Franco-German Security Accommodation

Paris's and Bonn's
Conflicting Vision of "Europe"

by Johnsen and Young

To grasp the full implications of European Defense Integration, one must first understand the political background, goals, and differences in Franco-German external policy. In the insightful words of Jim Hoagland, a noted observer of European affairs, European integration has had much more to do with overcoming the historic Franco-German conflict, than any other issue. [10]

Indeed, the slow (but not to be underestimated) progress toward fuller European integration has been largely a product of Paris and Bonn enmeshing themselves within supranational European organizations to overcome their history of bloody conflict.

Long-standing French policy has been to oppose any move by the Federal Republic to establish a national foreign or defense policy. At the same time, these policies have enabled Paris to effect a long-term rapprochement with Bonn, while simultaneously allowing France the luxury of being the only European member of NATO to pursue an independent defense policy. [11] This latter condition also provided France with considerable independence and flexibility in its diplomacy.

This unique process of working toward historical rapprochement remained constant until the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, when the unification of Germany considerably complicated the integration process. Indeed, a large part of the current difficulty in reaching agreement on new European political and security architectures within the EC is a result of Europe coming to terms with the newly unified Germany. To comprehend better these difficulties, an understanding of French and German expectations of European integration is essential.

The unification of Germany shattered many of Paris's comfortable assumptions of European integration. The French are now unsure whether the Germans are still suitably enmeshed in the EC and, if they are not, Paris may lose the considerable influence and flexibility it previously enjoyed. In the words of Daniel Vernet, "...all of us... are afflicted with the 'German obsession.' [12]

In short, the French are concerned about a Germany of over 80 million that will possess an economy--once the eastern Laender have been rebuilt-that will dominate Europe.

In fact, German unification has already reduced the heretofore politely-accepted myth of French political leadership in the EC and altered the leading French role in the Franco-German relationship. Fearing an eastward-oriented united Germany, or, worse, a Germany "that goes it alone," Paris moved quickly after German unification to tie Bonn firmly to Europe through economic, political and security linkages. Hence, the relatively quick, by EC standards, move to write and seek ratification of the Draft Treaty on Political Union. Mitterrand and Kohl's surprise announcement at Lille in October 1991 to form a Franco-German sponsored European Corps established a similar linkage in the security arena. [13]

Just as Frenchmen are "obsessed" with a unified Germany, so, too, is Bonn fixated on France. Simply stated, in German eyes, France has long held the key to German acceptance into the polite company of Western European society. Germany's leadership will go to great lengths, even to the extent of occasional public pandering to French sensitivities, to maintain this status. [14]

One cannot overestimate the value to the Federal Republic of French assistance in guaranteeing inclusion in Western European institutions. For without this institutional entre, the legitimacy within Europe of Germany's national economic, political, and military power would have been questioned.

Therefore, to a degree unlike any other EC member, Bonn has long favored expanded integration. Indeed, maintenance of the integrational status quo is insufficient. Integration must, however slowly, continue to expand lest Bonn be suspect in the eyes of its physically smaller, economically weaker, and militarily less powerful neighbors. Such perceived dedication to integration has obviously become even more imperative to Bonn following unification. As former Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher stated, "A Germany that is firmly anchored in the EC will not be regarded as a threat to anybody. A Germany that rejects Europe would soon be very alone. It would become cold--ice-cold-- around Germany. [15]

An interesting point, however, and, indeed, an underrated manifestation of the importance of this bilateral relationship, is that despite agreement on the criticality of European integration, Paris and Bonn do not share a common view of how this ambiguous supranational institution should be formed. For instance, Germany has long favored transferring greater power from the European Commission (and those increasingly unpopular and overpaid "Eurocrats") in Brussels to the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Highly centralized and statist France, on the other hand, has opposed this move, largely because such a transfer would give the Federal Republic-with its larger population-the largest number of parliamentarians; thus, further reducing French influence in that body. [16]

Germany has also advocated "enlarging" the EC through the acceptance of the developed European neutrals, as well as the newly democratizing states in Central and Eastern Europe, all of whom are clamoring for membership. From the German standpoint, good reasons exist for this policy. The entry of wealthy neutrals like Switzerland and Sweden would help finance the economic rebuilding of Central and Eastern Europe, a sine qua non of economic viability and, most importantly, long-term political stability. Moreover, increased EC membership might appear to dilute Germany's dominant position in the Community and, therefore, dampen criticism of growing German economic power.

France, on the other hand, has traditionally seen the EC as a vehicle for balancing German power. Should countries like Poland and Hungary gain admission to the EC, the center of gravity may well shift toward Germany. [17]

Nor is this new French policy; it dates back De Gaulle's opposition to British entry into the EC in the 1960s. Thus, Paris has been loath to contemplate an enlarged Community that could diminish French power, as well as allowing the EC to become a mere Zollverein, or customs union.

As these brief examples indicate, France and Germany lack an agreed definition of, and mutually accepted means to, attain their declared common objective. This lack of French- German consensus and concomitant drive to appear to be making progress toward increased integration has not gone unnoticed by their EC partners. In recent years, the Franco-German haste to press toward the "ill-defined" goal of integration has resulted in a series of fait accomplis that have increasingly irritated their EC partners, particularly smaller members who have not been consulted on important issues. [18]

Indeed, this lack of Franco-German consultation in their mutual effort to restrain and reassure each other has helped produce the current backlash against greater integration manifested in the Danish rejection of the Maastricht draft treaty, the narrow margin of approval in the French referendum, and Prime Minister John Major's back (and front) bench revolt in the House of Commons.

Yet, so strong is their drive toward integration that France and the Federal Republic have refused to accept any of these rebuffs. Indeed, these obstacles have only spurred them to greater efforts to assuage their partners. For example, at the emergency EC summit in Birmingham in October 1992, the French and Germans committed themselves to introducing more democratic arrangements into the EC process. Another fascinating example is the widely circulated (but officially denied) rumor that Mitterrand and Kohl agreed to consider merging the Deutschmark and French Franc, and, in consequence, their central banks. [19]

This option would establish an inner circle within the EC and, in effect, make a two- speed approach to integration inevitable. Such an option, writes the European, "...reflects the increasing sense of desperation of Mitterrand and Kohl as their Maastricht vision of European union fades. [20]

Thus, France and Germany may be prepared to go it alone to achieve greater integration, even at the risk of politically alienating some of their closest EC partners. Such a two track option, while economically advantageous to their EC partners, implicitly includes much greater political and security arrangements than these EC states heretofore have been willing to accept. [21]

Notwithstanding their economic, political, and security differences, conflicting policies, and divergent national interests, both countries are intent upon pressing forward, perhaps blindly, toward creating a unified Europe. Indeed, within this bilateral relationship, the French and Germans have evolved an ideology whereby they must be perceived as continuously making progress toward European unity, and are always in agreement. The latter point becomes even more imperative during instances when Paris and Bonn do not agree. One can sympathize, therefore, with France's and Germany's EC partners, who have become increasingly frustrated by what they see as a Franco-German abuse of the delicate process of decrementing state sovereignty within a greater European super-state in order to solve what are basically mutual French and German suspicions.

That EC states have been willing to accept these ambiguities reflect their interest in promoting stability in Central Europe, and their belief that "integration," particularly in the field of security, has not been framed within the context of a zero-sum game, i.e., at the expense of NATO. However, the point has been reached where difficult decisions in this sensitive area need to be made. Moreover, European concerns and efforts coincide with Washington's attempts to redefine the U.S. role in European security.

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