.

Nor should the formation of the Eurocorps overly concern the United States. First, the small numbers of units presently envisaged in the Franco-German corps are not significant. Second, the Germans and the French have agreed that the corps will serve under NATO operational control in time of crisis, [58] albeit details remain to be resolved.

Third, regardless of the eventual size and scope of the Eurocorps, U.S. assistance will still be required to provide capabilities that the Europeans lack (e.g., airlift, intelligence, etc). Thus, the United States will likely be involved with planning and execution and will be able to influence both activities.

Fourth, the full establishment of this organization will require substantial time, and events will undoubtedly result in considerable fits and starts that will shape future developments. It makes little sense to expend significant political capital now to influence a concept that may be considerably altered by future events-perhaps in directions the United States desires.

Finally, the United States needs to keep the issue of European integration in perspective. The intent behind European integration is not to freeze out the United States. To the contrary, Europeans recognize the importance of keeping the United States engaged in Europe. European integration is about promoting European stability in general, and, in particular, putting an end to Franco-German animosities that have frequently overturned that stability. The United States must not get caught up in architectures or wiring diagrams and lose sight of the critical issue of promoting European integration to sustain the stability gained at such tremendous cost.

Endnotes

[1] See, The Washington Post, December 12, 1991.
[2] Paragraph 2, Annex V, "Draft Treaty on European Union," December 10, 1991. A copy of the treaty text may be found in EUROPE (Brussels), December 13, 1991, pp. 1-28.
[3] Mitterrand and Kohl originally raised the possibility of the Eurocorps in a footnote to the summit communique of their October 1991 meeting in Lille. For background and analysis on the creation of the Eurocorps see, Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Ein Spaltpilz fuer das Atlantische Buendnis? Das deutsch- franzoesische 'Eurokorps."' Europa-Archiv, Volume 45, Nos. 15-16, August 25, 1992, pp. 445-452.
[4] The International Herald Tribune (Paris), September 15, 1992.
[5] See, The Washington Post, June 2, 1992.
[6] See, Daniel Vernet, "The Dilemma of French Foreign Policy," International Affairs (London), Volume 68, No. 4, 1992, p. 655.
[7] For Mitterrand's motivations see, The New York Times International ed.), June 7, 1992. For the outcome of the vote and commentary, see The Washington Post, September 21, 1992.
[8] See, Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Muenchen), October 29, 1992, for a report of an EC-sponsored study by a group of experts, led by former Irish EC Commissioner Peter Sutherland, pointing out the many shortcomings in the Single Market.
[9] For a concise overview of the currency crisis see either "Europe in Pieces," Newsweek, September 28,1992, pp. 24-26, or Adam Zagorin, "On Each Other's Nerves," Time, September 28, 1992, pp. 41-42. For a day-to-day account of the economic issues, see Financial Times (London) during the period immediately following September 14, 1992. For blow-by-blow accounts of political fallout from the currency crisis, see Times (London) during the period September 16-24, 1992.
[10] See, The Washington Post, October, 1, 1992.
[11] Albeit dated by contemporary standards, a good assessment of French defense policy is found in David S. Yost, France and Conventional Defense in Central Europe, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.
[12] See, Vernet, p. 658.
[13] For an excellent assessment of current Franco-German affairs, see Peter Schmidt, "In the Midst of Change: The Special Franco-German Security Relationship in the 1990s," unpublished paper, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, FRG, August, 1992.
[14] See, Jenonne Walker, Fact and Fiction about a European Security Identity and American Interests, Occasional Paper Series, Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 1992, p. 7.
[15] Quoted by Theo Sommer in Die Zeit (Hamburg), June 12, 1992.
[16] See, Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe," in The New Germany and the NewEurope, ed., by Paul B. Stares, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute, 1992, p. 266.
[17] For an excellent analysis on this point see, Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Toward a New European Political Economy," in, Stares, ed., The New Germany and the New Europe, pp. 189-193.
[18] See Theo Summer's excellent commentary on this point in, Die Zeit (Hamburg), June 12, 1992.
[19] See, Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 29, 1992, pp. 1-2 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FB/S)-WEU-92-190, September 30,1992, pp. 11 - 12; and, Der Spiegel (Hamburg), September 28,1992, pp. 18-23.
[20] See, The European (London), September 24-27,1992.
[21] It is interesting to note that despite French and German efforts to create common European security arrangements, there has been an increasing lack of consensus among EC member states over foreign policy issues, if measured by, for instance, their stance in the U.N. General Assembly. One source cites a significant decrease in uniformity on EC members' voting on General Assembly resolutions; from a 65.3 percent conformity in 1975, to 44.2 percent in 1990. "If the Europeans are keen to give the Community an army as if it were a 19th-century state writ large, then the first step would have to be a foreign policy made and implemented in common." See, David Buchan's article in, The Financial Times (London), October 18, 1992.
[22] See, Le Monde (Paris), June 23, 1992.
[23] For background on this subject see, David S. Yost, "France and West European Defence Identity," Survival, Volume 33, No. 4, July-August 1991, pp. 327-351.
[24] For example, according to Jacques Isnard, France has agreed to examine the possibility of participating in a NATO air operations network. See, Le Monde (Paris), June 27,1992.
[25] See, Claire Trean's essay in, Le Monde (Paris), June 6, 1992.
[26] See, "North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation," Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, Press Communique M-NACC-1 (91)111 (Rev), December 1991.
[27] See, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, Norway," Press Communique M-NAC-1(92)51, Bruxelles, NATO Press Service, June 4, 1992.
[28] Nonnenmacher is the chief of the foreign affairs section of the Frankfurter Allgemeine. This particular quotation is taken from an article he penned for Le Monde (Paris), June 23, 1992.
[29] See part two of a three part series by Lellouche on France and NATO in, Le Figaro (Paris), July 22, 1992.
[30] See, David S. Yost, "Mitterrand and Defense and Security Policy," French Politics and Society, Volume 9, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Fall 1991, pp. 141-158.
[31] See, Le Monde (Paris), November 10-11, 1991.
[32] See, Le Monde (Paris), September 30, 1992.
[33] See, Le Monde (Paris), September 6-7, 1992.
[34] For a short, but excellent assessment of this issue see, The Economist (London), October 3, 1992, p. 34.
[35] For a recent example, see The Washington Times, November 7, 1992.
[36] For an interesting contemporary German perspective on alliance nuclear strategy see, Holger H. Mey und Michael Ruehle, "Deutsche Sicherheitsinteressen und Nuklearstrategie der NATO," Aussenpolitik, Volume 42, No. 1, 1991, pp. 21-31.
[37] For background on German defense policy see Thomas-Durell Young, The Normalization of the Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1992; and, Wolfgang F. Schloer, "German Security Policy," Adelphi Paper, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, forthcoming.
[38] See, Amand Menon, et al., "A Common European Defence," Survival, Volume 34, No. 3, Autumn 1992, particularly p. 105.
[39] See, Frankfurter Allgemeine, December 16, 1992.
[40] See Federal Defense Minister Volker Ruehe's comments following the La Rochelle Summit in Handelsblatt (Duesseldorf), May 27, 1992 in FB/S-WEU-92-105, June 1, 1992, p. 15.
[41] See, Le Monde (Paris), June 19,1992; and, Frankfurter Allgemeine, June 22, 1992.
[42] See Le Monde (Paris), July 8-9, 1990, p 5 in FB/S-WEU-92-131, July 9, 1992, p. 1.
[43] "Integrate and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies'ability to work together in the common defence." See, "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," Rome, November 7-8, 1991, Press Communique S-1 (91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991, para 54.
[44] See comments attributed to CDU/CSU Faction spokesman on foreign policy in Guenther M. Wiedemann's article in Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, May 22, 1992.
[45] For examples of British, Italian, and Dutch criticisms of Eurocorps, see The London Financial Times, June 15, 1992; Stefano Silvestri's article in Mondo Economico, May 30,1992, pp. 44-45 in FB/S-WEU-92-118, June 18, 1992, pp. 4-5; and, AFP (Paris), May 21, 1992 in FB/S-WEU-92-099, May 21, 1992, p. 27.
[46] For example, at La Rochelle, French Presidential spokesman, Jean Musitelli noted that the corps would be open for membership to all members of the WEU and that the forces would defend NATO territory. See, AFP (Paris), May 21, 1992, in FB/S-WEU-92-099, May 21, 1992, p. 27. Recent discussion within the EC and WEU that the WEU will evolve as the defense arm of the EC further complicates the issue. For elaboration on the WEU's role as the defense arm of the EC, see "Petersberg Declaration of the Western European Union," Information letter from the Assembly of the Western European Union, No. 12, July 1992, pp. 12-13.
[47] See, The New York Times, December 1, 1992.
[48] French participation in the recent Gulf War provides the most recent example. To be fair, the command and control difficulties were predominantly at the political, not military levels. For background on command and control of coalition forces during the Gulf War, see Thomas-Durell Young, "Preparing the Alliance for the Next Out of Area Campaign," Naval War College Review, Volume 45, No. 3, Summer 1992, pp. 32-36.
[49] See, The Washington Post, May 23, 1992.
[50] See, Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), May 21, 1992 in, FB/S-WEU-92-1 00, May 22, 1992, p. 6.
[51] See, Walker, p. 12.
[52] See, William Drozdiak's piece in, The Washington Post, September 1, 1992.
[53] See Holger Mey's excellent essay on this point in Europaeische Sicherheit (Herford), July 1992, p. 369.
[54] See, The Washington Post, June 27, 1992.
[55] For a concise discussion of the various sides of this issue, see, Frederick Kempe article, "U.S.-Bonn Clash Over Pact with France," The Wall Street Journal (New York), May 27, 1992.
[56] The lack of information on the Eurocorps made available to France's and Germany's allies can only be assessed as having been appalling. See, The Times (London), June 27, 1992.
[57] "Europe ci la Carte would allow countries to choose from a menu that offers differentiated degrees of integration within various policy areas .... As long as the concept of L'Europe ij la Carte is understood as a menu of transitional options, it may well be an ingenious response to the multiple challenges that Europe faces-in particular to the dual pressure of widening and deepening." See, Reinicke, The New Germany and the New Europe, p. 208.
[58] See, Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), November 29, 1992.

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