Dutch During The Revolutionary Wars

French Invasion of
Dutch Republic: 1793

French Advance

By Geert van Uythoven, The Netherlands

Part V
Part IV
Part III
Part II
Part I

During the first days of February, only French patrols advanced in the vicinity of Steenbergen, Oudenbosch and neighbouring villages. The Dutch were in the dark about the French plans, and as a result the whole province Brabant was in great alarm. The threat became so real, that for example on 10th February the outpost at the village Hoogerheide was pulled back to the fortress-city Bergen-op-Zoom. Until the 13th February, secret negotiations were held between the French envoy De Maulde and General Dumouriez on one side, and the British envoy in The Hague and the Councillor of State Van der Spiegel on the other. These did however not succeed. As a result, the National Convention ordered Dumouriez to attack immediately. On the 17th, the Armée de Hollande crossed the Dutch border and concentrated in the area between the fortress-cities Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda. The army consisted of 21 infantry battalions, of which only two were regular line, the remainder being ‘national’ battalions. Of these national battalions, only three had seen any fighting before. Only eight of these battalions had regimental guns. Discipline was bad. Especially the gendarmerie nationale was renowned for its bad behaviour. The light troops consisted of three Batavian battalions (1,500 men), about 1,000 Belgians, and 1,200 men of the newly created Légion du Nord. [13]

The cavalry was about 1,000 men strong. The field artillery consisted of four 12-pdr and eight 8-pdr guns, four heavy and twenty small mortars, and four howitzers. The army would be reinforced by additional units being assembled in cantonments around Bruges, commanded by maréchal de camp Louis-Charles de La Motte-Ango, marquis de Flers. De Flers had also the task to create out of these troops a corps consisting of 5,000 - 6,000 men with a small siege train, to threaten the fortress-city Sluis, situated in Dutch Flanders. The composition of the Armée de Hollande and the units assembled by maréchal de camp De Flers are depicted in Table C. [14] The advance guard, commanded by Adjudant Général, Colonel Benoît Guérin de Berneron, had already advanced on to the territory of the Dutch Republic on the 16th. The exiled patriot Colonel Daendels was ordered to lead the advance with part of the Advance Guard; both battalions (800 men) of the Légion Batave and the Dragons Bataves (100 men), both formed of Dutch patriot exiles. He would have to penetrate on to the Roode Vaart and Zwaluwe, to confiscate all boats he could lay his hands on, cross the river to the island of Dordrecht and to gather about one hundred transport ships. With these ships Dumouriez’ main army would cross the Hollandsch Diep near Strijensas. In addition, a bridge would be constructed across the river Mark, to secure communication between the advance guard and the main army.

On the 16th, Colonel Daendels had crossed the Dutch border and advanced north, followed closely by the remainder of the French Advance Guard. These troops were followed by the main army, divided in two columns. On the 19th, the village Oudenbosch was occupied by 400 infantry and 50 cavalry. In addition, the village Zevenbergen was occupied by the French. However, Colonel Daendels was to be very disappointed when, reaching the rivers Mark and Dintel, he found no boats to cross. The predominantly patriot inhabitants had not followed the order of Prince William of Orange to bring all their boats over to the north side of the Hollandsch Diep, but they also hesitated to hand them over to the French, or even their Batavian allies! It is not so strange that the inhabitants reacted this way; every village were the French came had to deliver not only billets for the soldiers but also food, guides, labourers, horses, cattle and wagons, without any payment at all! Also many villages had to provide for a ‘loan’ in cash! Therefore, not surprisingly, the inhabitants had more and more the idea of being plundered instead of being ‘freed’ from the oppression of the House of Orange.

So when on the 22nd Dumouriez left Antwerp and arrived with his army, except for the advance guard he found it standing idle on the left bank of the river Mark, northwest of Breda. Not sure what to do, the French had positioned troops at all gates of this fortress, and thrown up some batteries on the south side of it. So initially following a scheme in which time was essential, in this way whole days were wasted. The only positive aspect was that the French soldiers for once had more then enough provisions, provided by the inhabitants, voluntarily or requisitioned.

The Dutch did nothing to hamper the advance of the French, and because for the reasons already being mentioned the French weakness was unknown to them. Having lost precious time, but meeting no real resistance until now, Dumouriez decided to bombard and try to take one or more of the fortress-cities in the western part of Brabant. This in order to capture the much needed guns and ammunition, while more boats were being gathered for a crossing of the Hollandsch Diep. [15]

Adjudant Général Berneron was ordered to move the Advance Guard to the fortress-cities Klundert and Willemstad, both at the Hollandsch Diep. Théodore-François-Joseph Leclaire, Colonel of the 90me Régiment d’Infanterie and also commanding the Division de Gauche, was ordered to cover the fortress-cities Bergen-op-Zoom and Steenbergen. As a result of the French presence in front of these fortress-cities, both governors evacuated their outposts and retreated into both fortresses. The remainder of the French main army took up positions between Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda.

In Zeeland not much happened. Once the French squadron, commanded by Captain Moultson, made a feeble attempt to force the Scheldt, but a few shots from the Dutch held fortress Bath sufficed to scare the French off. The sheer presence of this squadron however occupied a strong force of especially Dutch and British warships, much needed at other places. [16]

Footnotes

[1] A rather positive reason contradicted by a few sources, stating that Dumouriez was in Paris to plea for ‘living of the land’ with his army. It was a fact that the Belgian population, initially pro-French, every day opposed the French presence even more. This was triggered by the many requisitions, the treatment and plundering of the Catholic Church, and the bad behaviour of a great part of the French soldiers. It is difficult to be certain what were the real motives of Dumouriez, and not the purpose of this article to look further into this matter. Further, the term ‘Belgian’ is historically not right, but I will use it to simplify the articles, lacking another term as clear to everyone.
[2] Of which only 13,700 were ready for battle. Chuquet in his ‘Les guerres de la révolution - Tome V: La Trahison de Dumouriez’ (Paris 1887) p.34 gives 15,582 infantry, 1,036 cavalry, and 228 artillery.
[3] For a biography of Daendels, see my article on him that appeared in First Empire No. 39.
[4] Strengths given are the returns of 1 March 1793. Based on Desbriére E. et Sautai M., ‘Organisation et tactique des trois armes - Cavalerie-IIe Fascicule: La Cavalerie pendant la Révolution du 14 Juillet 1789 au 26 Juin 1794’ (Paris, Nancy 1907).
[5] Yes, this is the same Moreau that would win the battle of Hohenlinden (1800) and would serve the Allies in 1813 as a military advisor, to be mortally wounded during the battle of Dresden (27 August).
[6] Organisation and strengths of 3 February 1793. Main sources: Dohna, Albrecht zu, Der Feldzug der Preussen gegen die Franzosen in den Niederlanden im Jahr 1793 1er Band (Stendal 1798) pp. 6-16; Stammliste aller Regimenter und Corps der Königlich-Preußischen Armee. Für das Jahr 1804 (Berlin 1805).
[7] Schützen = sharpshooters.
[8] Small mortars, to fire grenades, to be carried by two men.
[9] A very interesting remark about the origin of the Prussian soldiers (source: Dohna, Albrecht zu, Der Feldzug der Preussen gegen die Franzosen in den Niederlanden im Jahr 1793 1er Band (Stendal 1798) p. 28.
[10] See the previous article for details about the Anspach Brigade.
[11] According to Fortescue, the Prussians and Austrians agreed on 40,000 men more then they actually had! His judgement of the Austrians and Prussians is very critical. The taking of Mainz was, according to Fortescue, deemed necessary by the Prussians and Austrians. According to them, Belgium was plundered by the French and not able to nourish an advancing Allied army. Without the taking of Mainz, the main supply route for the Austrian army, the river Rhine, was effectively blocked. Why the Austrians and Prussians did advance without Mainz being taken, Fortescue does not explain. Source: Fortescue, J.W., British campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794, being extracts from “A history of the British army” (London 1918) p.178.
[12] As we will see, eventually Maastricht was relieved by the Austrians, the Dutch being to much occupied with Dumouriez’ troops.
[13] A “gaffelaar” or “gaffelschip” is a small kind of yacht.
[14] Commanded by Colonel François-Joseph Westermann, the Légion du Nord was erected not long ago, and very raw and undisciplined.
[15] Based on: Chuquet, Arthur, ‘Les guerres de la révolution - Tome V: La Trahison de Dumouriez’ (Paris 1887) pp.34-35.
[16] Up to this moment, only twenty-three boats were found, capable to carry only two thousand soldiers in one shift. To less to try a crossing with a reasonable chance of success.

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Region of Dumouriez' Advance Jumbo Map (extremely slow: 574K)

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The Dutch During the Revolutionary Wars

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