article and photographs by John Grehan
Map by Derek Stone
The Military Situation in 1810 On 12 July 1809, Austria and France signed an armistice that
ended the Wagram campaign. With France's northern and eastern
borders once again secure (albeit temporarily), Napoleon could turn
his full attention upon events in the Iberian Peninsula. Although
initially he intended to go to Spain himself to 'finish the business' in
person, his divorce from Josephine and the subsequent marriage to
an Austrian princess compelled him to remain in Paris. [13]
His operations in the Peninsula were thus entrusted to his
lieutenants. Nevertheless, Napoleon fed large numbers of fresh
troops into Spain during the Autumn and Winter of 1809-10.
Additionally, he ordered his brother, King Joseph of Spain, to
consolidate the French position in Spain and not to undertake any
offensive until the following Spring when all reinforcements would
have arrived. The bulk of these were to form an army for the
conquest of Portugal and this campaign was to be the main focus of
operations in 1810.
Of the other forces in Spain, Marshal Soult with 73,000
men had recently occupied the province of Andalucia, whilst
General de Division Suchet with 26,000 held Aragon. Marshal
Augereau, commanding 56,900 men was engaged in attempting to
subdue Catalonia. The area around Madrid, together with the
province of New Castile, was controlled by King Joseph with
14,000 men. A further 20,000 were scattered in garrisons across the
northern provinces and guarding the line of communication back
into France. In all, the French had 237,000 men already in Spain,
and a further 100,000 marched to join them throughout 1809-10.
Between them, the French commanders controlled the
province of Leon, the greater part of Old Castile, part of
Extramadura, Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, Biscay, New Castile and
Andalucia. Most of Central, much of Northern, and part of
Southern Spain were in French hands. However, it was this extent
of territory that restricted any further French advances, for all this
land had to be policed and most of those 200,000 men were not
available for field operations.
Wellington saw this situation quite clearly. 'My opinion is,
that as long as we shall remain in a state of activity in Portugal, the
contest must continue in Spain,' he advised the Earl of Liverpool.
'They must employ a very large force indeed in the operations
which will render it necessary for us to go away; and I doubt
whether they can bring that force to bear upon Portugal without
abandoning other objects, and exposing their whole fabric in Spain
to great risk. If they should be able to invade it (Portugal), and
should not succeed in obliging us to evacuate the country, they will
be in a very dangerous situation; and the longer we can oppose
them, and delay their success, the more likely are they to suffer
materially in Spain.' [14]
Yet it was inevitable that eventually the French would find
sufficient men to march against Portugal. It was thus to the frontier
fortresses that Wellington looked to delay the invaders whilst his
plans reached fruition.
Portugal's first line of defence, ironically, would be the string of
Spanish border fortresses. Built to threaten Portugal, the massive
walls of Astorga, Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were now to defend
it. All were still held by the Spaniards and could be expected to
defy the French for a number of weeks.
Badajoz on the River Guadiana, This fortress was still in Spanish
hands in 1810, and it was the strongpoint from which the Spanish Army of
Extramadura operated. The French would have had to capture Badajoz before any
advance into Portugal south of the Tagus could have been undertaken.
The flying-bridge at Villa Velha. To enable the rapid passage of troops
from the Castello Branco region to the Lisbon peninsula, Wellington established a
route which went directly south from Castello Branco to the defile at Villa Velha
where a flying-bridge carried the troops across the Tagus. The road then continued
through Nisa to the lowest permanent bridge across the Tagus at Abrantes. From
Abrantes the main road from Badajoz ran directly to Lisbon. To aid lateral
communications and to allow the concentration of Wellington's divisions at his
chosen defensive position, another road was also constructed. This was known as
the 'military road, and ran from Thomar, via Espinal, to the Ponte do
Marcella.
Astorga lies so far to the North that it might well have been
ignored by the invaders, but Napoleon had ordered that it
should be reduced before the campaign began. This fortress,
Napoleon reasoned, gave the Spanish Army of Galicia a stronghold
on the plains of Leon from which it might operate against the
French rear. Because of its dilapidated medieval walls, its capture
would not prove difficult.
Ciudad Rodrigo, by contrast, was a regular fortress and,
situated as it was on the Portuguese frontier, was a place of
undisputed importance. There was no question about the necessity
of the French taking Ciudad Rodrigo before any serious attempt
upon Portugal could be considered. For its reduction Napoleon
provided a great battering train of fifty large calibre guns, with
2,500 artillerymen and sappers in addition to the artillery of the
three corps that were to form the invading army.
Badajoz, far to the South in Spanish Extramadura, was the
most formidable fortress upon the frontier. It was much larger and
stronger than Ciudad Rodrigo, with towering fortifications set on a
rugged hill overlooking the whole countryside. Badajoz also had a
ring of strong detached forts in dominant positions. The circuit of
ground that would have to be taken up by a besieging army was
vast, and a wide, fast-flowing river -- the Guadiana -- cut any lines
an attacker would occupy in two.
Portugal's second line of defence was her own frontier
fortresses of Almeida and Elvas. Both were capable of a prolonged
defence and all that Wellington had to do was ensure that they
were adequately garrisoned and provisioned. Almeida was placed
under the command of the English Colonel William Cox, with
5,000 men consisting of one regiment of regulars and three
regiments of militia. Elvas was held by two regiments of regulars
and three of militia -- 8,000 men -- under General Leite.
Only four other Portuguese fortresses were placed in a
state of defence: Peniche, Valenza, Abrantes and Campo Mayor.
Peniche was a very strong, isolated sea-fortress, on a projecting
headland in the Atlantic, forty miles north of Lisbon. It was
virtually impregnable. 'The isthmus over which the peninsula of
Peniche is approached is covered with water at High tides, and
from the Line of Works describing a sort of arc, very powerful
cross-fires may be established upon every part of,' noted a British
staff officer. [15]
If the French were to penetrate as far as the Lisbon
peninsula, Peniche would afford an ideal base for allied raids
against the rear of the enemy. It would also act as a secure point
from where stranded troops and partisans could be carried off by
the Royal Navy.
Valenza, on the River Minho in the North of the country
above Oporto, was situated at a strategically important point, and
its defences, destroyed by Soult in 1809, were fully repaired. This
fortress however, would only come into play if the French made
their attack from Galicia.
Abrantes is situated on a hill above the North bank of the
Tagus upstream from Lisbon. It is at the point where the road from
Spain by way of Castello Branco crosses the road from north to
south down the Portuguese frontier from Almeida to Elvas. It was
the natural point through which troops could be moved north and
south along the frontier, with its permanent bridge protected by
commanding fortifications. Wellington ordered its old defences to
be re-built and strengthened, under the direction of a British
Engineer, with new earthworks and redoubts. [16]
It was garrisoned with two militia regiments. The
fortifications of Campo Mayor, a small antiquated fortress close to
Elvas, were also repaired and the place garrisoned by a militia
battalion.
Elvas and Almeida, Peniche and Abrantes were all regular
fortresses with large garrisons. There were also other points where
Wellington ordered fortifications of a less permanent kind to be
thrown up. The first of these was the line of earthwork redoubts
near Penacova behind the River Alva (a left bank tributary of the
Mondego), where Wellington expected to make his decisive stand
against the French. Here an abrupt ridge commanded the important
Ponte da Murcella, the only bridge across the Alva, carrying the
most direct road from Celorico to Coimbra south of the Mondego
valley. The ridge dominating the left bank of the Alva offered an
excellent defensive position to dispute the river crossing.
On 31 January 1810, Wellington ordered the 6-pounder and
9-pounder cannon of the British Reserve Artillery to be moved up
from Lisbon and sent to the Ponte da Murcella. [17]
The second was a line of redoubts and trenches, virtually a
fortified camp, that was built on the east bank of the Zezere. This
covered the main Castello to Abrantes road at the point where it
debouches into the river.
French Invasion of Portugal Part 1: Wellington's Plans for the Defence of Portugal
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