The Capture of Breda
and Geertruidenburg 1793
Dutch During the
Revolutionary Wars Part 8
Introduction and Garrison of Breda
by Geert van Uythoven, Netherlands
 |
Lieutenant-General Beurnonville Engraving by Pannemaker, after De la Charlerie
In addition, Breda was ideally located as a base for further operations. Colonel François-Joseph Westermann, commander of the Légion du Nord, was promoted Adjudant général and given command of the siege troops, only a mere 1,000 men and eight field guns strong! He was to be ably assisted by maréchal de camp and engineer Jean-Claude-Eléonor Le Michaud, chevalier d’Arçon. The besieging force consisted of the following units: - Légion du Nord - 9me bat / Fédérés nationaux - a bataillon gendarmerie nationale [1]
Breda was one of the relatively best-prepared fortresses in the Dutch Republic, with a relatively strong garrison and provisions. Recently this garrison was much weakened by moving the 3rd battalion of the Regiment Nassau-Usingen [2] to Arnhem, and most of the detachment of artillerymen to other fortresses. The garrison still consisted of 1,335 infantry and 197 dragoons, coming from the following regiments [3]:
Further there were 153 artillerymen, some cadets from the school for artillery and sappers, and a few pontonniers. This garrison was much to small for a
fortress of this size to withstand a regular siege, and all outlying defence works had to be abandoned. It was, however, strong enough to prevent a coup de main and to
defend the fortress long enough to be relieved by the field army. The fortress had 360 guns in all, [4] and was provisioned with 300,000 pounds of gunpowder, 6,000 muskets and all other things needed to withstand a siege for a while.
It came close to a weakening of the garrison even more. The battalion of the Regiment Oranje Nassau, No. 2 received orders to leave on 18 February for another destination. A Swiss battalion from the Regiment ‘Hirzel’, coming from Geertruidenberg, would relieve it. However, when the battalion was ready to march on the 18th at break of day, to leave when the Swiss would arrive, message came from Geertruidenberg that, because of the threatening situation, the governor of Geertruidenberg refused to let the Swiss go. As a result of this the governor of the fortress-city Breda, Alexander Count van Bylandt, Adjutant-General of the Stadtholder, also refused to let the battalion of the Regiment Oranje Nassau leave, and it was ordered to return to their barracks.
On 10 February, news reached the governor that a few hundred Batavians (exiled Dutch patriots) with two guns had reached the villages Meerle and Meersel, in the vicinity of Breda just on the other side of the Dutch border. Especially in Breda the citizens were predominantly patriot and thus pro-French. On the 14th, peasants brought news of the advance of French patrols across the Dutch border. The around three hundred French and Belgian immigrants present left the city in all haste, for a safer place far more north in the Dutch Republic. Many officials and even half of the clergymen followed them. Beforehand, the municipality had already designed a capitulation of their city to the French in case that the city could not longer be held, which the magistrate had sent to the Stadtholder on 18 February.
Receiving the capitulation, the Stadtholder William V ordered the governor to defend the fortress to the last, repeating his orders not to capitulate, and to open negotiations only when a practicable breach had been made! However, as would become clear very soon, the 77-year-old Count van Bylandt was, because of his age and also for his qualities, not the best choice for such a position. Receiving message that the French had reached the vicinity of Breda, Van Bylandt ordered a number of trees around the fortress to be felled and the roads leading to Breda to be cut, and to demolish all the bridges across the moat except one. About three hundred peasants, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Director of the Corps Directors and Engineers Johan Ferdinand Schouster, did this work. Some of the surrounding fields were flooded, which effectively prevented the French using heavy siege guns because of the wet and weak ground (if they had possessed them in the first place!). Then he ordered all gates to be closed and the garrison was effectively locked up inside the fortress. Outside the defences, beside some felled trees, no lines of sight or fire were cleared. Van Bylandt even did not try to augment his provisions with requisitions from the nearby villages! Therefore, the French could advance undisturbed, while Van Bylandt was completely at a loss about the strength and positions of the French troops, especially because for some successive days a heavy fog prevented all observations from inside the fortress.
On 20 February the council of war, presided by the governor, decided that, in case the French would try to cross the moat, the officer commanding that section would give the signal to capitulate the moment the French would be a few meters away from the main wall! The signal would then be taken over and passed on by the
nearby posts. In any way, this measure was unique in history as far as I know!
Capture of Breda and Geertruidenburg 1793 Dutch in Revolutionary Wars Part 8
The Dutch During the Revolutionary Wars
|
As already described in part 6 of the series, Dumouriez had decided to bombard and try to take one or more of the fortress-cities in the western part of Brabant. He chooses Breda as his first target. His aim was to capture the much-needed guns and ammunition, while boats were being gathered for a crossing of the Hollandsch Diep.