On 22 June 1941, Russia possessed 10 armies in its operational reserve. Four of these (19, 20, 21, 22) existed in the Reserve Front. Two additional armies (16, 18) were deployed in the Orel-Kharkov area. Two (24, 28) served near Moscow and a further two (27, 13) deployed in the western district reserves. Of these armies, the forces directly under Stavka totaled 158,600 men, 1,700 field guns, 200 mortars, and 700 tanks.

Taken together, these armies represented the second echelon designed to stop any German attack. However, Stavka did not foresee the losses incurred in the heavy initial fighting. By 10 July, only 90 of the 201 Russian divisions at the front retained effective levels of combat strength. Stavka maintained 31 divisions in its reserve. [22]

Throughout the campaign, Stavka continuously withdrew frontline units for rest and rebuilding so as to increase its operational forces. For example, while awaiting the final German offensive in the south of Russia, Stavka withdrew 9 rifle divisions and two cavalry corps from the front line. These forces (designated 37 Army), together with one Stavka reserve army (56 Separate), became the strategic reserves for the Winter counteroffensive. By 17 November, these reserves totaled 22 rifle and 9 cavalry divisions plus 5 tank brigades. Similarly, before the beginning of Operation Typhoon against Moscow, Stavka ordered the weakest formations on the western direction withdrawn to become front reserves. After the offensive began, Stavka ordered a further 5 divisions back to cover the Mozhaisk defense line. At the end of October additional troops withdrew from the front line into the reserves. From these forces and additonal Stavka reserves, a second echelon development to cover the forward defense line. [23]

This method of establishing reserves contrasted sharply with German practice. Throughout 1941, German reserves proved inadequate to campaign needs. The German Army rapidly expended its initial 28 reserve divisions. Later, including allied troops, a further 21 divisions and 15 brigades, as well as 2 divisions and 4 brigades formed at the front also moved forward. [24]

However, by midSeptember it became apparent that Germany lacked the strength to continue attacking all along the front. Only a massive reorganization, including the removal of 16 divisions from Army Groups (AG) North and South permitted the 2 October commencement of the drive on Moscow. Even this effort, however, merely provided AG Center (70 divisions) with a bare equality of force compared to Soviet totals. More worrisome still, total German reserves consisted of only two divisions, a situation in marked contrast to the Red Army.

By 1 October, the USSR stood ready to meet the anticipated German offensive with an impressive paper strength. The active Red Army totaled 213 rifle, 30 cavalry, 5 tank, and 2 motorized rifle divisions as well as 18 rifle, 37 tank, and 7 airborne brigades. Many of these formations were, however, seriously understrength. Average rifle division strength was 7,500 men, and for tank/ cavalry divisions it was 3,000. The total strength of the Army was 3,245.000 men-, 2,715 tanks (only 728 were heavy/medium models): 20,580 guns and mortars; and 1,460 aircraft (excluding long-range aviation) [25]

Of these forces Stavka deployed fifteen armies to defend the Moscow axis. Its troops were arranged in three fronts and included 83 rifle, 2 motor rifle, 1 tank, and 9 cavalry divisions as well as 13 tank brigades. Total strength was 1,252,000 men, 990 tanks, and 936 aircraft. These forces totaled 30 percent of the rifle and cavalry divisions on the Soviet-German front. Additionally, 35 percent of the tank brigades and separate antiaircraft troops, 54 percent of the artillery regiments, and 17 percent of the Guard mortar battalions were attached to the forces of these fronts. [26]

In spite of its preparations, however, within days of the opening of Operation Typhoon, the GKO faced a serious crisis on the western direction. The skillful German attacks led to the encirclement and disintegration of Moscow's forward defense line. Drastic measures became necessary to restore the front. Thus, in early October, the GKO ordered the creation of 10 new reserve armies on the line Vytegra-Astrakhan. [27]

Additionally, Stavka committed 14 rifle divisions, 16 tank brigades, and 40 artillery regiments to restore the front. They also summoned 3 rifle, 2 tank, and 2 cavalry divisions plus one motorcycle regiment and one tank brigade from the Far East and the Northwest Front. [28]

These troops, together with the forces that succeeded in breaking out of the encirclement and the meager units scraped together by Stavka combined to form four (116, 5, 43, 49) new armies to defend the Mozhaisk line. By 1 November, the Western strategic direction contained 34 percent of the rifle divisions, 30 percent of the cavalry divisions, and 52 percent of the tank brigades available in the Soviet-German theater. Additionally, 55 percent of the artillery regiments, 30 percent of the separate antiaircraft battalions, and 33 percent of the Guard mortar battalions deployed with these forces. [29]

Throughout November, Stavka attempted to stabilize the front line west of Moscow. During this period, the western axis received 11 rifle, 9 cavalry, and 1 tank divisions. In addition, 16 rifle and 8 tank brigades, 4 tank battalions, and a considerable number of artillery regiments also joined those forces. [30]

The efforts to create a new front line involved a significant movement of new formations. These units came in two groupings. Between 1 and 15 November, Stavka provided 100,000 officers and men, 300 tanks, and 2,000 guns to repair the disorganizations caused by the October battles. Frontline units were brought up to complement with many formations receiving artillery and Guard mortar units. These efforts allowed the creation of reserves. Total strength on the western axis by midNovember included 61 rifle, 3 motorized rifle, 3 tank, 17 cavalry divisions, and 19 tank brigades. [31]

Later, after the German offensive toward Moscow resumed, that is between 16 November and 5 December, Stavka added to its troops before Moscow the following formations: 7 rifle and 10 cavalry divisions; 9 rifle and 10 tank brigades; 4 rifle, 3 motorcycle, and 10 artillery regiments; 4 ski battalions; and 18 separate rifle companies. [32]

These Soviet reinforcements allowed the stabilization of the front line and slowly drained the German offensive of its power. In spite of the enormous losses and dislocations caused by encirclements, Stavka managed to preserve the strength of the Red Army before Moscow while continuing its preparations for a Winter counterattack. This significant accomplishment can be clearly seen in two ways. First, between 1 October and 1 November, Soviet frontline manpower dropped from 3,245,000 to 2,250,000. However, by 1 December, it had climbed back to 4,196,000 men. Second, the organizational strength of the Red Army on the western direction showed substantial growth as revealed in Table 5.

Table 5 Total Soviet Forces On The Western Direction
Type	On Oct. 1	On Dec. 1
Rifle Divisions	30	50
Rifle Brigades	1	15
Aviation Divisions	5	8
Cavalry Divisions	3	16
Tank Brigades	3	22
(Res.) Artillery Regts.	28	53
Guard Mortar Bns.	1	30
Separate Air Defense Bns.	11	16
Source: Murlev, 14.

These increases represent a substantial investment of Stavka's reserve forces and transfers from other fronts. By 1 December, in total, the western strategic direction possessed 34 percent of the rifle divisions, 41 percent of the cavalry divisions, 49 percent of the tank brigades, 43 percent of the artillery regiments and 74 percent of the Guards mortar battalions then available on the entire Soviet-German front. [33]

In the first days of December 1941, AG Centers attacks came to a halt short of Moscow. The German forces ceased to possess the capability for further sustained action. The weather remained miserable and the German troops too exhausted and illequipped to handle the supply requirements for a renewal of the battle. As Soviet strength continued to rise, German frontline combat strength fell to ominously low levels.

Total casualties (743,112) since 22 June 1941 equaled 23.12 percent of manpower and reflected the continued decline of German strength throughout the Autumn campaign. For example, on 6 November, OKW estimated that the 101 infantry and 19 panzer divisions in Russia actually amounted to only 65 and 6 divisions respectively in strength. By December, continuing losses and the awful supply situation negated any improvements caused by the enforced pauses due to weather. Within the panzer divisions, losses totaled over 40 percent of the 30 September totals. Of the 78 divisions in AG Center these forces maintained a combat strength of only 35 divisions.

These shortages, although bad enough, disguised the actual situation which was much worse. In August, Halder had reported that only about one-third of the needed replacements had gone forward resulting in a decline in combat strength of 40 percent in infantry and 50 percent in panzer divisions. In spite of the September pause, this situation remained unsatisfactory throughout the Fall campaign.

By 30 November, Halder faced the stark reality of an army short only 340,000 men (9 1/2 percent of strength), but with only 50 percent of infantry combat power. [34]

A much different situation existed on the Soviet side. From 29 November to 5 December, Stavka prepared to unleash its Winter counterattack utilizing its carefullyhoarded strategic reserves. These troops, largely provided by the GKO decisions of October, gave Stavka a powerful weapon unmatched on the German side of the line. These Soviet reserves formed in spite of the apparent earlier German successes. For example, on 1 October, Stavka possessed a mere 4 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions in its reserve forces. However, by 1 November, in spite of the terrible losses in the October battles, Stavka managed to build its reserves to three armies possessing a total of 22 rifle and 8 cavalry divisions.

Throughout November, as heavy fighting continued, Stavka succeeded in organizing, training, and moving to the Moscow area an additional seven armies. Thus, it still retained on 1 December eight armies with 44 rifle and 14 cavalry divisions, as well as 13 rifle brigades, in its reserves. [35]

The substantial infusion of new forces into the Moscow area and the concurrent decline of German strength changed the balance of forces on the western direction to one of even or slightly favorable for the Red Army. However, the alteration can also be seen along the entire front line for, by early December the land strength of the Soviet Army stood at 5,493,000 with an additional 563,000 in the air forces and 514,000 in the naval forces. Combat aircraft totaled 7,409, and tanks totaled 4,495. Of the land forces, those deployed in the west contained 4,196,000 men; 1,984 tanks; 32,194 guns and mortars; and 3,688 aircraft.

Additionally, Stavka retained another 531,000 men with 1,300 guns, 2,800 mortars, but no tanks in its reserves. The western deployment of the Red Army revealed 39 active armies, 4 operational groups, and 9 reserve armies. These forces contained 279 divisions, 93 separate brigades, and 193 separate regiments. Reserve forces totaled 123 divisions, 31 separate brigades, and 16 separate regiments. [36]

In the first week of December, troops of the Kalinin, Western, and SouthWestern Fronts moved forward to destroy AG Center. In preparation for this counterattack, Stavka committed its reserves in a series of groupings. For example, in late November-early December, besides three armies (1 st Shock, 10, 20) containing 11 rifle and 4 cavalry divisions, 11 rifle and 2 tank brigades, 11 ski and 4 tank battalions, Western Front also received 9 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions, 8 rifle and 6 tank brigades, and other artillery and specialist troops. Additional forces went to Kalinin and South-Western Fronts. Many of the formations were quite combat-ready when compared to their German opponents. The 10th Army's 100,000 men for all its equipment mismatches and shortages possessed respectively an average of 11,447 and 3,500 rested and winterized troops in its 8 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions. [37]

Fifteen Soviet armies stood ready to participate in the Winter counterattack. These forces possessed 75 rifle, 3 tank, and 23 cavalry divisions as well as 18 rifle and 23 tank brigades and other specialist units. Total strength included 1,100,000 men, 7,562 guns and mortars, 774 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft. Throughout the month, as the Soviet counterattack continued to force the German Army away from Moscow, the Red Army on the western axis received further significant reinforcements. These troops included two reserve armies (39, 61), and totaled 20 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions as well as 1 tank and 11 rifle brigades, and 9 separate tank battalions. Later, when the central grouping of armies of the Western Front joined in the counterattack, these formations received reserves totaling 4 rifle divisions, 1 rifle brigade, 1 reserve artillery regiment, and 2 Guard mortar regiments. [38]

During this time, AG Center did not receive any substantial formations as reinforcements.

Similar situations occurred on both the north and south axis of the Soviet- German front. For example, in the south, the utilization of Stavka reserves led to the recapture of Rostov and a return to the Crimea. In the north, Stavka committed three (59 , 3 Shock, 4 Shock) new armies to assist in relieving pressure on Leningrad. When created these forces possessed a total of 14 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions as well as 7 rifle brigades. By the beginning of the offensive, near Tikhvin, the Soviet superiority in personnel was 1.5 to 1 and in artillery 2 to 1. Likewise, on the Volkhov, Soviet superiority was 1.5 to 1 in both artillery and personnel. These forces enabled Soviet troops to retake Tikhvin and open a tenuous land-lake route to Leningrad. [39]

By the first days of January, the initial objectives of the Soviet Winter counteroffensive had been achieved. Although Soviet active strength had risen to 4,199,000 men, its tank strength had fallen to 1,784 (only 506 heavy/medium) and guns,'morlar to 27,700. On the western axis, manpower had risen to 1,245,000, but tanks fell to 571 (198 hvy,'med) and gun and mortars to 8,700. Stavka, however, still retained 14 divisions and 7 brigades, including the Moscow Defense Zone, in its reserves. [40]

Later offensives continued to move the front line westward, especially on the western axis. However, Soviet resources proved inadequate to the task of destroying the German Army. On 19 January, Stavka began removing frontline armies into the reserve for rebuilding.

More Russian Reserves in the 1941 Campaign

Introduction
Fremde Heeres Ost
USSR Law of Universal Military Service
USSR Operational Reserves
Conclusion and References