On 1 September 1939, the Law of Universal Military Service was adopted by the Supreme Soviet. At that time, the Red Army was still nominally on a peacetime level. Its major formations consisted of 96 rifle (infantry) divisions and one motorized rifle division organized into 25 rifle corps, and 26 cavalry divisions organized in 5 cavalry corps. [5]

Many of these divisions possessed a tank element. In addition, the army possessed independent rifle and tank brigades as well as four tank corps, each consisting of one rifle and two tank brigades. To expand these formations the Law lowered the draft age from 21 to 19 and for those who had completed secondary school it specified 18 years. This change contributed to the increase in the size of Soviet reserve forces before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War as seen in Table 2.

Table 2 Soviet Armed Forces Growth
Date	1/1/39	6/1/40	1/1/41	6/11/41	6/22/41
Numbers in Uniform	1,943,000	3,602,000	4,207,000	5,000,000	5,373,000
Increase from Previous-		1,659,000	605,000	793,000	373,000
% Increase (Rounded)	-	46%	14%	16%	7%
Time Elapsed	-	1.5 years	6 months	6 months	3 weeks
Sources: For 1/1/39 and 6/1/40, S.P, Ivanov, Nachal'nyi Period Voinyl (Moskva 1974), 207; for 1/1/41, Istoriya Velikol Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 (Moskva, 1960), Vol. 1, 460-1 hereafter IVOVSS; for 6/1/41, Velikaya Otechestvermaya voiny Sovelskogo Scyuza 1941-1945, Kratkaya Istoriya. 2nd ed. (Moskva, 1970), 53, hereafter VOVSS, for 6.22 41, IVAIV, Vol. 4. 18.

The period between September 1939 and June 1941 witnessed substantial formation changes to conform to the personnel increases. The additional manpower enabled new rifle units to be established. Concurrently, Soviet mechanized corps first disbanded and then rebuilt on a new table of organization. Tank brigades nominally reformed into divisions. However, significant numbers of technical and officer specialists were required to create the necessary mechanized corps, and to increase the existing tank cadres to their new strength. These cadres could not be quickly created.

Therefore, it became necessary to reorganize Soviet cavalry divisions to obtain these men. Thus, of the 32 Red Army cavalry divisions that existed in 1938, only 13 remained by 1941. [6]

These changes allowed the reformation process to occur in two stages. In 1940, nine mechanized corps began forming. Later, in the period March-June 1941, another 20 mechanized corps organized although war broke out before most of these could be considered battle-ready. In fact, of the 20 mechanized corps in the West on 6/22/41, only six had relatively high combat value. Of the others, some could scarcely be considered mobile due to their severe shortages of tanks and motorized support elements. [7]

By 22 June 1941, the Red Army possessed a total of 303 divisions of which 81 divisions remained in the process of formation. By type, these units broke down as 178 rifle, 18 mountain rifle, 2 motorized rifle, 61 tank, 31 motorized, and 13 cavalry divisions plus 3 rifle brigades. Supporting these forces, the Red Army contained 91,493 guns and mortars and retained 74 artillery regiments, 8 percent of total forces, in its reserves. [8]

However, not all Russian units faced Germany. Thus, within the five western military districts, the Red Army only deployed 15 armies containing 170 divisions and 2 brigades. These districts totaled 2.9 million men representing the first and second echelon units of the Soviet armed forces. By type, Red Army formations consisted of 103 rifle, 7 cavalry, 40 tank, and 20 motorized divisions plus 2 rifle brigades.

Significantly, however, these forces did not include all of the units available within those districts. During the Spring of 1941, the Glavnoe Komandovanie (High Command) ordered the reorganization of its airborne troops. [9]

A total of five corps formed containing 15 brigades. Each 10,000 man corps officially contained a tank battalion and support units. [10]

Four corps deployed as western district reserves. Additional formations included 10 mobile antitank brigades, the First Brigade of naval infantry, and the 11 divisions of Soviet border troops including 47 land and 6 naval detachments, 9 independent border Kommandatura, and the 20 fortified areas of the various border districts. Further strength came from 11 regiments and the other field formations of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Apart from the field forces, these troops totaled 100,000 men. [11]

Yet even these units did not represent the total forces within the western districts. In May 1941 the 22nd Army moved from the Volga District to Gomel; the 19th Army (including the 25th Rifle Corps) moved from the North Caucasus District to Belaya Tserkov; the 16th Army moved from the Transbaikal District to Orel and then Shepetovka, west of Kiev, and finally the 21 st Army moved from the Urals District to Velikiye Luki.

Although the transfers were not complete by 22 June, these 28 divisions formed the basis of Russia's initial reserves. Even though Soviet accounts mention these forces, they are not added to district totals since they did not garrison in those border areas. [12]

Upon the outbreak of the war, the Soviet Union mobilized its available manpower born between 1905-1918 inclusive. This call up produced a total of 5.3 million additional men by 1 July 1941. Through December 1941, 3,544,000 of the new recruits served in the active army. By the end of the year, these recruits formed over 400 new divisions, although not all were immediately ready for the front. [13]

Of the forces available between 22 June and 1 December 1941, Stavka transferred only 291 divisions and 94 brigades to the active army. [14]

These forces formed the bulk of Stavka's operational reserves. They consisted of the figures cited in Table 3.

Table 3 Formations Transferred to the Active Army
Type	From Pre-War Formations	Newly Formed	Total
Division
Rifle	73	108	181
Milita	-	35	35
Cavalry	1	42	43
Tank	12	9	21
Moto.	11	-	11
Brigades
Rifle	-	36	36
Tank	-	56	56
Moto.	-	2	2
Source: M. Kazakov, "Sozdarie ispolzovanie strategicaskikh rezervov," V1Z, #12(1972), Table 1, 47, hereafter Kazakov.

Stavka had two methods of reinforcing the active army during the first five months of the war. Each month Stavka dispatched 300,000 to 350,000 men to the active front as draft companies and battalions. [15]

Similarly, the receiving of reserves by the various fronts occurred through the deploying of reduced strength formations and forming new ones. These methods were adopted due to the tremendous dislocations caused by the heavy losses of the first several weeks.

In mid-July, the Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony (GKO), the State Defense Committee chaired by J.V. Stalin, took steps to reform the Red Army: First, to assist in creating reserves GKO set up the Glavnoe upravlenie formirovaniya i ukomplektovaniya voiskKrasnoiArmii (Chief Directorate for the Raising and Recruitment of the Red Army Troops); second, Stavka targeted a reduction of Soviet armies from 9-12 down to 6 divisions to improve command/control since many new officers were unskilled in handling combined arms units. This action allowed 56 of the prewar 62 rifle corps HQ's to be abolished or reformed into army and divisional staffs.

Third, Stavka removed specialist troops from divisions and reorganized them into reserve forces for specific employment; and last, Stavka reformed artillery assets to create new reserves. Through December, 215 artillery, 72 antitank, and 8 Guard mortar regiments and 73 separate battalions had been created. [16]

The creation of Soviet reserves allowed Stavka to organize new active armies. Additional armies formed in the field from new reserves and reductions of existing armies. Several rebuilt while in the battle line. This continuous process of forming, recreating, and rebuilding of troops distorts the true picture of Soviet reserves during the first SummerAutumn campaign. Although not all formations came directly under Stavka control, many specifically assembled as reserves for strategic counterattacks. Few people outside the Stavka knew of the existence of these special reserve armies until they appeared around Moscow and elsewhere. Therefore, a clearer picture of Stavka's effort may be obtained from Table 4 which depicts the rate and appearance of the reserves of Stavka.

Table 4 Activation of Soviet Armies in 1941
Time	Total Formed	Designation
19 Exsisted in 1941	--	1 Red Banner, 2 Red Banner, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 26, 27
Activated
June	10	9, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29
July	14	30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, Maritime
August	9	37, 40, 42, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53
September	2	54, 55
October	2	56, 57
November	6	39, 58, 59,60, 61, 1 Shock
December	3	2 Shock, 3 Shock, 4 Shock

Time	Rebuilt w/Reserves	Designation	Reorganized/ Reactivated	Designation
June	-	-	-	-
July	2	6, 11	-	-
August	4	4, 13, 26,	2	3, 12
September	3	Maritime	3	4, 8, 21
October	5	6, 38, 40	7	5, 9, 10, 16, 19, 26, 31
November	4	13, 16, 30, 33	7	3, 10, 20, 26, 28, 37, 50
December	2	5, 43	1	24

Sources: Sovetskaia Voennala Entsiklopediia (Moskva, 1976-1980), Vol 2, 264-265, 366-367, 388-390, 408-409; Vol. 3, 103-111, 121-123, 157, 467-470: Vol 6, 26-27, 264-265, 539-541, 648-658; Vol. 7, 310-311, 320, 447-453; Vol. 8, 105-106, 109-117, 172-175, 508-510: hereafter SVE. IVOVSS, Vol. 2; IVMV, Vol. 4; V.D. Sokolovskii, ed., Razqrom Nemetsko-Fashiskikh Volsk od Moskvol (Moskva, 1964), hereafter Razgrom.

Throughout the Summer-Autumn campaign of 1941, Stavka continued to make adjustments to its forces. First, by the end of the year, 286 new rifle divisions had been formed. This total included 24 Divizii Narodnogo Opolcheniia (DNO People's Volunteer Divisions) and 22 divisions converted from troops of the other branches of the service. Conversely, 124 divisions disbanded due to losses. Of those formations some reformed as rifle brigades. By year's end, 159 new rifle brigades had been created. In addition, losses caused Stavka to organize 48 new cavalry divisions between July and September to restore its lost operational mobility. Only 43 of these were committed by 1 December.

However, even this number did not meet Soviet requirements, and addiJonal units were committed for the Winter counterattack. By year's end a total of 82 cavalry divisions had formed with 35 organized into 11 active corps. Third, in early July, Stavka created 10 new small tank divisions and committed 9 formations by December. Through the Fall, however, the existing mech corps and their component units disbanded or reorganized into new rifle divisions and tank brigades. From the freed specialists and equipment, Stavka formed new tank brigades and separate battalions.

Through 1 December, Stavka committed 56 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades; Red Army strength totaled 68 separate tank brigades and 37 separate battalions. By year's end, these totals increased to 7 tank divisions, 76 separate tank brigades, and 100 separate tank battalions. Finally, additional mobility appeared through the creation of ski battalions, many from the Gorky and Kirov regions. Eleven battalions initially intervened in the December counterattacks, and a further eleven battalions appeared later during that month. [17]

Not all of the new formations organized in a conventional manner. For example, after the improvised use of Soviet sailors and marines in Odessa and Tallinn, the GKO took steps to form a larger force of naval troops. By autumn, the Baltic Fleet had organized a total of nine brigades to help defend Leningrad. Similarly, another nine brigades organized at the other fleet locations.

However, with the Soviet defeats in October, the GKO demanded further drafts from the Navy. By decree of 18 October 1941, the GKO ordered the assembly of 25 naval rifle brigades. The Soviet navy allocated 38,000 men to these units. Each brigade organized on a TO&E of 4,334 men set up as a conventional rifle brigade. Sailors made up 29-47 percent of these units with the balance supplied by newly mobilized troops. The senior command positions for these formations usually received naval officers from the Fleets. During December, 6 brigades joined in the Moscow counterattack. [18]

In addition to the regular call-up of new manpower, Stavka also made use of existing civilian organized groups. These DNO troops consisted, in many cases, of industrial workers from the urban areas of the USSR. For example, Moscow initially raised 12 DNO containing 120,000 troops. In October/November it raised 4 more divisions. Similarly, Leningrad formed 10 DNO as well as 14 independent artillery and machine gun battalions with 135,000 soldiers. Additional DNO came from other industrial areas such as Odessa, Stalino, and Voroshilovgrad. Initially, these units formed based on a lower TO&E than regular Red Army divisions, and most received little formal military training.

However, the heavy fighting in 1941 caused the new formations to be committed to an active combat role. In September, many converted to regular status and took new unit numbers. Of total divisional formations, 35 DNO actively served at the front between 22 June and 1 December 1941.

Another source of troops included the military formations and population of the eastern Districts of the Soviet Union. During 1940-1941, steps were taken to reorganize the forces available to the Red Army in the eastern districts. Four (15, 16, 17, 25) new armies were organized, and existing mechanized forces reformed. In the Transbaikal Military District (MD), one mech corps and one tank division were created. In the Far East MID, one mech corps and one tank and one motorized rifle division were organized.

Also, 16 rifle divisions reformed on the 10,000 man structure. On 26 April 1941, Moscow ordered from the Far East and Transbaikal MD's one mech corps, two rifle corps, and two airborne brigades to move to the west. After hostilities began, mobilization created new forces. With these new troops the Transbaikal set up the 36 Army, and the Far East created the 35 Army.

This strengthening of forces provided potential formations for the active army. After 22 June 1941, Stavka systematically took forces, including 8 rifle and 3 tank divisions, from the Far East while local authorities mobilized formations to replace them. Almost 30 divisions and brigades organized in the Far East alone. These formation movements also coincided with the removal of tens of thousands of additional men in draft units. However, the mobilization of new troops allowed the strength in the Far East to double over the prewar level. [19]

In total, the Soviet Union took 27 divisions from the existing formations in the Far East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The remainder of the 97 existing divisions that appeared in the Summer- Autumn campaign, that is 70, came from the interior districts of the Soviet Union. Of the other 194 divisions and 94 brigades, these units represented newly-raised formations. [20]

The 291 divisions and 94 brigades that appeared between 22 June and 1 December provided Stavka with its strategic reserves. The distribution of these forces coincided with the needs of the front and Stavka's offensive plans. However, the Moscow axis remained as the principal theater for these additional Soviet formations. In total, 150 divisions out of 291 (52 percent) and 44 brigades out of 94 (47 percent) went on the Moscow axis: the other formations, 141 divisions and 50 brigades, appeared elsewhere. Since most of these units came from newly-organized troops, they did not become readily available.

For example, between 22 June and 10 July, only 36 divisions moved along the Moscow axis. The other 114 divisions and 44 brigades arrived at later times. [21]

More Russian Reserves in the 1941 Campaign

Introduction
Fremde Heeres Ost
USSR Law of Universal Military Service
USSR Operational Reserves
Conclusion and References