Adolf Hitler's initial decision to begin preparations for an invasion of the USSR led the German eastern intelligence branch, Fremde Heeres Ost (FHO) to redouble its efforts to obtain information on the Red Army. Based upon this research, the operational planning for Case Barbarossa took shape during the winter of 1940.

The initial estimates, however, revealed a departure from past years when the USSR usually appeared as numerically dominant on the continent. FHO believed that Russia no longer possessed the enormous active military resources of previous times. Its estimate of 21 July 1940 stated that Russia maintained only 50-75 good divisions and would be defeated by a German force of 80-100 divisions. Germany could readily field this number despite commitments in Western Europe and Norway. [2]

In August, General Erich Marcks, in charge of formulating the initial invasion study, revised his plan to incorporate the latest information. Marcks postulated that Russia would have available 96 infantry, and 23 cavalry divisions as well as 28 mechanized brigades in its western districts. These forces, he indicated, could be defeated by a German force of 24 panzer, 12 motorized and 110 infantry divisions.

Further, Marcks stated, FHO believed Russia would not be able to increase its strength appreciably by the Spring of 1941, and little evidence existed of a strong mobile reserve force.3

During the period Winter 1940 to Spring 1941, FHO continually revised its calculations regarding Soviet strength. These estimates and their growth may be seen in Table 1.

Table 1 German Estimate of Soviet Forces
Date	In European Russia				In Total Forces	Reference
	Rifle Div	Cavalry Div	Motor Mech Bde	Tank Div
7/24/40	90	23	28	-	151 - 32 - 38	Erickson, 557
8/05/40	96	23	28	-	151 - 32 - 38	NARG T312, R776,F8425961
1/30/41	121	25	31	-	150 - 32 - 36	KTB/OKW, 290
2/15/41	121	25	32	-	150 - 32 - 37	NARG T311 R260,F202-203
5/20/41	147	25.5	41	5	172 - 33.5 - 46 - 5	NARG T3111 R261,F1 065-66
6/20/41	154	25.5	37	10	179 - 33.5 - 42 - 10	Halder V.2, 461; Boog, V.4, 275
Sources: John Erickson, The Soviet High Command Band I (Frankfurt 1965) H.A. Jacobson, ed., Kriegstagbuch der Oberkommando der Wehmacht, (London 1962) Horst Boog, et al., "Der Angriff, Auf Die Sowjetunion," in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart 1983), Vol. 4, 275

Uniformly, these estimates lagged behind the actual changes in the Red Army. This situation could probably be anticipated given the secretive nature of Soviet society and the limited intelligence tools available to FHO. However, more significant than the time lag remains the crucial error in numbers. FHO consistently miscalculated the size and strength of the USSR, in varying degrees, until the invasion. Actual Soviet strength is discussed later, but briefly the problem with FHO's estimates may be summarized as follows: they omit the Russian cavalry reductions, the reported divisional totals are in error by one-third, and they miscalculate the creation of new mechanized corps and tank divisions. After 22 June, FHO secured much better information regarding Soviet frontline strength. However, total estimates, including reserves, reveals only a marginal improvement when compared to the historical record. For example, on 8 August, FHO estimated the Red Army strength at 260 rifle, 50 tank, 20 cavalry, and 60 other divisions. Organized Soviet strength by that date actually totaled over 300 rifle, 70 tank, and about 61 cavalry divisions. Yet perhaps the worst estimate appeared on 1 December 1941.

No Soviet reserves had been identified although twelve armies existed. The FHO summation stated: "The numerical strength of the majority of Soviet combat units is low-, their equipment is unsatisfactory. New units were appearing with less frequency in recent days-, individual units are being transferred from quiet to endangered front sectors. On this basis it should be assumed that no significant strategic reserve units exist at present .... The combat strength of the enemy has been weakened decisively, as a result of losses in personnel and material which have surpassed all expectations." These errors provided ample reason for the terrible miscalculations of the late Summer and Fall. [4]

More Russian Reserves in the 1941 Campaign

Introduction
Fremde Heeres Ost
USSR Law of Universal Military Service
USSR Operational Reserves
Conclusion and References