Russian Reserves
in the 1941 Campaign

Conclusion and References

by Louis Rotundo


Conclusion

An examination of Soviet reserves reveals two significant historical facts. First, the Soviet Winter successes testify to the serious German miscalculations of Red Army strength. FHO assumed Russia could not mobilize reserves fast enough to decisively influence the 1941 campaign. This proved not to be the case. Soviet reserves, although not always fully trained, remained large enough to intervene decisively at several critical moments in the 1941 campaign.

By careful accumulation and selective employment, Stavka managed to find the necessary forces to tilt the balance against Germany. Stavka employed its active forces to cushion the various German thrusts, and then deployed its reserves to continually create a new front line. Even when the German Army created encirclement battles, Stavka utilized the ensuing period of German dislocation created by the attempt to clear each pocket to rebuild its shattered forces. Although not as obvious at the time, and certainly not by initial intention (for Stavka did not set out to destroy its armies just to prove its strategic deft touch), in retrospect Stavka skillfully manipulated its growing assets to master each new situation. As a result, it denied Hitler most of his major objectives for the first campaign.

Second, Hitler demanded a quick destruction of the Red Army. He assumed an initial superiority or, at least, equality with existing Soviet forces. However, throughout the invasion planning, the German margin of strength remained precariously thin. By 22 June 1941, it had disappeared entirely. If General Halder seemed puzzled in July by continuing Soviet resistance, he could only be stunned to learn of the Red Army's true strength, revealed throughout 1941.

Germany required numerically more resources to conquer Russia. The German Army failed before Moscow because those resources did not exist regardless of debate over misguided strategy. If Germany's odds seemed better on 22 June, it perhaps is best to recall that the Axis entered Russia with frontline resources roughly equal to Stalin's. However, Hitler possessed only 14 divisions as operational reserves while the Red Army maintained 133 divisions and 35 percent of its tank strength beyond the initial defense zone in the west.

While German frontline strength declined as the campaign progressed, Stavka continued to maintain an acceptable and sometimes impressive force of reserve formations. By November the decline of German strength coupled to the increasing availability of Soviet reserves, misled Hitler and the German High Command into concluding that the struggle now pivoted on questions of the last battalion and human will. [41]

This concept, as evidenced by the information presented herein, bore no relationship to reality. The decisive defeat before Moscow altered not only the situation in Russia; it tied Hitler into a long war in the east with disastrous consequences for the prosecution of the war against Britain.

Western historians have recorded that territorial distance and bitter Winter weather decided the first campaign in Russia. Rarely is the Red Army given substantial credit. [42]

Yet, Soviet sources reveal a different story. While raw numbers alone could not defeat the Wehrmacht, it remains true that lack of adequate research into, or familiarity with Soviet sources, has obscured the real balance of strength of the Eastern Front. This reality of Soviet strength permitted Stalin several options which less fortunate Western nations never possessed. The skillful creation and careful use of Soviet reserves continues to remain one of the least explored or understood issues in Western historical literature. This article should provide some assistance in remedying that omission.

REFERENCES

[1] Most Western sources are simply too old to incorporate the new Soviet material. Of major works, J. Erickson's The Road to Stalingrad (London, 1975) is excellent. However, it doesn't have an order of battle and buries reserve totals in foot- notes (534, 536). A. Seaton's The Russo- German War 1941-1945 (N. Y., 1971) does give totals (61) but without a com- plete breakdown and misstates reserves. T. Higgins' Hitler and Russia (N.Y., 1966) gives some incorrect data (122-123) and lacks a complete OB or totals. A. Clark's Barbarossa (N.Y., 1965) gives some data (38-40) but most is from German Sources as is true of most German language works. Both A. Werth's Russia at War (N.Y., 1964) and H. Salisbury's The 900 Days (N.Y., 1969) make good use of So- viet material but give little total data, and B. Fugate's Operation Barbarossa (Nova- to, 1984) despite good reserve totals, fails to give an accurate OB (317) or make an adequate presentation of the Dec. re- serves (317).
[2] Walter Gorlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad (N.Y., 1960), 128-129. Franz Halder, The Halder Diaries, 2 vols. (Boulder, 1976), Vol. 1, 517.
[3] National Archives Record Group (NARG), Captured German records, T312, Roll 776, Frame 8425693.
[4] NARG T78, R261, F52-61. Seweryn Bailer, ed. Stalin and His Generals (N.Y., 1969), 592 (note 36).
[5] Istoriya Vtoroi Mirovoi Voiny, Vol. 3 (Moskva, 1973-82), 418; Vol. 2 202, here- after 1VMV.
[6] 50 Let Vooruzhennyzh Sil SSSR (Moskva, 1968), 236, hereafter 50 Let.
[7] I.E. Krupchenko, et al,Sovetskie Tan- ovye Voiska 1941-1945 (Moskva, 1973) , 21-22, hereafter STV. Total Soviet tanks on 22 June 1941 remains very unclear. Stalin indicated 24,000 organized and 60 tank divisions. Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (N.Y., 1948), 335. Of existing models, only 1,861 were new heavy/medium types. 1VMV, Vol. 3, 420- 421 indicates 60% of Soviet tanks were in the western districts. If so, the total would be 14,000. 1VOVSS, Vol. 1, 475 re- ports on 15 June 1941 of the older types, 27% were operational. Ignoring the 1,475 new units in the west, it appears 4,000- 5,000 tanks might be the active Soviet strength. In fact, not numbers but rather lack of cohesion, equipment and motorization were the major constraints on effective Soviet performance.
[8] 50 Let. 235-236. STV, 14. 1VMV, Vol. 3, 418 and 421.
[9] After 22 June the Stavka Glavnovo Komandovaniya (High Command Headquarters) was created. In August it became Stavka Verkhovnovo Glavno Komandovaniya (Stavka of the Supreme High Command).
[10] A. Tsvetkov "Boevye deistviya voz- dushnyzh i morskikh clesantov v tylu pro- tivnika, " Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 8, (1972), 20, hereafter VIZ.
[11] IVMV, Vol. 3, 438-39. 50 Let, 252.
[12] Kievskii Krasnoznamennyi (Moskva, 1974), 2nd ed., does not locate 16 or 19 Armies on its situation map. See map.
[13] 50 Let, 257. See N.M. Kiryayev, ed., KPSS o Stroitel'stvo Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh sil 1917-1964, (Moskva, 1965),259.
[14] 50 Let, 292.
[15] M. Gareev, "Ob opyte boevoi podgo- tovki voisk," VIZ#4, (1983), 13.
[6] 50 Let, 269-271.
[17] 50 Let, 269-270. VOVSS, 98, A. Ya. Soshiniov et al, Sovetskaya Kavaleriya (Moskva, 1984), 197-198, SVE, Vol. 7, 670; "Moskovskaiya bitva v tsifrakh" VIZ #1 (1967), 90, Table 1, and 9 1, Table 3; hereafter VIZ #1 (1967).
[18] VOVSS, 79, Kh. Kh. Kamalov, Mors- kaya pekhota v boyakh za rodinn (Moskva, 1983), 24-25. P. Yakimov & V. Petukhov, "Boevoe primenenie morskoi pekhoti u desantakh" VIZ #11 (1974), 27. 1VOVSS, Vol. ~, 91. V. Shlomin "Dvadstat' piat' morskikh strelkovykh" VIZ #7 (1970).
[19] Zabaikalskii Voennyi Okrug (Irkutsk, 1972), 171, 175, 188. Krasnoznaomennyi Dalnevostochnyi (Moskva, 1917), 156, 162, 183-184, 187, 195-197. IVMV, Vol. 3, 436. Kazakov, 46.
[20] 50 Let, 273.
[21] Kazakov, 48, V. Zemskov, "Nekotorye voprosy sozdaniya i ispolzov- aniya strategicheskikh reservov," VIZ # 10 (1971), 15.
[22] V. Golubovich. Sozdanie strategicheskikh reservov," VIZ #4 (1977), Table 3, 16; hereafter Golubovich. 50 Let, 277-278.
[23] IVO VSS, Vol. 2, 220, 222, 250, 255. A.M. Vasilevsky, A Life-Long Cause (Moscow, 1981), 115, hereafter Vasilev- sky.
[24] Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand, Das Heer 1933-1945, Band 11 (Frankfurt, 1956), 11, hereafter Das Heer. 1VOVSS, Vol. 2, 267.
[25] IVMV, Vol. 4, 90-91.
[26] Razgrom, 30, "Moskovskaya bitva v tsif rakh" VIZ #3 (1967). 1VMV, Vol. 4, 93. D.Z. Muriev, "Nekotorye voprosy Sovets- koi voennoi strategii v Moskovskoi bitve, VIZ# 12 (11971), 12, Table 1, hereafter Muriev.
[27] Western historians appear confused over Soviet reserve armies as many quote IVOVSS, Vol. 2, 271. This lists 9 new armies created Oct./Nov. (110, 26, 57/ 28, 39, 58, 59, 60, 61). But Vasilevsky 110, says the GKO ordered 10 armies formed. Razgrom, map 10 gives 11 armies on 1 Dec.: Two (11 Shock, 20) are committed 29 Nov.; one (10) shortly thereafter: eight are in reserve (24, 26, 28, 39, 58, 59, 60, 61); one (57) is not shown. Thus the total is twelve.
[28] Razgrom, 38. Vasilevsky, 114. 50 Let, 292.
[29] Muriev, 12, Table 1.
[30] lVMV, Vol. 4, 110
[31] G.K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshall Zhukov (London, 1971), 336. VIZ #3 (1967), 70, Table 1.
[32] Muriev, 14.
[33] bid., 12.
[34] Seaton, 191. Das Heer, 19. Paul Ca- rell, Hitler Moves East 1941-1943 (Bos- ton, 1967), 197, 332-334. Haider, Vol. 2, 192-193.
[35] Kazakov, 49, Table 2. However, Raz- grom, 194 cites 59 rif le and 17 cavalry divisions on 1 Dec.
[36] IVMV, Vol. 4,270-272. 1VOVSS, 197. Vasilevsky, 120. Golubovich 16, Table 3, and 17, Table 4.
[37] IVMV, Vol. 4,281. 1VOVSS, Vol. 2, 274. F.I.*Golikov, VMoskovskoiBitva (Moskva, 1967), 24.
[38] VIZ #1 (11967), 89, Table 1, and 9 1, Table3. Muriev17. IVMVVol.,4,283- 284.
[39] SVE, Vol. 6, 652-653, Vol 8, 173-175. IVOVSS, 298.
[40] IVMV, Vol. 4, 305, 307.
[41] Haider, Vol. 2, 303, 307.
[42] Seaton, 221.

Note: This article first appeared in the January 1986 issue of Military Affairs and is reprinted here with the permission of the author.

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