Lost Victories

Stalingrad Counteroffensive

Design Notes

by Bradley Skeen


The Scenario

This scenario is what I always wanted out of Europa. In many Europa games one side or the other has a crushing superiority and the situation is simply played to the bitter end with victory decided not on the basis of who will win, but on how quickly and efficiently the predestined looser is crushed. But in this scenario the whole outcome of the war is at issue so there is a real winner and loser. For that same reason the importance of the campaign and its extreme demands on playing skill have always recommend such a scenario to me. I had hoped I would be satisfied with the 1942 Scenario in SE, but when I play the Germans (I confess they are my favorite side, despicable as they were, and quixotic as their ultimate hope of victory may be) in that game, I always make my main thrust at Moscow (and always win), so the particular details of WINTER STORM (the German code-name for von Manstein's counter offensive, of which I presume George Bush was ignorant) were denied to me. I may add that I was dispirited to find the road network on the FitE/SE maps such that no Soviet offensive such as URANUS could ever be launched where it was historically since no Soviet units could be supplied in the area. I wonder if this oversight was a Freudian slip on the part of someone who just couldn't bear to suffer a defeat like Stalingrad? I was finally forced to quit hoping some one else would do it and designed the thing myself.

I would be very interested in knowing what the magazine's readers think of my effort, and especially to hear suggestions for improvement. Also, I am half inclined to expand a second edition to cover the whole 1942-43 campaign in the Ukraine and the Caucuses if there is any interest in such a long scenario.

The Rules

The plan of division of the rules is not random. The Scenario Rules merely serve to delimit the game and to make it conform to refinements recently introduced into the Europa system. The increased rate of Soviet armor and artillery replacements, and the un-motorized NKVD units follow this logic; both (along with the re-rating of various panzer divisions) are derived from the "Clash of Titans". I am especially pleased that no "invasion­turn" seems to be necessary, only one of many benefits of low-odds overruns.

The Special Rules introduce the means of more closely simulating history. In every case I believe these concepts ought to be incorporated into Grand Europa, and they have been written with that in mind. Some of them are self evident while others are gratefully cribbed from earlier scenarists. The inclusion of the Sixth Army and fortification limitations in this category may seem strange to some, but it is obvious to me that any Europa action which does not take into account the effect of Hitler's unbalanced mind on German operations is not simulating history, but alternate history, answering the question, "What if Hitler had been sane?"

As the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm has pointed out, Hitler's orders always entailed the greatest level of destruction attainable: inflicted on the enemy if possible, but on Germans if necessary. His principle goal was destruction; the sensible conduct of operations was a secondary consideration. Nothing else explains his militarily senseless orders to hold every inch of ground, resulting in this case in the destruction of 6th Army that could easily have been saved. Consider also that in 1945, when the Wehrmacht was finally rendered impotent to harm its foes, Hitler commanded it to destroy the German nation. Confirmation of this imbalance of his reason, if any were needed, is found in the diversion of resources to the shadow war fought against the Jews. Ignoring this restraint on a commander's actions makes for no more realistic a game than ignoring the course of rivers. I am only glad I won't have to write the final rules for it. Similarly, the mobility restrictions of Sixth Army in particular (rather than, say, any isolated unit) may seem artificial, but the rule is not based on operational factors, but on Hitler's orders and reflects the rigid, arbitrary way he thought.

The Optional Rules are intended to solve problems in the Europa system, but which for the time being I consider tentative. The bloodier CRT and new treatment of Special Replacements (which must obviously be used in conjunction) were directly inspired by Charles Sharp's article, "Blood Bath: Casualties on The Eastern Front," in TEM #34. The ZOC rule was inspired in part by Campaign to Stalingrad and in part by an appreciation of the abilities of mechanized forces which seems well in keeping with Europa's emphasis on armor. The artillery division rule seems obvious from the amount of motorized transport they had on hand and also makes these units a little tougher as has often been suggested.

The Variant Rules represent events or policies that had some chance of coming to pass historically, but did not, and, as suggested above, answer, "What if Hitler had been sane?" Notice that the victory conditions are modified accordingly.

Finally, if anyone who read 'Europa Reform Reasoned and Revealed," is surprised to see no complex logistical rules, such constraints would not operate in the scope of even this large scenario where both sides are concentrating their efforts. In Grand Europa the fighting in the south would curtail the historically unsuccessful Soviet offensive launched against AGC at the same time and prevent the Germans launching attacks to cut the reestablished supply line into Leningrad.

Strategy and Victory

I can only give the most straight forward advice. The Soviets must encircle the Sixth Army on the first turn and seize Rostov as quickly as possible. If large portions of Army Group A come north things are all over. The Italians and Hungarians can and must be destroyed quickly, but strikes against deep objectives must be carefully planned and strongly supported. Your only advantage is that the Nazis are off balance; they are still stronger than you.

I remind the German player that von Manstein's preferred means of fighting was to let Soviet mobile forces make deep penetrations, then cut off and kill them with a strong reserve.

Territorial objectives were chosen to fit the ideas of Hitler and Stalin; neither cared much about casualties, but both were obsessed with the occupation of land. In any case the technique of counting eliminated units is tedious and, really, is not likely to produce a radically different result in this case.

Bibliography

Dupuy, T. N., and Paul Martell, Great Battles on The Eastern Front (New York: Bobbs-Merill, 1992).
Kurowski, Franz, "Dietrich and Manteuffel," Hitler's Generals Correlli Barnett, ed. (New York: Quill/William Morrow, 1989)., 411 437.
von Manstein, F. M. Erich, Lost Victories Anthony G. Powell, ed. and trans. (Novato, Calif: Presidio, 1982).
Mitcham, Samuel W., Hitler's Field Marshalls and their Battles (Chelsea, Mich.: Scarborough, 1990).
Rotundo, Louis C., Battle for Stalingrad: The 1943 Soviet General Staff Study (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989).

Ludography
Arnold, Jim, "Lunge to Stalingrad," TEM 34.
Carillo, Flavio, "Kiev 1943," TEM 32.
Simonitch, Mark, Campaign to Stalingrad (Rhino Games, 1992).

More Lost Victories: Stalingrad Counteroffensive


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