Battle of Saalfeld 1806

A Discussion

IX: Conclusions

by Jean A. Lochet

We find confirmation of many points argued in our previous article on Bressonet's conclusions. The main point here concerns the effectiveness of unopposed skirmishers. At Saalfeld, their effectiveness is recognized by Foch as well as by a Saxon eyewitness to the ordeal. Like at Jena, we see formed troops standing for hours under the fire of unopposed skirmishers as reported by Engineer Mumpfling:

    "From that rampart, enemy skirmishers could easily pick out any one of us .... and this past time lasted for several hours."

Was that an isolated instance during the Campaign of 1806. Certainly not. In EE&L 2, in our analysis of Bressonet's conclusions we also presented another similar eyewitness account at the Battle of Jena. That of Lieutenant von Borcke of Ruchel's Corps in which Von Borcke states:

    "However, from a great distance, the bullets of hostile skirmishers already reached us; they were placed formidably in the front of us laying down in the field, bushes and covers; we were unacquainted with such tactics; the bullets appeared to come from the air. To be under such fire without seeing the enemy made a bad impression on our soldiers. Then, because of the unfamiliarity with this sort of fighting, they lost their confidence in their muskets and immediately felt the superiority of the adversary. They therefore suffered, already being in a critical position, very quickly in bravery, endurance and calmness and could not wait for the time to fire themselves which soon proved to be to our disadvantage."

We have there a very similar situation of troops exposed to unopposed skirmishers but this time note the terrible effect that the combined fire of the artillery and the unopposed skirmishers had on Ruchel's Corps. The very same thing had taken place a little earlier in the front of Vierzelmheiligen where that deadly combination of unopposed skirmisher fire and artillery took a heavy toll of Hohenlohe's troops that stood there, inactive, for two hours, while Napoleon's reserves were building up for the final onslaught which routed Hohenlohe's command as it later did Michel's Corps. The very same had taken place at Saalfeld.

From the above, I can only reiterate the effectiveness of unopposed skirmishers in somewhat shaking up an enemy line and repeat my statement published in EE&L 2. However, I do partially agree with Bressonet on the following:

    "But, it is also evident to report that if on open ground, the fact of not using tirailleurs in liaison with the line battalions has been more costly to the Prussian battalions in their effort to advance, the lack of tirailleurs did not prevent them firom resisting us vigorously until the action of new French troops on the weak points of their line or on their flanks forced them to give in."

Which does not mean that if the tirailleurs had been used by the Prussians, their ability to resist would not have been better!

But let us not be carried away by tactics and forget the main and most important principles outlined by Marshal Foch, because tactics alone do not win battles.

Perhaps the most striking point to any wargamer is the considerable amount of time needed at Saalfeld for Lannes to deploy his troops and prepares his final attack. He patiently prepared the battle for 6 hours! But let us go back to Foch.

The theory which has been put in practice by Lannes is obvious. One clearly sees how the maneuver of long duration (from 9 A.M. to 3 p.m.) aims exclusively at bringing about the powerful, undisputable conclusion by means of all the main forces. Such conclusion being preceded by a preparation to which the smallest number possible were devoted.

The determination of the point where to execute the main and final effort is very important. The direction selected for attack must include good means of access, few obstacles and space to maneuver in force. Of the main body in reserve for the final attack, two parts must exist:

    (1) A main one, devoted to the decisive attack (17th, 34th and 64th).
    (2) The security disposition for that attack, the weaker (88th), designed to support and protect the decisive attack. In any case: this is the last reserve of the front.

In the process of execution (through maneuver and/or fire), the decisive attack would tend to achieve such a combination - envelopment or attack in front and in flank - as would enable numerical superiority to develop all the effects of which it is capable. The attack in front and the attack in flank remaining in any case closely connected with each other.

The decisive attack should be carefully prepared by artillery. Finally, at the moment when the enemy is worn down and held on his front, threatened on his most exposed flank, and about to be assaulted by the decisive main attack; we add the final ingredient. A general attack across the entire battle line is let loose, today as in the past, in order to prevent the enemy from parrying the final effort.

Then comes the pursuit, without truce or mercy, with troops as well in hand as possible, commanded at Saalfeld by Victor and Claparede.

That theory of the decisive attack had been perfectly grasped by the Prussians of 1813, from studying the wars of the Empire. Proof:

    action and, if we have no fresh troops to oppose his, he compels us to give way. We must draw therefrom this principle, which is the enemy's, that we must spare our forces and support the action until we turn to the main attack.

    (2) Our artillery has not produced a great effect, because it has been too much divided....

    (6) War in general, but above all, the issue of battle, depends upon superiority of forces on one point.

    (7) In order to secure this superiority of forces, it is necessary to deceive the enemy concerning the real front of attack and to make a false attack and a real attack.

    (8) Both attacks must be masked by skirmishers, so that the enemy should be unable to distinguish the difference.

    (9) A line of skirmishers is first of all to be sent out. The attention of the enemy is to be drawn by several battalions designed to fire on one of the wings, on which guns must be firing heavily at the same moment. Battle must be ordered in that fashion.

    (10) Meanwhile, the real attack is still postponed and it only begins later on, at the moment when the enemy's attention is entirely turned on the false attack.

    (11) The real attack is made as quickly and as vigorously as possible and above all by a large mass of artillery and infantry, of a superior force, if possible, while a particular corps goes round the enemy flank .... In principle, a commander should devote one brigade [10] to the false attack, two brigades to the real one and have one brigade in reserve.

    "These are principles which are well known to you and which have been several times recommended. We have put them frequently into practice in our peace maneuvers but I remind you of them, because what is known is sometimes forgotten, because though a simple thing may seem to be commonplace, yet victory often depends upon it. Unless one is careful to recall it everyday to mind, one indulges in combinations which are too scientific, or, what is worse, one goes into battle without having taken any disposition whatever."

Then Foch goes on to his own conclusions:

    "As we see, after explaining the theory of the preparatory attack, or false attack, and of the decisive attack, which he calls the real attack, after showing by what kind of actions this theory must express itself the King states, in order to make more precise for the use o undecidedminds: 'Ou toffou rbrigades, you shall devote one in the false attack, two to the real one and one to the reserve.' Later on, a prefect will lay down the formula: a third in order to open, a third in order to wear down and a third in order to finish."

Map of Saalfeld


Jumbo Map (very slow: 337K)

More 1806 Battle of Saalfeld

Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 6
Back to EEL List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1994 by Emperor's Headquarters
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com