On 17 April 1810, Marshal Andre Massena, Prince of Essling, was placed in command of 'L'Armee de Portugal' and instructed to capture Lisbon and drive Wellington's army into the sea. At various times during the subsequent campaign he was obliged to make a number of crucial decisions. As Massena ultimately lost the campaign it would seem that he made the wrong decisions. But did he?

Massena's force was to consist of the 2nd, 6th and 8th army corps and the troops of General Kellerman and Bonnet that were occupying the provinces of Toro, Palencia, Valladolid and Santander. An unattached division was under General Serras. Massena was also promised the use of the 9th Corps which was a recently formed body made up of newly recruited 4th Battalions of regiments already serving in Spain. This whole force numbered some 138,000 officers and men. However, Kellerman and Bonnet were fully occupied with maintaining order in their respective districts and the 9th Corps did not arrive at Vitoria until September, after the invasion had begun. The effective strength of the available field army was therefore no more than 86,000 (2nd Corps, Reynier - 20,000 all ranks; 6th Corps, Ney - 35,000; 8th Corps, Junot 26,000; Reserve Cavalry Corps, 5,000; 12,000 sick).' 1

Napoleon had told Massena that "I do not wish an immediate entry into Lisbon, as I could not feed the city with its immense population which lives on imported food. He should employ the summer months taking Cuidad Rodrigo and Almeida. There is no need to hurry. He should proceed methodically." 2

Consequently, it was not until 15 September with the frontier fortresses of Cuidad Rodrigo and Almeida safely in French hands that the invasion began. Until this point, Massena had not been called upon to make any significant decisions. The capture of the two fortresses had been left to his most capable subordinate, Marshal Ney, but now he had to decide which route to take to Lisbon. It was a decision of paramount importance.

The first, and most obvious, route was along a major, paved road that ran from Almeida by Celoricol Ponte da Murcella and Coimbra. It was a relatively good road compared with many of the Portuguese roads of the day. However, it was known at Massena's headquarters that Wellington had built a line of earthwork redoubts at the Ponte da Murcella 3, where there was a 'long commanding bare ridge between the Alva and the Mondego, a distance of six miles, each flank falling steep to the deep ravines of those rivers'. 4 It offered an excellent defensive position to dispute the river crossing. The bridge was also mined.

The only apparent alternative route was a very poor, mountainous road which went through Pinhel and Viseu, by-passing the Ponte da Murcella, and then on to join the main road at Coimbra. A possible third alternative was to divide his army in two, sending one part to hold down Wellington at Ponte da Murcella whilst the other part turned the British position by marching via Viseu. It would thus be able to fall upon Wellington's rear.

To aid him in making his decision, Massena had thirty renegade Portuguese officers on his staff. He also had the help of Junot and the officers and engineers of his corps that had invaded Portugal less than three years earlier. 5 Ye the information that he received proved completely misleading. 'The presence of the Portuguese officers was particularly disastrous for us,' wrote Pelet, 'Without making a dismal listing of all the errors transmitted to us in the information that the Prince or I requested, I will cite only one example.

On 15 April, an engineer captain who had taken part in the campaign of 1807 gave me the following information at Cuidad Rodrigo. I copied it word for word in my Journal the same day. 'Beyond the confluence of the Zezere the country becomes flat. The bed of the Tagus becomes wider. There are only scattered hills and everything is very approachable . . . It is the same all the way to the sea...accessible to all armies, and adequate for marching or manoeuvring in any direction from the Tagus . . .' From this vague description how could we anticipate the inaccessible positions and the rock walls? (of the Lines of Torres Vedras) . . .

We were even less fortunate in what we had been told about the military topography of Portugal, about the inaccessibility of the Serra de Estrella and the banks of the Zezere, the nature of the Tagus and the country in general, the roads and the positions of Bussaco and Murcella. . .We had been told that some good roads extended on the right bank of the Mondego through open, flat country up to Coimbra, and that by this means we could turn the position of Ponte da Murcella. 6

From this it is clear that Massena, though he knew that the Celorico road was the best and most direct route to Lisbon, believed that he would encounter no particular difficulty if he took the road through Viseu. By following this road he would force the AngloPortuguese army to abandon its position forcing them to battle on ground that was not of their choosing. The consideration of dividing his army was quickly dismissed. 'Double lines were rejected because of the size of the army as well as the nature of the country,' said Pelet, 'The enemy would be able to throw himself on either line or between them as we approached Lisbon, where the ground became less difficult.' 7

The maps with which Massena had been supplied did nothing to counter this view. 'We were in effect without maps,' recorded Pelet, 'since that of Lopez, in spite of its large scale, was poorly marked, the roads and rivers horribly drawn and the terrain even more poorly represented. There was also a poor little map by a Portuguese major, not to mention several even more defective ones drawn on the previous maps. A few private drawings had been given us, but they could not be of any help, they showed even more errors, for their scale was larger. 8

The Army of Portugal therefore left Almeida and marched to Viseu. Very shortly after leaving the main Celorico road, it became apparent that Massena had made a mistake. 'After passing the little town of Trancoso . . . all the countryside is mountain and rock,' remarked one of Junot's artillery officers, Colonel Noel. 'There is no road, only a stony, narrow, dangerous track, which the artillery had all the pains in the world to follow without meeting accidents. It is all steep ups and downs.

I had to march with a party of gunners ahead of me, with picks and crowbars to enlarge the track . . . The guns were almost always abandoned to themselves; we did not know what road to follow, having no-one to give us information but a few infantry stragglers, who had themselves lost their way.' 9 When Massena reached Viseu he informed Napoleon of his predicament. 'It is impossible to find worse roads than these; they bristle with rocks; the guns and train have suffered severely, and I must wait for them. . . Sire, all our marches are across a desert; not a soul to be seen anywhere; everywhere is abandoned.' 10

The 2nd Corps led the French march from Viseu and, on 24 September, it encountered the allied rearguard for the first time in the plain before the town of Mortagoa, fourteen miles north of Busaco. The rearguard held its ground until the main body of the 2nd Corps arrived the following day. It then retreated to the village of Moura at the foot of the Serra de Busaco where it again made a stand. Ney, with the 6th Corps, joined the 2nd Corps and Wellington withdrew the rearguard up the slopes of the mountain where further allied troops were posted. By this time, there was only a few hours of daylight left and Ney decided not to attack the heights. Massena did not ride up to the front even though he must have heard the cannon firing throughout the afternoon. He had been informed by Reynier that Wellington was standing at bay on the Busaco ridge.

The following morning allied troops could be seen moving around along the crest of the ridge. A few deserters and captured stragglers revealed that Wellington had concentrated a large body of troops upon the mountain. 11 Ney sent a message to Massena informing him of the situation. Ney's aide, a Colonel D'Esmenard, arrived at Massena's headquarters at Tondella, twenty-two miles to the rear at about 10:00 a.m. Upon receipt of Ney's letter, Massena set off for the front, reaching Mortagoa at noon. 'I have arrived at Mortagoa an I have decided to stop for a time,' he wrote to Ney,' I think that you should continue your march, pushing them towards Luso. If they hold, please send one of my officers who is in your vicinity, and I will join the 6th Corps. 12

It seemed apparent to Ney that Wellington would not be easily dislodged from an obviously strong position, and he did not attack as requested. Instead, Reynier wrote to Massena: 'It is necessary to climb a steep slope to attack the Anglo-Portuguese. Moreover, I am not in a position to oppose the enemy artillery. I impatiently await the role that you will assign to me. 13

It was becoming increasingly evident to Massena that his presence at the front had now become essential. He left Mortagoa in the afternoon, arriving at Ney's headquarters at around 5:00 p.m.

Together, the two marshals made a reconnaissance of the allied positions in the fading light of evening. Wellington was in a strong position and apparently prepared to fight, and so Massena was now faced with the second major decision of the campaign.

Massena's instinct was to attack but he decided to call a council of war. That evening he invited Friron, his chief of staff, Eble, who commanded the artillery, Lazowski of the Engineers, and his three corps commanders to discuss the situation. Only Reynier and Lazowski were in favour of an attack, all the others opposed an assault upon such a formidable position. Ney suggested a withdrawal to Viseu from where they could threaten Oporto or retire upon Almeida and Cuidad Rodrigo to await reinforcements.

Massena quickly dismissed this negative line of reasoning. 'The Emperor has ordered us to march on Lisbon, not Oporto, and he has his reasons.' he told Ney, 'The capture of Lisbon ends the struggle while that of Oporto only prolongs it without any termination. ' He also reasoned that that Wellington would still be able to block the French if they marched upon Oporto, as the allies had a direct route from Coimbra to Oporto. They could therefore be there ahead of the French.

Regarding Ney's suggestion of retiring to the protection of Almeida and Cuidad Rodrigo, Massena answered that ' there will always be time to think o that after sustaining a defeat...The worst result of a defeat would be to retire our base of operations behind the Coa between Almeida and Cuidad Rodrigo . . . The victory on the other hand, would force the British to evacuate the country between the Mondego and Tagus. 14 Friron and Eble suggested making an attempt to turn Wellington's flank. But Massena ignored this sound advice. 'You are of the Army of the Rhine, you like to manoeuvre,' Massena replied contemptuously, 'This is the first time that Wellington appears disposed to offer battle. I will profit by the occasion. 15

That night, Massena dictated his orders for the attack.

End of Part 1

More Portugal

Part 2: Wellington's Plans for the Defense of Portugal
Massena's Invasion of 1810 Part 1
Massena's Invasion of 1810 Part 2