Letters on: Thin Red Line; Postscript; Defending Wellington; the Hollins Dispatch; D'Equipage Colours; Prussian Staff Command; Praise for Cook; Naval Landings; 1815 Landwehr; and Belgian Cavalry Trotting.
The Thin Red Line
I enjoy reading the articles in the magazine, particularly the debunking ones. Though I detect a distinct tendency to go over the top. The debunking of Bonaparte on the grounds that he did not himself personally invent the 'new' techniques - well - did no one then ever read any of the literature from the wars of the Roman, Greek, or Mongol empires?
Most of the "revolutions" mentioned can be read in descriptions of warfare from 1,000 years or more before, try Ceasar, Hannibal, and Alexander for starters. To judge a generals effectiveness surely needs a comparison of how well that general performed using the same troops in similar circumstances as another general from the same side. On this basis Napoleon comes out on top, so does Wellington, Suvorov and Archduke Charles.
And now may I take the liberty of trying to stir up another debunk? When I left the hobby it seemed generally accepted belief that the French Columns were superior to the old outdated Prussian Line, but could never defeat the two deep British Line.
On reading some newer research on the old regulations and recent articles it now seems that the two deep line was a matter of doing so when understrength and / or deploying skirmishers. Stated in both the Prussian and British regulations. Also if we consider a continuos line of regiments being attacked by columns separated by their deployment distances - it matters not one musket whether the line is 2,3,4 or even 10 deep.
It would be extraordinary indeed if the French sportingly changed their deployment distances and spread out their regiments only when facing British troops. Books containing lengthy passages on the invincible indominitable British in the peninsula are two a penny (in English), but does anyone possess an authoritative book on the less than sparkling showing in the various Holland and German expeditions ?
I can no longer blithely accept that the failure of the British to change their tactics from the old Linear style was the reason for their seeming superiority over French troops post 1808. (If I remember rightly though British Generals were still convinced of the superiority of this style on the Somme in 1916 against machine guns and barbed wire) So what is the truth?
(jeffj@gol.com)
Gunma, Japan
A Postscript
Dear David,
I notice that today is the deadline for the next magazine, and that some four weeks ago I sent off a letter asking the question why it was that a British trained Line apparently regularly defeated the French but a Prussian trained line did not.
By sheer coincidence I have just come upon not just a possible reason but what seems like a magic formula for predicting the capability of a unit in combat regardless of its nationality, drill, weapons training, organic artillery, skirmish supports, nor social class of officers, never mind what it had for supper.
That I am answering my own earlier question is only part accident, as once I have a problem in a subject of interest to me which no one has ever produced a logical answer for, I rarely rest until I know the answer. In this case the basic idea and inspiration was found in George Nafzigers book "Imperial Bayonets" at the start of chapter 7 on Cavalry. I extended the study on distribution of officers and sergeants to cover infantry formations of different nations, then drew conclusions from the results (while trying to ignore any prejudice of history), it blew my socks off to say the least.
Perhaps there is a grave error in my analysis, perhaps it is just wild fluke, but I suspect not. Actually I almost wish it is wrong as my lovingly painted Austrian army is beginning to look like a distinct case of inevitable cavalry fodder.
Editor: Jeff's conclusions can be found in Command and Control: Keep a Stiff Upper Lip.
In Defence of the Duke
Dear Dave,
A valued contributor to the Mag he may be, but I sometimes find Peter Hofshroer's tone very off-putting to say the least!
His constant babble of "the Prussians did this and the Prussinns did that etc" would ensure that the novice historian, upon reading Hofshroer's work, may be forgiven for believing that the Napoleonic Wars were fought solely between Imperial France and Prussia. Not so!
Peter seems to forget that Austria and Russia were regular members of the various Coalitions against Napoleon's France and it is true to say that his conquest of the Russian homeland proved to be one of the major blunders of Napoleon's career. His earlier invasion of Prussia proved a walk through the park in contrast, something which Mr Hofshroer seems to neglect, or deem unimportant.
Another annoying habit of Peter's is his continual anti-British sentiments. He must remember that England was regarded by Napoleon as the "Nation of Shopkeepers", and it was England who gave the vast financial backing to the other European countries, including Prussia, so they could continue the fight against him. Hofshroer is always reminding others of "the facts" and I'm sorry if he doesn't agree with them, but these ARE the facts. As are that London was the only European Capital which Napoleon never invaded, and it was the English who decisively defeated his naval fleets time and time again.
He also feels that Blücher was badly let down by Wellington in the 1815 Campaign. A fair point maybe, but it works both ways. Blücher's blind hatred of Napoleon made him wanting to strike the first blow against him inevitable - not that the personal glory of beating them on his own ever came into it, of course!
Wellington knew of Blücher's plan for the 16th June but he did nothing. He also understood Blücher's tenacity in action, how he could lead his Army to destruction and yet still rally the remnants and come back for more. He'd had plenty of practice in the preceding years, after all.
The skill of the Prussian Staff. who even themselves believed that "Old Forwards" did not fully understand how to fight a Campaign, saved the Army many times.
From the Duke's point of view, having the Prussians go looking for a fight probably was a blessing in disguise. Letting another's troops face the main enemy force is much better than sacrificing the lives of one's own soldiers, and if your Allies are defeated in the field, a good portion of the victorious enemy force must be dispatched to pursue them. As was the case in the Waterloo Campaign.
Hofshroer is quick to point out the mistakes committed by Wellington during June 1815 but the truth is - and again Peter may not like it - that they were no worse than those by Napoleon and indeed Blücher. All three men made terrible miscalculations throughout the Campaign and indeed did their subordinates for every Prince of Orange there is a Muffling or Grouchy.
David O'Conner
Dinnington, Sheffield, South Yorkshire
On The Hollins Dispatch
Dear Dave,
I have just finished reading FE 34 and must congratulate you on another excellent edition. I especially enjoy reading Dispatches and this time was no different. Dave Hollins's letter was particularly thought provoking and although I don't necessarily disagree with everything he says
I do have a different viewpoint (I hope there is a subtle difference ?!) on some issues he raises. I therefore thought I'd write to help generate / initiate the debate he was obviously trying to encourage.
The first point he raises is what real demand there is for books translated from other languages and on areas less well covered than the Peninsula War and Waterloo. I suspect that the fact is that many people cannot afford extensive libraries, with books running at £20 plus, especially if they are looking for details (or even an OB!) on a single battle they fancy wargaming. It is of no surprise therefore that they are looking to magazines like FE to produce this sort of information, and much else too, at a more reasonable price. I am lucky to have a half decent library but it concentrates on the campaign in which I have a particular interest; however it is because of this that I enjoy detailed accounts of battles outside this campaign in FE.
I, for one, would love to see more books available that were translated or reprinted. However, I am realistic enough to realise that my particular interest is likely to be a minority one and therefore of little commercial interest to a publisher. I accept that it is up to me to track down relevant books through people like Ken Trotman who offer old French, German and out of print books.
What publishers could do is identify books that would have a more general appeal. Examples of these are memoirs and tactics books which cover a number of campaigns or subjects that should interest any Napoleonic enthusiast. Although we should be wary of the historical accuracy of many memoirs they do serve to give an excellent feel for lifestyles and tactics at a level not generally covered in narratives of campaigns or even battles. My own choice of reprints would be Marmont's memoirs (despite their bias), De Bracke's Cavalry Outpost Duties and Duhesme's Essai sur l'Infanterie Legere. Surely these would have a wide appeal?
I accept Dave's comments on the veracity of French histories but are we not all guilty of this? It is natural for any nation to glorify it's victories and play down it's defeats just as any individual is likely to write himself up in his memoirs. We Brits have few peers in this department and I think Peter Hofschroer would agree when it came to British accounts of Waterloo!
The Prussians and Russians were just as bad (see Gneisenau's Life and Campaigns of Blucher and Mikhailofsky-Danielofsky's History of the Campaign in France in the Year 1814). It is up to us as amateur historians to take this tendency into account and balance one view with another. However, we can't do this if only one nation's perspective is available. Dave seems to have a terrible hang-up about detailed Orders of Battle (OB)! Personally I am not a wargamer but still like detailed OBs to peruse. There seems to be a straight choice here and it depends on who you are trying to please.
For example lets take the Battle of Craonne in FE 34. Ian Barstow presents a one page wargame scenario for this battle, with a wargame orientated OB. Excellent for wargamers but of only the most peripheral use to any one else. In FE 19 there is a detailed account of the same battle (purely coincidentally written by me !) with detailed OBs (or as detailed as I could make them). I like to think that the latter article was of much broader interest and still of the same use to wargamers. Perhaps Ian would say there is room for both and I would agree, it is Dave who seems to think there isn't.
Wargamers face the choice of giving both sides, irrespective of historical performance, exactly the same capabilities in order to make it a pure test of generalship, using a points system to give a side less units that are elite/veteran than a side with militia units or trying to refight historical battles by assigning morale values to reflect the conditions of the day.
The latter tends to be attempted by the more experienced wargamers and thus follows that suitable research has been done to avoid some of the pitfalls Dave envisages.
In his points about OBs Dave mentions how strategic developments often decide victory on the battlefield. This is most definitely true and would make a good, thought provoking article. Any offers?
Dave also calls for more people to make their own contributions to FE. I give this my wholehearted support; as I mentioned earlier I have made my own modest contribution with another imminent. However, it is not always that easy as the research, writing and preparation of a decent article is a considerable undertaking and many people just don't get the time or have the resources available. However, I have found it a most rewarding experience and would encourage anyone who harbours an inclination to "go for it".
Finally, I was tempted to comment in detail on Paddy Griffith's article The French Art of War in the 1790s - Its Legacy for Napoleon (FE 34), but realised that it would require a complete article! Very thought provoking and crying out for a counter argument (typical Paddy style I think). Unfortunately, Her Majesty will be keeping me occupied on exercises in Canada and Poland over the coming months so perhaps a fellow Napoleon admirer could break their "contributions duck" and do it for me?!
Keep up the good work!
Major Andrew Field
Devon & Dorset Regiment
D'Equipage Colours
Dear Sir,
As a subscriber to First Empire, I wonder if I may use your magazine to pick the brains of my fellow readers to see if they can answer the following questions:
1. What colour were the Wagons of the French Train D'Equipage supply services? Were they left a natural wood? Were they supposed to be painted a uniform colour? Were they painted various colours at the whim of local Operators? What about the Train of various nationalities that fought with the French?
2. The same Question as applied to wagons of the British Commisariat Services, also were the limbers containing musket ammunition for Line Regiments the standard Artillery limber? What colour were they?
3. The same Question as applied to the Prussian Train Wagons, and the Limbers I am particularly interested in the Year 1811, and the start of the 1812 Campaign, and would like to thank both you, and any readers who take the time and energy to assist me in the answer to, or where I may obtain the answer to, these questions
Russ Feakins
Canterbury, Kent
That Old Thing Called a Prussian Staff Command
Dear Dave,
Following on from the exchange of views in recent issues of First Empire concerning the age (or relative age, as it seems to have settled down to) of Prussian Generals in the 1806 campaign I came across the following which I thought might add to the debate. The primary interest of this piece is that it gives a contemporary view of these individuals - and it shows how deeply embedded the "too old" idea is. as well as how far back it goes!
The quotation is from the memoirs of Captain Fritz -------, whose surname is not known but whose memoirs were published in 1861, two years after his death, (Wider Napoleon! Ein Deutsches Reiterleben, 1806-1815; Stuttgart 1861). The Captain had been at Auerstadt in 1806 and was wounded at Lubeck, he is here describing the Army of Bohemia in the 1813 campaign:-
"Individual Austrian battalions and squadrons fought with great courage and skill, and one could wish for no better comrades than most of the officers; but among the senior generals were a great number who would have been more fitted to a grandfather chair than to the command of troops, as was the case with us Prussians in 18O6-7. Prince Shwarzenburg was a very gallant gentleman and a real soldier..."
Translation and quoted from Anthony Brett James' excellent work Europe Against Napoleon (London 1970) p 82.
An interesting comment on how the Captain, and probably many or even most of his brother officers in the Prussian Army, viewed their generals from the 1806/7 campaigns.
Keep up the good work
Stephen Ede-Borrett,
Hertford
Praise for Cook
Dear Sir,
Many Thanks to John Cook for his response (Dispatches, FE34) to my enquiries arising from his article in FE33.
In his reply John suggests this is an obscure and complex subject. However, I am sure many Napoleonic enthusiasts have, like myself, found his explanations and interpretations of great interest, particularly since the subject is of some importance if a set of Napoleonic wargame rules are to produce a realistic simiulation of battle of in that period.
John's articles on the subject of infantry formations and conversions have certainly opened my eyes as to the amount of space a battalion in column required on one or both of its flanks in order to deploy into line and, similarly, that which a battalion in line required to its frontand/or rear in order to ploy into column. This is an issue that the wargames rules with which I am familiar do not seem to have adequately addressed. Nor have have they identified the differring amounts of time required to deploy / ploy to from line, depending upon which type of column / on which division / with which division in front, is involved.
Reading John's reply it occurred to me that the formations and manoeuvres he has described in his several articles would be an excellent subject for a video (?!?!). After all, is not a picture worth a thousand words. Surely, one or more of the Napoleonic Assocition's re-enactment units would enjoy taking direction from Mr. Cook in order to demonstrate how Napoleonic infantry formed, marched, converted, as well as their musket drill.
Produced and distributed by First Empire, of course, to ensure excellent quality - I'm sure it would find a receptive audience. How about it Mr. Watkins?!
Keith Webb
Market Harborough, Leics.
Napoleonic Naval Landings
Dear Sir
I am trying (without much success), to ascertain the conduct of naval landings operations. This would involve a description of the various navy's procedures for beach landing operations. It would appear that the British had this down to as fine an art as was possible, mostly due to their experiences in North America through the mid to late 18th century. Could you please provide some detail of the landing procedure, the troops capacity of landing craft and/or their transport ships and a description of any naval landings of note conducted throughout the period...indeed anything related to this subject.
Rolf Grein, rolf@onaustralia.com.au
Prussian 1815 Landwehr
Dear Dave
Thanks for issue 34.
I am interested in the Prussian involvement in the 1815 campaign in particular, and I have French and Prussian 15mm armies. Can anyone help me with the following information?
Were the Prussian Landwehr infantry regiments organised into 2 musketeer and one fusilier battalions. If so, were there any distinctions between the two types in terms of uniforms? Did Prussian Landwehr regiments have a skirmishing capability, and if so, was it as proficient as that of line battalions.
Regarding the cavalry contingent of IV Corps, were the cavalry regiments organised into larger formations? Did these formations act independently of the infantry brigades, or was each infantry brigade assigned a cavalry formation?
Andy Finkel, finkel@dircon.co.uk
Belgian Light Cavalry at the trot! - Not!
Dear First Empire,
Whilst I have only a vague interest in things Napoleonic (wargaming from time to time), I occasionally peruse my partner's copy of First Empire - and one thing that I can tell you is that the Belgian Light Cavalry in issue 34 are definitely NOT in trot! They are cantering.
Margaret Parker, MParker61@aol.com
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