Dispatches:
Letters to the Editor
by the readers
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Censorship & Time Zones Dear Dave, Some quick comments re. the Dispatches in FE #36: Jane Craufurd Hoyle mentions that sixty newspapers were closed down in France during the imperial era. This is actually not quite correct. 60 is actually the number of newspapers shut down by the Decree of 17 January 1800 in Paris alone. That decree also forbade the setting up of new newspapers. And things did not stop there. By the end of the year, the number of political newspapers in Paris had been reduced from 73 to nine (including the government's official Le Moniteur), and in 1810 Napoleon decreed that four papers were enough. Most other towns had to make do with one or two. David Markham's article in FE #35 also displays the usual tendency to praise Napoleon for things that properly must be credited to the successive governments of the French Revolution (like the metric system, the administrative reorganisation of France etc.) or even the ancien regime (such as the naval base in Cherbourg). However, I would like to point out that the "gradualist evolutionary approach to democracy" in Britain also included things like the beheading of Charles I and the Peterloo Massacre. But maybe that has something to do with the tendency not to refer to socio-political revolutions in English-speaking countries as revolutions, preferring instead terms like "the (English) Civil War and the Commonwealth", "the American War of Independence" and "the (US) Civil War and Reconstruction". Re. Peter C. Gibbs' inquiry about time zones: If my memory serves me correctly, standard time zones are a product of the introduction of railway timetables, i.e. they only came about after the Napoleonic Wars. Up until then, communications and stage-coaches were too slow to make standard times necessary. (For the purposes of a military campaign, vague terms like "at first light" probably were hard enough to achieve even without wondering what time it was in Paris or London). People used local times (where you basically define 12 o'clock noon as the time the sun is at its highest over the town where you live), so I would assume that on campaign officers would habitually reset their watches. For the purposes of navigation on sea the standard times of the defining points of whatever meridian you used (Ferro, Greenwich or Paris) were of course important. But until 1845 even the international date line had a dramatically different appearance (running south-west from the Aleutians, east of Japan but west of the Philippines, then south-east north of Borneo and New Guinea, then between Fiji and New Caledonia). All the best Aachen-Orsbach, Germany On St Pierre Hello Dave, I am in the middle of re-fighting the Battle of St. Pierre inspired by Leon Parte's excellent article in FE21. This has raised a question or two that you or your other readers might be able to answer. Firstly, I have read Oman's, Napier's, Bell's and Batty's accounts as well as a biography of Soult, none of which makes clear what was going on in the French High Command that day. Specifically who was actually in command of the French? Was it D'Erlon or Soult himself, neither of whom are particularly high profile in either Leon's article or in 3 of the other account's mentioned above? Oman on the other hand at least asserts control of the battle by Soult himself, and consequently hands out some harsh if well deserved criticism. The non-commitment of the large French reserves e.g. Foy, Maransin and Gruardet, seems to indicate that no one was in actual charge of the French that day after about 8am! I was however surprised that this battle received such little attention in Hayman's biography of Soult. Is there a good, detailed account of the battle from the French perspective, including perhaps the actual orders given to the various Divisional commanders, available in either French or English? Is Oman's damning of Soult, as a tactical commander of men in battle, fair and backed up by his other experience? Oman is also fairly derisive regarding Daricau's efforts to take the Chateau on the British/Portuguese left, stating that 400 or 500 casualties show that no real effort was made. However, George Bell of the 28h Foot, states in Soldiers Glory (p. 110) that the chateau was in French hands by noon but changed hands several times, which at least seems consistent with the casualty list. On a technical point the ground scale given in Batty's map seems to be very different ( by a factor of 2) to Leon's which however seems to tie in better with Napier's narrative. I have assumed Leon to be correct. Is this right? or have I just misunderstood/ mismeasured Batty's map. While on the subject of maps Oman's map is a third version different in detail from the other two, which most accurately describes the ground in 1813? Was St. Pierre itself in the centre of the British/Portuguese position (Napier, Bell & Parte) or in the centre of the French position (Oman & Batty), or were there two St. Pierre's? As a final point it strikes me that history has been rather harsh on Col. Bunbury of the 1st/3rd Foot who chose to retire in the face of 4 or 5 times his own numbers(in fact his unit was probably outnumbered by the French skirmish screen alone), when holding a position that could easily be ( and presumably was) outflanked. On the other hand did Byng deploy any or all of the Brigade Lt Coys. forward with Bunbury? Thanks to John Cook for his patient, detailed and long running answer to my last letter. Letter to Editor in FE#23 (Soult OB) Best Regards, First Empire Magazine Dear Dave, I received my first copy of FE (33) from the "Tin Soldier" and was very impressed. A lot of the information and sources are unavailable in Australia but now I'm on the net I hope to be able to delve deeper. One thing that interested me was the discussion on what are and are not the methods by which units deployed. Cook's assertion that it is rubbish to say that regulations reflect theory rather than practice I find amusing. I wonder how much military experience he actually has, if any. After 22 years service in our Regular Army (roll on retirement next year!) as both an infantryman and with RAEME in various unit I can state that regulations are a guideline that are aspired to but not always reached. In particular, the tactical situation leads to modifications, adaptations and outright expediencies that may be remembered by those there at the time but never recorded. To say that it happens rarely, if ever, shows the ignorance of someone who hasn't tried to get the job done in circumstances other than perfect, (e.g. conduct a platoon deliberate ambush with only 12 men). One of the ways that tactics evolve is when some-one throws away the book, finds something that works and then adopts it. Success brings emulation and eventually adoption. Another thought - to truly experience how different nations view history take a quick read through the UK, Australian and US Official Histories of W.W.I and W.W.II. The national slant in the recording can be astounding, (e.g. US - "US and Allied troops pushed the Japanese from Kokoda", UK - "Australians assisted by US air and logistics support" Aus- "Our troops, after heavy fighting...."). Were things any different after the demise of the Corsican Ogre? From: dcgavan@one.net.au Australia To All Re-Enactors Who Took Part In The Fishguard Event. Dear Dave, Could you possibly publish this letter for me? As many of you will know I have been unable to attend events for some time. However as this was the only Bi-Centenary event in Great Britain, we decided to make the trip as part of a 'holiday'. Could I first say how much we appreciated the warm welcome which we received from many old friends, as well as many new ones! Meanwhile, the real reason for writing is to convey to you the following: On Saturday 30th. Trish and myself, together with David Chandler and his wife, had the honour of representing the Re-enactors at the various Civic Ceremonies at Goodwick and later in Fishguard itself. I can only say that this was an honour indeed (and I'm sure I speak for David Chandler as well) not because we were in the presence of representatives of the House of Lords, the local Boroughs, and the Military (American, British and French), but because we heard the great appreciation and respect paid to the Re-enactors by all sections present. Compliments covered Uniforms, demeanour, and the overall spectacle presented, which far exceeded the expectations of the organisers. I took the liberty of giving a vote of thanks to those present on behalf of the re-enactors, and said that I would convey their respects to you all. Sunday presented to be a difficult day, but again I must compliment you on behalf of not only myself, but also the Mayor of Fishguard. Janet Bennett-Howell, and Bill Fowler (Chairman of the Bi-Centenary Committee) who found the small ceremony prior to the battle "very moving", and who thoroughly enjoyed the battle itself. Thank you all for giving so many people, least of all myself, a very memorable weekend. My very best wished to you all, Hon. Life Member Napoleonic Association CANDVT@aol.com 2 deep line...Where's the research? I know I mentioned at least one good book in my second letter, but since the question has been asked and sparked me off again . . . Where's the research is what I too thought when I considered the implications of management theory on military events of 1791 to 1815. It would appear that for over two hundred years little attention has been given to this vital aspect. In reading various historical books they tend to concentrate on what was reported to happen (and generally biased reports at that). The analytic process appears to get not much further than 'the thin red line usually won, therefore 2 deep line was totally superior' QED. For an army to function its troops must all follow a general set of regulations that are known by all units, otherwise co-operation of units and officers would not be possible. For an entire army to use a particular formation or tactic it would need to be written and published to all units. In this case the operating procedures of an army may be known by inspecting the manuals for officers and the instructions issued by commanding Generals. Referencing 'Imperial Bayonets' by George Nafziger, in the original regulations of the time for British, French, Prussian, and Saxon troops are instructions that 3 deep should be used except that to maintain frontage by forming 2 deep when under-strength. The limit however varied, French units only usually hit their limit in 1813-14, British units were nearly always under their limit. Austrian and Prussian regulations also included instructions for deploying skirmishers from the third rank, obviously if sufficient were deployed these units also became 2 deep. Adoption of 2 deep line is documented in French and Austrian instructions from commanders; BUT - has anyone ever referenced a single document instructing British line troops to form 2 deep instead of 3 regardless of strength ? Where's the research ? From: jeffj@gol.com, Japan Colours And Devices Dear David, I wonder if you could put out a request for any of the readers to list the colours and devices on the British Line Regiments. It is possible to find many but not all. Perhaps you know of a book which covers the topic? Yours, Faringdon, Oxfordshire On Initiating Metrics Dear Sir In response to Mrs. Jane Crauford Hoyle's letter (FE#36) I would point out that far from "initiating the metric system" Napoleon was opposed to it. In his Memoirs, edited by Somerset de Chair, he states
The metric system was introduced by compulsory law under the Directory to replace a wide range of differing weights and measures in operation throughout France. Napoleon therefore inherited a system, which one assumes he felt would be too confusing to retract, or that he had more pressing matters on his mind. However he concluded
Yours faithfully The French Art Dear Sir, I was most interested to read the very well researched and argued article by Paddy Griffith 'The French Art of War in the 1790s' (F.E. issue 34) Whilst I found it a refreshing change to read a leader article in a mainstream Napoleonic magazine taking a critical, as opposed to awe-struck, approach to the capabilities of the Emperor Napoleon, I'm afraid that I must take issue with the basic tenets underpinning his rationale. The Author is obviously a very knowledgeable and well read man, and although I have had a lifelong love affair with all things Napoleonic, I'm afraid that I would be the first to admit that I do not have anything like that depth of knowledge. However, it is for precisely the reason that I come from the angle of 'interested amateur' that I find the underlying impression of the article all the more amazing i.e. basically the Emperor was nothing much more than a `good general' who merely plagiarised the military concepts of others. Surely a leader of the historical notoriety (understatement) of Napoleon, who' s very name and appearance is as familiar to virtually everybody on the planet 175 years after his death, as that of any personality in history, would have something more about him than `falling somewhere between ordinary and bad'. Whether or not he actually innovated any of the 'parts of warfare' listed in the article is not the point, surely it is for the very reason that he was able to take these (and other) aspects of the art of late 18th early 19th century warfare, bind them together, and co-ordinate them in such a way that he was able to repeatedly, over a period of some 20 years, (usually successfully) prosecute large scale campaigns of both an aggressive and defensive nature ( Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau Germany 1813 etc., etc.), often many hundreds of miles away from friendly territory and against vastly superior odds, taking on all or several of the contemporary world powers at once, with all the tactical, strategic, logistic, morale, and, not to mention, economic considerations that this entailed, all against the backdrop of seemingly endless political instability in his own back yard i.e. France, that he rightfully takes his place as one of the greatest military brains in history. Who else could have pulled off a `Beresina' under the terrible circumstances of `the retreat'. No, I cannot agree with the authors' basic assertions regarding the Emperor. If e.g. a Moreau had the political awareness of Bonaparte, or a Dumouriez had the relative integrity of Bonaparte, then they too might have achieved a similar degree of devotion from their men, and a corresponding place in history. How many of us in this field of interest would not give our eye teeth for just one day, to don the uniform of one of his troops, and march with `Le Grand Armée', drums ringing in our ears, eagles overhead, and to see and cheer the Emperor as he rides past acknowledging our cries? How many characters in history could do that in these cynical times? Of course Napoleon was but a man, with all the failings that that brings, but, to leave the last word to his last great adversary the Duke of Wellington " I used to say of him that his presence on the field made a difference of 40,000 men ". Yours Sincerely, Games of War Dear Dave, I've just bought Issue 36 of First Empire and must congratulate you on yet another superb issue. Six years of publishing behind you and the magazine still goes from strength to strength! I am looking forwards to the "more use of colour and pagination" but hope you will not change your current format too much because it's great as it stands. My favourite features include "Dispatches" and Ian Barstow's long-running series "The Fighting Marshals". When Ian has finally covered the life of every Marshal in Napoleon's Army, I hope he'll run a similar series exploring the colourful lives of his generals such as Lasalle, Foy and Desaix. On a totally different note, did any other readers see the recent Channel Four series "Game Of War", broadcast on Sunday evenings? The last one featured a refight of Waterloo! Although the wargame rules seemed very simplified, perhaps due to the battle having to be resolved to a strict timetable, it nonetheless proved compulsive and interesting viewing which, hopefully, will help the hobby to reach a wider audience. Congratulations to Channel Four for daring to attempt something different! Perhaps they could be persuaded to de, another series, maybe involving Naval actions? A refight of Trafalgar. for instance, would be terrific! Talking of Television programmes, is there any more news on the making of the new "Hornblower" series? The last I heard they'd nearly lost all of their replica ships in a storm! Yours sincerely, Dronfield, Sheffield On Sharpe Niggles! Dear Dave, Although I enjoyed the recent series of "Sharpe" and thought the Waterloo battle well-staged, there were a couple of niggles which for me slightly ruined the fifth, and final, instalments. The first was the inconsistency concerning several events, where obviously someone hadn't done their homework. For example, Sharpe first met Frederickson in the "Enemy" episode - set in 1812 - yet when Sharpe spoke to Frederickson in "Revenge" he said they'd been friends for five years. Now I know that Sharpe was rubbish at maths (hence he never made a very good Quartermaster) but even he should know that 1812 to 1814 does NOT make five years! Furthermore, am I right in believing that Harry Price was killed by Sergeant Hakeswill in the "Company" episode? How then did he make a miraculous recovery and join his old Regiment to fight at Waterloo? Surely a better idea would have been to introduce Robert Knowles (who I always thought was a better character than Price anyway) to fight the Waterloo campaign and let the ghost of Harry Price rest in peace! There were historical inaccuracies during the defence of La Haie Saint (or should that be Hougoumont?) but I suppose the producers can be forgiven for opting for excitement over historical details in this event. Watching the French smash though the gates certainly made compulsive viewing! So, to the future, and I hear that ITV is now planning to dramatise the superb "Hornblower" novels by C.S. Forester. Once again it seems the military adviser is to be that "expert" Richard Rifleman Moore, but is he really qualified for this job? Moore certainly knows his Peninsular stuff but fleet actions of the period were obviously so different to the massive land battles which we've come to know so well that I hope that Moore hasn't bitten off more than he can chew. Yours sincerely, Dinnington, Sheffield Ed. I'm sure Richard will mange OK in his new role! Details of the Sharpe fan club for those suffering withdrawal symptoms can be found elsewhere in this issue Is Mainstream Wargaming? Dear Dave, Way back in First Empire # 9 Pat Conner wrote an article on the dire state of the hobby which I expanded on in First Empire #10. One of the common themes between our two articles was Games Workshop and how they overshadowed the world of "mainstream wargaming". At the time, while agreeing with a lot Pat said, I did make the point that comparisons between wargame traders, shows and clubs alongside the commercial world of Games Workshop were a little unfair. Readers may be interested in some facts taken from the Finance and Economics Section of The Guardian newspaper for 14.8.97. Where, GW were announcing a rise in pre tax profits for the third year running, up by 26% to £ 11.1 million this year. The article said that the company, based in Nottingham, England is opening about 30 shops a year (world wide) and claims to have introduced more than 100,000 people to "wargaming." Back in our world little if anything has changed in the four years since we wrote. The message is clear: Surrender, or Die, Suckers ! Reply in #39: Wargaming Brigade A Bravo Wargamers Dear David Just a brief line to say how much I appreciate the Wargaming section of First Empire and hope we see more articles on the subject. I wanted to write earlier but various events have prevented otherwise. I was very interested in your article on Adler Miniatures in FE 33. I've recently started to slowly rebuild my Napoleonic Armies with these figures, especially the Revolutionary Range. The figures are really well detailed and look great when painted. Adler's 10% discount was also very interesting, even though I found out too late to profit from it with my last order. It made me wonder if other manufacturers I've bought figures from offered anything similar? So, with this in mind, I wrote to Irregular Miniatures, who, I'm pleased to say, will offer a 5% discount on orders to members of societies. However, the discount is not available to Credit Card orders. I should imagine you have their new address but just in case, it's 3 Apollo Street, Heslington Road, York, Y01 5AP. They've brought out some new 10mm figs, although not in the Napoleonic period. Their posh new catalogue is very good, although at £2.50 I'm not sure I prefer the old one. I could have bought a few 6mm battalions instead. But the pics are nice to look at and give a good idea of what you'll be getting. I hope other manufacturers pick up on this. Anyway, I hope you'll pass the word on and I'll look forward to seeing the next issue of FE. All the best Runcorn, Cheshire Cook Bites Back! Dear Dave, Further to Robert Swan's letter in Dispatches FE34, could I just point out to him that Peter Hofschröer and I have been friends for the better part of two decades. There was no exchange, at least not in the way he imagined. The list, which wasn't actually published in FE anyway, didn't take "hours" to produce and was a simple exercise in collation. Mr Swan calls it "waffle". He may please himself. I beg to differ. I thought it was quite revealing. As for his final paragraph, perhaps, I might be allowed to tell him just a little about myself. I spent almost a quarter of a century in the British army and I suspect I know rather more about soldiers and soldiering than you do, Mr Swan. Please do not presume to lecture me on the subject of death and suffering. Your remarks in that context are nothing less than fatuous rubbish. In Response to Dispatches FE36 Dear Citizen Dave, 1). I take Peter Hofschröer's point, but I didn't compare the Baker rifle with anything. Indeed, I didn't even mention it. Lynn says that Prussian and English light infantry favoured rifled weapons over smooth-bore muskets. They didn't. Prussian fusiliers and British light infantry were armed with smooth-bore muskets on the whole. Rifled weapons, regardless of origin, type or characteristics, were reserved predominantly for specialists, such as Jäger and the 95th. 2). The answer to Keith Webb's question about the use of two ranks, is probably in Nafziger's Imperial Bayonets and Nosworthy's Tactics of Napoleon. The subject was first examined in depth, as far as I know, by George Jeffrey in EE&L some 15 years ago in a series of articles entitled The Firepower Syndrome. The evidence for the use of two ranks when units were under strength is contained in the Rules and Regulations 1792. 3). Peter Gibb's point about time zones is interesting. As with distances, there were indeed differences in how time was measured. The French, as is well known, used the decimal clock introduced by Napoleon in 1804 (heure civil or Heure Napoleon). This gave the Paris Heure 100 minutes each of 100 seconds duration. There were 10 Paris heures in a demi-jour. In practice, however, the French army usually conformed to l'Heure de Greenwich operationally, although other times were also used, including heure d'été and heure d'éclairage*. The Berlin Uhr, whilst having the usual 60 minutes, equated to approximately 300 British seconds, each Berlin minute being only 50 British seconds long. This is why Wellington didn't come to Blucher's support at Ligny, the latter fighting the battle a day earlier than the former expected. The Austrians, using Wien Zeit were much more relaxed about the whole thing. Under this system, and hour could be anything from 45 to 60 minutes long, depending how long it took to finish the coffee and strudel. * summer and lighting up time respectively. 4). I was not offended by Peter Hofschröer's letter (FE32). Neither he nor anybody else has the monopoly on leg pulling. The Hollins Dispatch Dear Dave, 'The Hollins Dispatch' - fame indeed! Major Field appears to have missed the point, but it is unintentionally made by Jeff Lewis and David Marks. Wargames are precisely that - not an accurate representation of the times. Thus to get worked up about one aspect, currently OBs, is further clouding the picture. Letters to FE and elsewhere urging OBs have now created a climate in which everything revolves around them and even fairly weighty tomes are considered of little value by publishers unless full of them and battle accounts repeating popular prejudice. If Major Field thinks all nations produce the fibs of the French, then he should consider who has written the best accounts of Jemappes, Eckmuhl, Wagram, Jena, Auerstädt, Dresden et al. We won't get the "other nations' perspectives" unless the material is published and enthusiasts buy it. Jeff and Dave illustrate the point by producing a mechanism for wargaming, the basis of which is wrong or not clear. That would be followed by recreated games run on that basis and written up complete with beloved OB - as the historical basis is wrong, does an accurate (or all too often inaccurate) OB matter? But that is precisely what is held up as being the most desirable product as book or magazine article. I am not sure of the extent of Jeff's library, but if Command & Control as defined is the key to victory, would he tell us why the French armies in Germany in 1796 got a good beating, whereas the Army of Italy did rather well? Similarly, does mass desertion of the peasants from a Landwehr unit, greatly improving the command ratio, make it better than a Line unit? His biggest error is that he has not done his basic research: (this is quite a complicated matter which is worthy of a longer future item). The leadership ratios are the one feature of George Nafziger's book that is of no real value. If it was merely a question of ratios, were the rapidly raised 3rd battalions as good as the veterans of the 1st, or was a ragbag unit such as IR44 in later years as good as IR4 Deutschmeister? As for Jeff's infantry being cavalry fodder, I suggest he reads about Aspern, where Austrian infantry held a full three arm French assault on 22nd May, many of those troops being new recruits - then ask yourself how the British might have got on if Ney's assault at Waterloo had been properly handled. If you are going to present a "magic formula for predicting capabilities" it must be clearly documented and have a factual basis; if it doesn't, it is better expressed as a discussion document, inviting further comment, rather than tablets of stone. Regards, Stamford, Lincs. Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #37 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1997 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |
