Letters on: Battle of Lodi; Rules Hard Pounding; FE Web Site; the exchange between Cook and Hofshroer; Picton 15mm figure; two letters for John Cook; a look at market choices; moving from re-enactments to the wargames table; and two happy subscribers.

Thanks...

Dear Dispatches

I'd just like to offer a BIG THANK YOU to Mag. Herbert Zima from Vienna, Austria.

In my article The Battle of Lodi (FE 32) some accounts I researched mentioned that Lodi contained some walls on the Western side of the River Adda. If so, it's just possible that the French prepared their forces behind cover of these walls before attempting to charge across the famous bridge. However, I could find no trace of these supposed walls on maps or anywhere else. In his letter Herbert Zima mentions that the Tranie/Carmigiani book covering Napoleon's First campaign in Italy, contains some paintings which show the walls of Lodi. There is also a model showing the walls in the Army Museum in Paris and a photo of the model in the book Les Armées a l'Epoque Revolutionayre 1789-1804.

If anyone can send me a copy or Photostat of these paintings/photos or offer any other form of visual or written proof of the existence of these walls, I'd be very grateful.

I hope more people respond like this. Thanks again Herbert.

Related: Letter to Editor #33

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Hard Pounding...

Dear Sirs,

I use the computer rules "Hard pounding" and would like to hear from others who do I am interested in any program or written additions which people have made. I find the rules very good.

If anyone can compare them to other computer rules that would also be of interest.

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FE Web Site

Dave -

Just want to tell you how impressive the First Empire Home Page looks.(www.FirstEmpire.ltd.uk) The index is a great research tool. I'm looking forward to using the index since after reading 32 issues filled with lots of interesting data it's getting really hard to remember which one had what in it. This well really fill a large gap in my research tool set.

Editor: All thanks for the index are due to Peter Kessler who undertook the work.

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Facetious and Childish...

Dear Dave,

... a comment first on a recent exchange in FE between John Cook and - you guessed it- Peter Hofshröer.

Peter is a valued contributer to the mag, and I have much respect for his scholarship. However, I do imagine that he may receive few repeat invitations to cocktail parties. Like Mr. Cook I too, noticed Peter's peurile - and in the context of the late twentieth century, archaic - remark in issue #32, but unlike him I felt it beneath my dignity to comment on what was an obvious attempt to goad certain readers. I certainly wouldn't have spent hours of my valuable time on producing three pages of type to refute it. Why breathe what I beheve Thatcher termed the "oxygen of publicity" into such waffle? Furthermore, John's football league analogy, while obviously meant in a lighter vein, I found it distasteful - has FE been taken over by Murdoch?

Others may disagree, call me pinko, liberal or what not, I don't care, but millions died in the Napoleonic wars alone and reducing years of suffering for many to sports event status doesn't seem appropriate coming from a man of John's standing who surely has read more on what the reality of war is than many of your readers combined. It really angers me to see these stupid national rivalries played out again on the pages of FE, especially when they result in multi-issue exchanges of veiled - and some not so veiled - insults. Come on Dave - edit the facetious and childish comments before they hit the pages, so that many of us may be spared such sad exchanges. As Mr Cook himself said - on to more constructive matters.

In another vein, but perhaps related to the above to an extent, it was refreshing to read the articles on Napoleon's failures a a statesman, followed soon after by Ian's article on Bernadotte. For many caught in the cult of Napoleon the Great Captain and his wonderful armies and victories, it should not be forgotten that Bernadotte's descendants still occupy the Swedish throne, and that for all the glory - whatever that is, it remains a matter of prevailing public opinion- where did Austerlitz and Jena ultimately get Napoleon?

All the best,

Cook Response in FE#37

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Picton anyone?

Dear Editor,

Could you or any of the raders help me in locating a 15mm representation of General Picton? I've been looking for the last few years and have yet to come across him. I would be grateful for any infomation.

Yours Sincerely,

Editor: Minifigs have Picton available in a command set 99NBC - it also contains Wellington, Hill and an ADC.

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But then Again....

Dear David,

Another fine issue (32). John Cook's article in FE 33 in response to Jean Lochet's comments made interesting reading. The piece came complete with John's thoughts, allowing the reader to follow the construction of John's argument.

The way in which John's words were distorted into Jean Lochet's version should give all historians food for thought. Clearly Jean believes that John said something other than what was contained within the FE17 article. If an editor can make such a mistake, then how realiable are our Napoleonic sources? A question that sems to be very dear to Peter Hofschöer.

Once again Peter attacked anothe myth of the Napoleonic era. I am left wondering, however, if all of the Napoleonic myths concern Prussia?

There must be French, British, Austrian and Russian myths, as well as all of the other nations involved. Would anyone care to help?

I look forward to the next issue.

I remain, yours sincerley

Well done Cook but please explain...

Dear Sir,

Congratulations are due to John Cook for yet another fine article (FE33) throwing light on the subject of French infantry manoeuvre columns.

While in no way disputing the arguments Mr. Cook presents in that article there are one or two questions which it raises in my mind on which I would appreciate clarification.

Firstly, the text beneath Illustration 4 refers to 'Colonne par divisions and colonne d'attaque formed from four fusilier divisions...' Which 'colonne' is which? And what distinguishes a colonne par division from a colonne d'attaque? Both columns ilustrated fall within my understanding of a colonne par division, differing from each other only in the location of the individual companies within the column.

Is the column on the reader's right not simply a colonne par division formed on the centre division by a battalion with only four divisions? Such a battalion would not be capable of forming on the centre and retaining the natural' divisions (numbering from the right of the line companies 1 and 2, 9 and 4, 5 and 8, 7 and 8) in the same way that a battalion with five divisions could. What circumstances would dictate the formation of one of these columns rather than the other ?

Secondly, I became confused by the concept of columns formed on the left, on the right, and on the middle. For example, the text beneath Illustration 1 refers to 'Colonne par divisions on the left...' and appears to have companies number 7 and 8 (which I understand would be the leftmost companies when the battalion is in line) as the leading division with companies 1 and 2 (which I understand would be the rightmost companies of the battalion in line) forming the rearmost division of the column.

However, this seems to differ from the concept of a column forming on the left shown by Illustration 9. Mr. Cook states that figure 1 of that illustration shows 'a battalion ploying by divisions into column behind the right', 'while figures 2 and 9 show the same conversion conducted on centre and left divisions respectively'. In each of those three figures, the column formed has the rightmost division of the battalion in line leading the column and the leftmost division of the battalion as the rearmost division in the column. In conclusion, my questions are these; when forming a column of divisions on the left, would the leftmost division of the battalion in line be the leading division at the head of the column or would it be at the rear? And similarly, when forming a column of divisions on the centre, would the centre division of the battalion in line be the leading division at the head of the column? I would appreciate any thoughts on the above points.

Yours,

Editor. I forwarded a copy of the above to John Cook and below is his response.

Thanks for the kind words Keith, I'm pleased to hear that you enjoyed the article and I am happy to clarify the points you raise, which I will do, as best I can, more or less as they appear in your letter.

The left hand sketch in Illustration 4 shows a colonne par divisions on the right. The right hand sketch in illustration 4 shows a colonne d'attaque. You are correct to surmise that the right hand sketch is merely a column of divisions on the centre. Colonne d'attaque, nevertheless, is the specific term used in the Règlement 1791 to describe such a column. Colonne par divisions, on the other hand, is the specific term used in the Règlement 1791 to describe a column of divisions on either the left or right.

As far as the theoretical deployment of the colonne d'attaque is concerned, the number of divisions present is not relevant. A feature of the colonne d'attaque was that its ad hoc 'horizontal' divisions contained peletons from different established divisions of the battalion, but closer examination reveals that what actually happened was that these four divisions were rearranged into two separate peleton width columns grouped together as a whole, achieved by collapsing the right and left wings. In essence, the right wing converted into a column of peletons on the left, comprising the first and second divisions, the left wing, conversely, converted into a similar column on the right, comprising the third and fourth divisions. 'Vertical' divisional integrity was, thus, retained. This system, however, enabled the column to deploy on the head, uniquely, to the left and right simultaneously, indeed, this was the only way it could deploy and it is worth pointing out that the manoeuvring sub-unit of the colonne d'attaque under the Règlement 1791, unlike the colonne par divisions, was the peleton, not the division.

When a battalion changed from column into line, the term used to describe the conversion was deploying; when it changed from line to column it ployed (from the French verb ployer'). When a colonne d'attaque deployed, the fifth and fourth peletons remained stationary, whilst those peletons behind them deployed into line to their left and right respectively. Deployment was carried out in the manner called en tiroir, like pulling drawers from a chest (tiroir' - a chest of drawers. The analogy is obvious), and you can see the way this is conducted in Fig 2 to Illustration 2. When a line ployed into colonne d'attaque the procedure was essentially the reverse of that described.

However, ployment was carried by a flank march of files directly into place in the column. You can see how this was done in Fig 1 to Illustration 2 and in Illustration 3. The text of the Règlement 1791 in the context of ployment of the colonne d'attaque says "One sees the peletons of the right and left break (déboiter - disconnect) to the rear, and proceed to section distance behind the two peletons of the centre".

If a five division colonne d'attaque was formed, when a regimental grenadier division was present, for example, the centre division in front would be formed from the fourth and third fusilier peletons. In such a case, assuming normal linear hierachy with the grenadier division on the right of the line, the two grenadier peletons would form the right peletons of the fourth and fifth ad hoc divisions of the column. I have to say, however, that I have not seen such a colonne d'attaque specifically described or illustrated, but there is no reason, in theory, to prevent it.

As for the circumstances when a particular column was chosen over another, this would be dictated by tactical circumstances. The advantage of a colonne d'attaque was speed of deployment. The furthest distance any peleton had to march laterally was the frontage three peletons, because deployment was to both flanks at once. This is seen in Fig 2 to Illustration 2. A disadvantage of the colonne d'attaque, however, was that it could only be formed via a line, and not directly from a colonne par peletons. In order to form a colonne d'attaque from a colonne par peletons it was first necessary to deploy, which involved an interruption to forward movement, and then ploy into colonne d'attaque.

This is an important consideration because the approach march to a battlefield was usually conducted in colonnes par peletons, which could simply double their frontages to form colonnes par divisions at the appropriate moment, by having the second, fourth, sixth and eighth peletons march out of their places in the column and dress on the left of the first, third, fifth and seventh peletons respectively, and then close up. Forward movement was not interrupted to the same degree and lateral space was not an issue because deployment was unnecessary.

A disadvantage of the colonne par divisions was that deployment to a flank involved a lateral march en tiroir, by the rear division, of the frontage of six peletons. A colonne par division formed on the right, for example, would normally deploy to the left, and vice versa. A colonne par divisions, however, could deploy on a central division to both flanks simultaneously; the Règlement 1791 (Ecole de bataillon #407 and Planche XVIII) describes and illustrates a colonne par divisions, comprising five divisions, deploying on the third division. By deploying on a central division the furthest distance a division marched laterally was reduced to the frontage of four peletons. Ground and obstacles would, clearly, influence which division deployment was conducted on. A fundamental disadvantage of colonne par divisions was that it was always slower to deploy from than colonne d'attaque. The considerations were essentially ones of time, space and ground.

A column is usually described by its head. Thus a column on the left is shorthand for saying that the left flank sub-unit is in front, conversely a column on the right has the right flank sub-unit in front. Other terms encountered to describe columns are right / left / centre / middle in front, on or by the right flank / left flank / centre / middle. Thus, because the column in Illustration 1 has the left flank division in front, it is described as on the left. Illustration 3 shows ployment into columns where the right flank division leads, thus the resulting columns will all be on the right, not on the left as you have inferred.

The conversion, however, is being conducted in Figs 1, 2 and 3 on the right, third and left divisions respectively. These are called the directing divisions and are those from which the moving divisions take their dressing. Thus, Fig 2 shows ployment on the third division into a colonne par divisions on the right, which is described as "a battalion ploying on an interior division into close column, the right in front" . Figs 1 and 3 show "a battalion ploying by divisions into close column behind the right" and "a battalion ploying into close column in front of the left" respectively.

I hope that this clears up your questions and if you, or other readers, have more, please ask away, but I don't promise to have all the answers to what is sometimes a pretty obscure and complex subject.

FE#35 Letter to Editor: Response

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Something to Chew on While Awaiting Sharpe's Return

Dear Sir,

The imminent return of Sharpie taking him to Waterloo prompted a light-hearted conversation with one publisher on what would be the best-selling Napoleonic book. No prizes for guessing that the conclusion was: 'Sharpe's Cookbook' with contributions by Delia Smith and other TV chefs, a Foreward by Diana, Princess of Wales on 'Landmines in the Peninsula' and a final chapter by Keith Floyd covering 'Wines of Spain and Beers of Belgium', topped off with pictures of Sean Bean and the Spice Girls in various Napoleonic kit. Think I'm exaggerating?

Last year marked the bicentennial of major opening campaigns by two of the period's leading commanders, but Ken Trotman's Autumn 1996 New Books list containing 216 Napoleonic books has 16 related specifically to Waterloo and another 62 covering the Peninsula or both. Compare that with just two (one a reprint) covering Napoleon's first Italian campaign and a handful on each of the subsequent major Continental campaigns. Indeed, Mr Cromwell's (aka Hamilton-Williams) fantasies on 1815 is one of the biggest sellers of recent years. What, aside from the Prussian input I suppose, remains to be said about Waterloo?

It's understandable for those interested in the British, (although few of these 216 or 78 even get a review) but is anyone seriously suggesting that WW2 can be understood solely in terms of the campaigns of the British army and the Battle of Berlin? The British land effort between 1795 and 1809 was not much more extensive than the Prussians - and where were Napoleon, many of his best commanders and the bulk of his best troops when the British made their major break-outs from Portugal in 1809 and 1812?

The probable majority favouring French re-enactment units, wargames armies etc. make this statistic appear even more unrelated to likely demand. Perhaps they feel that the current crop of memoirs and American theories is sufficient, the accuracy of which was summed up by the British historian Chesney: "French historians... sin not only by omission, but by wilful repetition of error from book to book, long after the truth has been given to the world... The ease and grace of the military writers of France and the number and accessibility of their works, have caused (people in the English speaking world) to adhere almost entirely to their versions of European wars".

Letters to Dispatches a year ago hinted that there was a hidden demand for material from other languages, but a few enthusiasts aren't enough. The problem is that the publishers don't get a clear signal - books on Waterloo sell well and steadily, so that is what you are going to get. The less accessible texts are not going to appear unless you buy them - although quite how you would indicate you would buy something before it goes through the capital-consuming publishing process is not obvious.

Oh yeah - this one about the Continental armies/campaigns/ sources again, you are thinking. But there appears to be a major contradiction here. In FE32, the Editor noted the many letters he receives demanding more battle accounts and OBs. Surely there are enough books on the Anglo-French clashes for those to be easily available by purchase or library borrowing. The alternative is that there is a group of readers, who presumably consider themselves enthusiasts, who shout loud, but do little? If what is being sought are the more obscure Continental actions, then why do we hear so often that no-one is interested - and wouldn't buy a book on it?

Go a stage further, DW doesn't have a supply of these articles in his pocket. Someone has to go and research them, obviously in less widely available sources. Why should 'anyone else' do this - you're the one who's bothered about it, and contrary to what some people think, there's no financial reward in it. Then consider articles that might be written: Suppose you have a Peninsula army. What use is a Continental Wars scenario complete with accurate OB? Do you know how a British Rifleman or light company private compared with a Tyrolean Jäger or a Prussian Fusilier? What about the state of the troops, both morale and physical, or the aims and objectives of their respective commanders. Readers of FE32 will have guessed that I would differ with Barstool about First Zurich (1799). I disagree on Second Caldiero too - informed debate is always illuminating, but for each battle, what constituted victory/success was deeply rooted in strategic objectives and political pressures on Massena and Archduke Charles. So what difference does the Austrian OB for First Zurich in FE32 make?

As Jomini wrote: "Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding factors of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched battles, ....." Most battles, Waterloo included, were decided before they started - the side with the most troops, especially 2:1 or more is probably going to win. What marked out the brilliance of Napoleon or Alexander the Great was that they could achieve a local superiority despite overall being the weaker side.

This is where the emphasis on OBs really get you into trouble. Sharpe and many of the French memoirs are good, rip-roaring stuff, and doubtless, what many like to read - and believe. Many writers, especially recently have gone on at great length about the French superiority in the Continental Revolutionary wars. What they are unable to explain is why, if these French troops and tactics were so great, did they get a fairly regular beating in Germany in 1796/9 or Italy in 1799, but many rules reflect the prevailing view. Get into specifics: Take for example, Arnold's 'Crisis on the Danube' p132, describing the early stages of Eckmühl. He mentions an attack by French voltigeurs against Austrian Grenzers on a ridgeline. Note (13) claims that 1500 voltigeurs defeated 2000 Grenzers and demonstrated their qualitative superiority. Well, that's okay then and confirms many prejudices.

Wait a moment, where did that figure of 2000 Grenzers come from? None other than the ropey OB at the back of the book, where 4 battalions of grenzers are listed in the Austrian IV Korps. Shouldn't really let documented fact get in the way, but the two battalions of 13th Grenzers were miles to the south-east at the time and only five companies (about 700 men) of 12th Grenzers were in situ. Add in the fact that these troops had suffered significant casualties over the previous two days and morale was lower than the advancing French. Shouldn't really be any surprise that the French won, should it? Would I be wrong in thinking that many wargames rules give the French voltigeur considerable superiority over these Grenzer - on the basis of unjustified assertion drawn from bad OB?

Thus what is often done in a wargame is that arbitrary values are being assigned to units on the basis of the original's performance under specific circumstances (notably a major numerical superiority) following strategic activities under the leadership of gifted commanders. If you are trying to recreate Napoleonic warfare, then presumably you are trying to pit your own skills against your opponent with troops based either on actual qualities alone or having enough knowledge of the campaign/objectives to justify certain advantages/disadvantages. If your response is that you are not bothered about all this and just want a game - fine, but what is this constant winge for accurate detailed material; wouldn't just a rough outline do, which can't be beyond the capacity of most enthusiasts to do themselves? Alternatively, Nafziger's OBs are only a few pence.

One new enthusiast at the Greenhill Fair asked what the veterans thought of the new boys, who just read FE and didn't write for it. Same as the Grande Armee veterans I suppose - don't mind helping out the new boys as they were themselves once, but there comes a time when you must do some of it for yourselves. If you are bothered about an OB, why not construct something for yourself and await a bit of constructive comment? Items in the hobby press have highlighted the dangers to UK re-enactment from proposed firearms legislation. If little worthwhile is published, it will be very easy for the public perception to arise that many readers are involved in nothing more than a social activity involving guns.

Should UK publishers be looking seriously at Sharpe's Cookbook with lashings of unconnected and often inaccurate OBs? Tell the publishers through the pages of FE: what you want, what you really really want. Just remember it's not a one-way process. If what you want is Sharpe and Marbot, why should anyone go to the trouble of providing historically accurate material?

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From Re-Enactment to the Wargames Table

Dear Dave,

In one thing I agree with Ian Barstow's column of 32ème, in that there is much to be learned about wargaming from re-enactment. There are, however a number of points in Ian's missive which I disagree with.

1. Movement, Line vs Column Yes, troops generally march at the same speed regardless of formation. However, there must have been good reason why armies of the period choose to make rapid deployments in column and why they developed difficult and complex manoeuvres for rapidly moving from column to line? Re-enactment has taught me some salutary lessons on this score. As Ian admits, the line must occasionally slow down or stop to correct dressing or face losing all cohesion as a line formation. This brings me to a second point, the speed of a line formation is affected by the quality of drill competence of the troops concerned. The better the drill of a formation, then the less often stops to correct dressing.

This is why I believe strongly in wargames rules such as AH Napoleon's Battles, where different troop nationalities (broadly reflecting quality) are capable of vastly different line movement rates.

While drill is one factor, another equally significant lesson learned from "dressing up" and playing soldiers, is that a column can be led, but a line has to be directed. To move a column from A to B, all you have to do is climb on your horse, ride out in front and shout "follow me"! Given that the 100 or so men in the front rank can see you and their NCOs can control rudimentary manoeuvres, then off you go, more or less where you like.

Now consider the line. Upward of 250 men, deployed over nearly 200 yds, cannot be commanded to move as one. Officers and NCOs have to be briefed, objectives pointed out and then commands issued, otherwise disaster will ensue. All this takes TIME, and hence line formations will manoeuvre slower than columns.

2. Noise of Cannons

I agree, they are very loud, especially if you are deployed forward of the axle. However, having been subjected to a sustained simulated bombardment by French cannons, the roar of a British 6 pounder, however loud, cannot help but draw a cheer from the hard pressed ranks of redcoats!

3. Massed Drums

They may be a pain in the bum, but they are really the only way to relay commands on a battlefield with anything like a realistic battlefield noise environment. Your average NCO can shout till he is blue in the face and only the twenty or so blokes closest to him will get any sort of message.

4. Hot & Heavy Muskets

I agree entirely with Ian. Not only do they become very, very hot, but they also start to misbehave. Only experience, spare flints, a brush & picker set and a bit of clean cloth can keep the beast firing for sustained periods. Training counts!

5. Awareness of Involved Troops

Yes, in the thick of the action, all that matters is your musket and your closest comrades. However, Napoleonic battles happen relatively slowly and while you are standing about waiting for the action to start, rumours become rife and the spectre of paranoia raises it's ugly head.

I thank Ian for starting this debate and I am sure he would never stoop to being deliberately inflammatory just to provoke comment, would he!?

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A Happy Subscriber!

Dear Sir,

Please find enclosed a cheque to cover a further year s subscription to your magazine. Whether by accident or design you have in the last six issues provided me with answers to several matters of interest. Of particular relevance were the articles on various rule sets; I now have a choice of three when drawing up a scenario. The balance of articles is fine; although I think the letters page would benefit from :-

1. Fewer "how many angels can balance on a pinhead" type debates.

2 Fewer bruised ego conflicts.

Please continue with the independent reviews of books, rules, figures etc. there is far too much hype around these days in the hobby.

In the last couple of issues music for wargames has been mentioned the following references may be of use (please note they are vinyl recordings) Military Fanfares. Marches and Choruses from the time of Napoleon. Nonesuch Records H71075 Musique Militaire Francais. Trianon / EMI C 045 12190

I have recently gained access to the internet and was amazed at the variety of information out there (also at the amount of rubbish). Using the address from First Empire I looked at the Magweb page, which was impressive. However, the thought of consigning my "plastic" number over the ether deterred me from further investigation. Is there any UK access to the project which would overcome this?

My apologies for rambling on. Keep up the good work

Nice Balance!

Dear Sir,

Thank you for your excellent magazine, for which I am pleased to renew my subscription. With reference to your editorial on page 34 of issue 31, may I say that Blandin had perfect balance when he crossed Niagra. So has your magazine. Please don't give in to pressures to tinker with it.

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