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So here we are, the King has laid down the Napoleonic principles of war. [11] In addition, all the true principles of war have been presented for us. We just have to apply them, providing we have our own self discipline to obey principles (see what the King says) and also realistic rules that allow us to practice them. (And that is far from a sure bet!). All of this constitutes the nuts and bolts of the Napoleonic battle.
So, what happened at Saalfeld? Basically:
(1) Prince Louis didn't concentrate his command. Quite the contrary, he dispersed it. So did Hohenlohe at Jena.
(2) In sharp contrast with the Prussian commander, the unfortunate Prince Louis, all the above Napoleonic principles were applied by Marshal Lannes at Saalfeld. That's what gave him victory.
(3) Tactics were secondary. It certainly was not the minor tactics or the formations used - columnar or linear - that were the decisive factor but the careful planning of the final onslaught. Granted, the absence of skirmishers did not help the Prussians. But formations and tactics - although a significant help - were used to fit a tactical situation at a given moment and were not an end by themselves.
Once more it is the application of the above principles that won the victory. Take away these principles and one has nothing.
A much more complete comparison between French and Prussian tactics and grand tactics in 1806 can be found in the fine article authored and presented by Scott Bowden at Historicon '92: "French and Prussian at War: 1806 - A Discussion of the Battlefield Myths and Realities of the Saalfeld-Jena-Auerstadt" to be found in EEL#1.
Footnotes
[1] The translation The Principles of War have been published in 1920 by Henry Holt and Co. New York.
[2] That line of conduct is clearly seen in the letters between Napoleon and Marshal Lannes too numerous to quote here.
[3] See Clausewitz On War, pp.247-8 quoted in EE&L 2.
[4] Marshal Foch. The Principles of War, p. 311. For an extensive coverage of the Oblique Order, see EE&L 4.
[5] Such dispositions include the occupation of ridges, etc. Unfortunately, that is too lengthy a subject to be covered in the present article.
[6] The enemy reconnaissances report the French troops coming on three columns, which greatly surprises the Prussians, who always use a single-column system.
[7] Skirmishers were trained to fire on officers.
[8] Note that the flanks of the attack are protected by the troops deployed in echelons capable of counter-attacking any troops that might threaten those flanks.
[9] In all battles, the casualties are always very hard to establish with any degree of confidence. The ordnance captured at Saalfeld is also hard to determine. Foch's number is 25 guns and 2 howitzers. Suchet in his report mentions that he captured 1500 to 1800 prisoners, 15 Prussian and 18 Saxon guns or a total of 33. That is 6 more than Foch reports (He appears to always low ball the enemy losses). We know that Prince Louis had only 2 1/2 batteries with him. One of the batteries had 8 guns, the 1/2 battery 4 guns and the third 12 guns - total 24, of which 8 were horse artillery. There were also 16 guns attached to the infantry battalions. Grand total of 40 guns. Since Pelet had 4 guns (half a battery), which escaped with him, and all the other guns were lost, the French should have taken the difference or 36 guns. These figures simply don't add up.
[10] Do not forget that in 1813, the Division does not exist in the Prussian army. Hence, organizationally speaking a Prussian brigade is the equivalent of a French Division.
[11] Foch does not mention King Frederick William's principles #3, #4, or #5.
More 1806 Battle of Saalfeld
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