Since the conclusion of World War II, western historians have provided a substantial body of information concerning the Russo-German conflict. Yet, the true size and composition of the Red Army, and its reserves, during the 1941 campaign remains one of the least discussed issues in those works. [1]

Even now, 40 years after the end of the war, it is extremely difficult to obtain an accurate Soviet order of battle or a clear picture of the real balance of power during that SummerAutumn campaign. The problem of accurately determining Russian strength in 1941 began soon after the first tentative efforts to research this subject. The ready availability of German source material and published works coupled with the slow release of Soviet official documents fostered a continuing tendency to utilize information only from captured German intelligence documents when discussing the Red Army.

When substantial volumes of Soviet official material began to appear, information about actual Red Army strength for 1941 was dispersed throughout dozens of sources, requiring considerable research and subject familiarity to piece together. Lacking this information, previous historical research has often fallen victim to the vagaries of imprecise phrasing and conjecture. Thus, presenting these numbers provides a necessary foundation for further serious study of the war on the Eastern front.

By examining the basic numbers regarding men, equipment, organizational totals and the creation of Soviet reserves, a clearer understanding of the actual situation in the SummerAutumn campaign becomes apparent. To present this data, two methods are used: first, a discussion of the Red Army's size, deployment and restructuring which allows an opportunity to follow its development in the campaign; second, a review of the actual commitment of Soviet reserves to highlight their impact at decisive points in 1941. By these methods, the reader can obtain a snapshot view of differing statistical indicators of Soviet strength and have the opportunity to see them at various times relative to German strength.

More Russian Reserves in the 1941 Campaign

Introduction
Fremde Heeres Ost
USSR Law of Universal Military Service
USSR Operational Reserves
Conclusion and References