As for the Prussians, what impression did they derive from all these actions? All the information concerning them is borrowed from the work of an eye-witness, the Saxon engineer Mumpfling, author of the Vertraute Briefe. After describing with little praise the situation in which the Prussian army was drawn up, he adds: "Can you not see us all in line before that threatening rampart and lying unsheltered on the narrow stretch of meadows which separates it from the Saale, with our back to the river? From that rampart, enemy skirmishers [7] themselves under perfect cover, could easily pick out any one of us, without it being possible to return fire on completely invisible men; and this past time continued for several hours (apparently two hours, i.e. from 11a.m. to 1p.m, JAL). During that time, the French commanders, who, from their places, could thoroughly mark the weak points in our line, took their disposition accordingly.... The maneuvers of the French were developing more and more, Their object was to fend off the troops posted on the left wing above and near Saalfeld and to keep the whole front of the Prince's position busy with their skirmishers, always edging for the left, so as to envelop the Prince and cut him off from the Schwarza." The above, of course was written after the event and shows that the writer had understood what the French preparation aimed at. However, during the action itself, the intentions of the French were not so easy to discover. Save the fire of the skirmishers, nothing could be seen on the horizon. Reconnoitering parties sent out very early in the day saw columns marching on Eiba, on the main road, and on Beulwitz. These columns, however, had all disappeared and, so far, nothing but an insignificant skirmish attack had taken place. What then are the intention of these columns of which nothing is seen? One battalion (2nd Mufling) is sent to Schwarza. At the same time an order arrives from Prince Hohenlohe to remain at Rudolstadt and not to attack, as the army is coming from Blankenhayen to the Saale. A battery and and the 1st Muffling battalion is ordered to the Sandberg. Then, other battalions establish a link with the main Prussian body. The attack is ready. A retreat by Schwarza, in case of a check, becomes more and more important. Hence, the Prince orders the foot battery and the 1st Mufling battalion to occupy the Sandberg. Then, the Prince-Clement regiment is ordered to establish one battalion (the 1st) between Aue and Crosten in order to connect this occupation of the Sandberg with the main body of the Division. The 2nd Clement battalion is to climb up on the Sandberg where it is to place itself on the right of the battery and of the 1st Mufling. So far, the Prince's dispositions have committed two regiments and 12 guns to occupy and defend Schwarza and hills commanding that place. In addition, two battalions and 12 guns are occupying Saalfeld. Map 3 MAP 3 SHOWING THE PARTIAL REDEPLOYMENT OF THE PRUSSIANS PRIOR TO THEIR ATTACK AND THE LOCATION OF THE FRENCH. THE TIME IS ABOUT 1 P.M. More 1806 Battle of Saalfeld Introduction I: Grand Army and Lannes' Movement Prior to Battle II: Initial Situation at Saalfeld III: Events and Intents from the Prussian Side IV: Lannes' Initial Disposition and Deployment V: Preliminary Action on Prussian Side VI: Prussian Attack VII: Lannes' Attack VIII: Combats Around Garnsdorf, Saalfeld, and the Pursuit IX: Conclusions X: Further Conclusions XI: The Battlefield Today Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 6 Back to EEL List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com