Those subscribers to First Empire (FE) who also read the American magazine Empires, Eagles and Lions (EEL), will know that in the September/October 1995 issue (EEL Vol 2 14) the latter's editor, Jean Lochet, in a response to a readers' question, made some comments in the context of my article on drill which appeared in FE 16/17 approximately three years ago. In addition to a specific complaint, which I can deal with here, Jean Lochet also introduced additional material and there is also, apparently, "much more in Mr Cook's article that we don't agree with, but we will be covering those questions in another issue of EEL after we correspond with Mr Cook".
Despite an attempt by me to contact him, no correspondence has been forthcoming (as I write it is November 1996). The difficulty now, of course, is that I don't know what 'their' other objections are or, indeed, who 'they' are.
In any event, the question raised in EEL Vol 2 14 by EEL reader, and presumably FE reader, Marco Gioannini was this.
"Mr Cook claims that according to the Règlement of 1791, battalions with an uneven number of formed companies were not allowed to form a column of divisions of any type. This implies that a voltigeur company screening its parent unit formed in division column was after 1808 an act forbidden by the Règlement of 1791. The same applies to battalions between 1804 and 1808, if the voltigeur company is out for skirmishing and the grenadier company is detached elsewhere".
It is not surprising that Jean Lochet was "unable to find anything of the sort in the Règlement" and the reason is very simple. It is not what I said. Nevertheless, that did not deter him from embarking on a diatribe, based on a fundamentally flawed proposition, that stretched the definitions of debate to the limit and beyond.
However, as EEL ceased publication shortly afterwards there seemed little point in pursuing it further but, with its recent resurrection, I thought it a worthwhile exercise to take a closer look at columns in general, and Jean Lochet's complaint in particular.
The paragraph from my article to which Marco alludes, and to which Jean Lochet objects, is this. It is found on page 5 of FE17.
"Furthermore, it is also the case that when the voltigeur company is detached, colonne par divisions, of any type, is impossible because the battalion is reduced to an uneven number of peletons. When a company was detached, the Règlement of 1791 prescribed colonne par peletons.
The logical upshot of this must be that either entire battalions were earmarked for skirmishing whilst others remained formed, or that colonnes par peletons were used much more than is realised. The custom of having an entire sub-unit in the light role is clearly less good than in the Prussian and Austrian services where each sub-unit earmarked its third rank as skirmishers, thus avoiding disruption of battalion symmetry when they were detached."
The first thing to establish is that I did not say a battalion with an uneven number of companies was "not allowed" to form a column of divisions under the 1791 Règlement.
The second thing to establish is that I did not say that the detachment of a voltigeur company from a colonnes par divisions was "forbidden" by the 1791 Règlement. There were no such sub-units in 1791!
What I Did Say
Let me now establish what I did say, which was this.
I did say that a battalion composed of an uneven number of companies, when, for example, the voltigeur company was detached, could not form in divisions because a division required two companies. The first sentence, therefore, is perfectly true. Two does not divide into an odd number and any attempt to demonstrate otherwise is futile.
I did say that when a company, any company, was detached (for obvious reasons I was careful not to say voltigeur company in the context of the 1791 Règlement), thus producing an uneven number of companies, the 1791 Règlement prescribed colonnes par peletons as an alternative. This is also perfectly true insofar as the 1791 Règlement describes only two practicable manoeuvre formations for the battalion, the colonne par divisions and the colonne par peletons, formed on double company and company frontages respectively.
I did say that the logical upshot of all this was that if a unit could not form in divisions, because an uneven number of companies was present, it probably formed in companies and that it is possible, therefore, that colonnes par peletons were used more frequently than is realized. I am quite content with that statement. The colonne par peletons was part of the repertoire of manoeuvre formations in the 1791 Règlement intended for use in a tactical environment, as the description of how a to form square from it, for but one example from that document, demonstrates. The only question is the degree of tactical use colonne par peletons received in practice. That, I cannot answer except to say that it was an option, I know of at least one one documented example from memory, and that it cannot be discounted.
I did say that it may also have had implications in the context of skirmishing and that to avoid "deranging in any way the ensemble of the corps"
[1] entire battalions, rather than specialist companies alone, may have been committed more often than is popularly thought.
"There are numerous historical examples of the French taking entire line regiments and even divisions of line infantry and deploying them as skirmishers." [2]
The only question here is why, and the answers are bound to be different depending on circumstances and, furthermore, are not usually obvious. I merely offered one speculative
possibility which I am quite content with.
My remarks, then, were a "logical upshot" (logic n. reasoning, thinking, inference etc.[3]) and, I thought, fairly obvious as such.
Uneven Companies?
To persevere, however, nowhere in the 1791 Règlement is a colonne par divisions, of any kind, shown with an uneven number of companies. It would, indeed, be
difficult to do so since an uneven number of companies precludes formation in divisions because a division requires two companies. Did I say that already? It seems to me that the presence of an uneven number of companies militates against the formation of a battalion in divisions.
As, however, the passage objected to was in the context of skirmishing and my further comment was that as far as skirmishing doctrine was concerned generally, the use of specialist sub-units, such as a voltigeur company, was a relatively clumsy and less good system than use of the third rank, I will dispose of this by deploying two primary sources to support it.
The first is Prussian.
"The detachment for skirmishing generally consists of a company of light infantry in each battalion, which in action is deployed either at the rear or in front of the battalion. It may also be the third rank of each company in line.
"This is the arrangement used in the Prussian infantry. In each company, each battalion, one third of the men, who once made up the third rank, are now designated for combat in open order.
"When a company is detached from the battalion, or even separated for a moment, it takes its rifle-section along. No battalion, no company, no section moves without its
riflemen" [4]
There is little doubt which system Scharnhorst preferred, and why.
The second is French and discusses the use of the third rank generally. Amongst other things it is pointed out that, "A column of infantry sent to search a wood, or a village, or any other part of a covered country, during its march, may employ the men of the third rank, without
deranging in any way the ensemble of the corps".[5]
Ney clearly considered that the detachment of a sub-unit was detrimental to battalion symmetry which, since he mentioned it, is presumably an important factor. This, it seems
to me, tends to support the supposition that divisional columns were expected to be 'square'. Ney's remarks also reflect the very small part of the 1791 Règlement that deals with skirmishers which, remembering that it was written prior to the raising of voltigeur companies, specifies that they were drawn from the third ranks.
Morale
The implications of Col. Elting's remarks are that the raising of voltigeur companies was more to do with reasons of morale than it was to do with the practicalities of providing a skirmish element for the infantry battalions which, clearly, already had one [6]. It was, in other words, the creation of an elite sub-unit for those deserving soldiers who would never be admitted to grenadier companies on account of their stature. Furthermore, simple common sense seems to indicate that it was not really necessary, on tactical grounds, to provide the light battalions of the légère regiments with a specialist light company, unless, of course, these regiments were light in name only.
If it is right that the creation of voltigeur companies was largely morale oriented, one is bound to wonder how much, if at all, it changed French skirmishing doctrine in the context of the third rank, also bearing in mind that, up to at least 1809, battalions quite often lost their voltigeur companies to special elite battalions on a temporary basis, or more permanently such as found in Oudinot's various commands and, therefore, would appear to have been without their 'light' elements. What, I wonder, did they do then? I expect the answer is that they did a variety of things, from deploying entire battalions for skirmishing missions, to deploying other companies, or elements of them possibly taken from the third rank. An entire lexicon of tactical alternatives in this context was available.
Whatever the case may be, Richard Riehn's [7] view is that creation of elite companies in general was at the expense of the centre companies, which were deprived of their best soldiers as a result. It is certainly true that the Prussians, when they modernized their regulations in 1812 to produce what are generally considered to be the best to emerge from the period, did not adopt the French system of using specialist light companies but retained the use of elements of the third rank, in musketier battalions, for skirmishing purposes. The Austrians, similarly, retained the practice of drawing skirmishers from the third rank as, I believe, did the Russians. Be all this as it may, it diverts us from the main thrust of this article which is concerned with columns.
Six in Context
Marco Gioannini went on to quote a passage, albeit in the context of six company battalions, from EEL Vol 1 93.[8] We will encounter a number of other passages from this august journal.
"In the French 6 company infantry battalion, when the elite companies were away from the battalion, the battalion did not operate by divisions but only by platoons, ie it could only form columns of platoons (or of companies; in this case, platoons and companies are interchangeable)."
The author of this was, incidentally, Jean Lochet and one of the constructions, not unreasonably, that Marco placed upon this was that colonne par peletons was adopted
when the voltigeur company was absent.
Another passage in EEL Vol 1 73, seemed to confirm this.
"When the elite companies were
operating away the centre companies deployed in a different order
(from right to left): 1st, 3rd, 4th and 2nd companies. The battalion
maneuvred (sic) by platoons (peleton)." [9]
Jean Lochet gives Belhomme as the source.[10]
Elsewhere in EEL Vol 1 93 where Jean Lochet discusses the hierarchy of companies within a battalion, this remark is made in the context of the pre-1808 nine peleton
battalion organisation.[11]
"That 9 company battalion formed 4 divisions with the 8 available fusilier companies."
The conclusion drawn from this was that French colonnes par divisions under the 1791 Règlement were 'square' and that the grenadier company was normally expected
to be detached. This is correct.
Jean Lochet then goes on to say,
"The grenadiers did not form a division with the fusiliers"
This is incorrect and the fact of the matter is that when two grenadier peletons were present they could form a division with a battalion of fusiliers. This is clearly illustrated and described in the 1791 Règlement, as we shall see.
Another passage from a past EEL in the context of the colonne d'attaque, is also useful for comparative purposes.
"Last of all was a division composed of the flank platoons of the battalion in line. Clearly this arrangement will be disturbed if the flank (or elite) platoons are detached
(as is likely in battle), or are nonexistent (as happens in guard battalions or provisional battalions, or if the number of platoons has been arbitrarily reduced below 6 by a reorganization following heavy casualties.). In such cases, the column on the middle was
simply not used, and a column on the right or left of platoons was the only choice.
Column 1808
This matter is laid down explicitly by Ordinance of February 1808 that reorganized the battalions to a six company basis. (Correspondance de Napoleon, Item No. 13574). Before the reorganization, the French battalion had nine companies, the ninth being the grenadier company. Under this system, the eight remaining companies formed 8 platoons which constituted the bulk of the battalion. The grenadiers formed a separate ninth platoon which was positioned on the right flank in line or at the front or rear of the battalion in column. In fact this system virtually presumed that the grenadier company would be detached, either tactically,
or permanently during the campaign. Note that this system produces four divisions, instead of three.
The result of having an even number of divisions is that none of the divisions of a column on the centre correspond to the divisions of the line. All have platoons derived from two different divisions in the line.[12]
This analysis by John Koontz is, in my view, as succinct and sensible an interpretation, based in part on primary sources, of the overall situation as you will find anywhere.
Let me return now to Jean Lochet's specific criticism of my article in FE16/17 in EEL 14, which is this,
"There is nothing in the regulations (the 1791 Règlement) about the column of divisions or the column of attack stating that either type of column could not be formed if one or more companies were detached, or if there were an uneven number of companies".
It is perfectly true that it does not say this. However, although I concede that there is no statement in the 1791 Règlement to that effect, I did not say that there was and, therefore, the point eludes me.
I reiterate, nevertheless, my view that it is possible to argue that the 1791 Règlement does place caveats on asymmetrical columns by implication, insofar as nowhere is a column of divisions illustrated being formed from an uneven number of peletons. As I have said, the simple fact that a division consists of two peletons makes it impossible to form a column of divisions with an uneven number of companies. This is the point I was trying to make. Perhaps it needs further elaboration.
The 1791 Règlement was written in the context of the nature of the then current and perceived future conflicts. The French army must have accepted it as being
relevant at the time since it documented the preparation of the
infantry for those conflicts, and the methods of conducting them
in order to achieve success. In summary the 1791 Règlement
was a formal expression of military knowledge and thought. It
was the framework document for the understanding of the preparation
and approach to warfare as far as the infantry was concerned,
and its practical application. Be that as it may, the fact of
the matter is that far from being a revolutionary document the
1791 Règlement was rooted firmly in the 18th Century, and
by the time it appeared it was already approaching obsolescence.
"The conclusion is that the 1791
Règlement was based on the Prussian regulations of 1772
and 1788". [13]
1788 Reglement
I have not seen the 1772 Prussian regulations
so I cannot comment. I do, however, have the 1788 Reglement, comparison
of which with the French 1791 Règlement shows that Schwarz
has a point and that the latter was merely a development of familiar
themes, but regulations everywhere were influenced by Prussian
methods anyway, so this should come as no surprise.[14]
Three Strands
It seems to me that there are at least three strands to the thrust of this enquiry.
The first is comparatively easy to answer but the other two are more difficult because the 1791 Règlement only reflects the science of drill and manoeuvre, it does not
necessarily reflect the art of tactical practice. In the words of Peter Paret in the context of historical sources generally, and regulations in particular,
"Like most historical sources they are ambiguous material. Too often, army regulations may represent theory rather than practice. By themselves they cannot tell us how men really fought; certainly from the 1790s on, if not earlier, the tactics British and French troops used in the field are only partially reflected in the manuals. And yet the battles of the
period cannot be understood without them" [15] and quoting
another author writing just before the end of the 19th Century "When we come down to it the Reglements are the most solid and most authoritative deposits of our knowledge of military affairs". [16]
Nine Companies
One is frequently told that the pre-1808 French infantry battalion consisted of eight fusilier companies and a grenadier company, for a total of nine companies. This appears
to be an administrative, rather than a tactical, organisation. If one consults the opening part of the 1791 Règlement entitled "Formation d'un Régiment en Bataille" one finds a two battalion regimental structure described and illustrated.
It describes how each battalion comprised eight companies and was divided into a left and right half-battalion, and how each fusilier and grenadier company formed a company of two sections.
It then says that the first and second companies formed the first division in each battalion, the third and fourth companies the second division, the fifth and sixth companies the third division and finally, the seventh and eighth companies formed the fourth division. A division, quite clearly, and unambiguously, consisted of two companies. Not one company or three companies, or any other number but two. Similarly, a battalion consisted of eight fusilier companies.
It goes on to talk about grouping individual soldiers of similar heights within the battalion for the sake of uniformity. It then says that every battalion will manoeuvre with equal companies and that men will be taken from strong companies and placed in the weak ones to meet this requirement. Finally it says that the two grenadier companies will remain with their
own battalions for drill. These are shown standing on the right and left flanks of the two battalion regiment. Although it does not say so specifically, it seems to me that the inference of this is that when not at drill, or in other words when on service, the two grenadier companies were not expected to be present or were used differently.[17] We also see the continued emphasis on battalion symmetry in general.
The illustration at Planche I confirms what is said in the text. Two battalions are shown in three rank line with the fusilier companies numbered one to eight from right to left in line, the divisions, similarly, one to four and the battalions one to two. Each battalion is further divided into a right and left half battalion (or wing - see also my article on Austrian regulations in FE25. A universal practice) at the junction of the fourth and fifth companies.
Two grenadier companies are present, as already described, and are positioned at the right
and left of the regiment. So, on the face of it, was it not for the explanatory text, one might expect a regiment to consist of two battalions, each of nine companies, comprising eight fusilier companies and one grenadier company, in the field. Ney, however, describes an attack by a division of four regiments, comprising eight battalions. This is the important passage.
"The eight companies of grenadiers shall form the reserve, and march one hundred and fifty toises in their rear." [18]
This is unequivocal evidence of a two battalion regiment with two grenadier companies per regiment, in accordance with the 1791 Règlement, but with the grenadiers
detached for tactical purposes. The description, of course, is intended as a vehicle for instruction, but it does, however, further suggest that Ney expected battalions to be formed of an equal number of fusilier companies on service with the grenadier companies used to provide a Formation reserve.
Can any of this be substantiated? Well, yes and no. In the first place the practice of forming separate grenadier battalions is well known and documented. Furthermore, examination of a French order of battle from this period (1806) shows that Ney's VI Corps consisted of two Divisions, each Division comprising four regiments of two battalions, in other words eight
battalions. On the other hand a great many regiments in other Formations consisted of three battalions and some of four, and because Ney might have done something a particular way it does
not mean that all Corps commanders did. Indeed, it may even be that Ney documented what he required of his regimental commanders precisely because it was different.
In the context of the grenadier company specifically, Jean Lochet has highlighted a passage from the 1791 Règlement which shows that a single grenadier peleton could
be posted behind the rear fusilier division of a battalion in column. This is Jean Lochet's preamble.
"However, to fully answer Mr Gioannini's questions, we cannot ignore some further parts of Mr Cook's article."
"The portion of the Règlement of 1791 pertinent to the school of the battalion deals with the maneuvres of a nine company battalion: eight fusilier companies
and one grenadier company."
I have both French and Westphalian versions of the 1791 Règlement and neither show manoeuvres by nine company battalions, but I will return to this later.
He continues,
"It is true that the Règlement illustrates all battalion maneuvres with an eight-company battalion which excludes the grenadier company."
Not Exclusively
Although it is perfectly true that an eight company battalion is described and illustrated throughout the 1791 Règlement, and this predominates, neither of my versions illustrate all battalion manoeuvres with an eight company battalion exclusively and they certainly do not exclude the grenadier companies. I will return to this later too.
Anyway. Jean Lochet continues,
"Should we conclude that the grenadier companies did not maneuvre with their battalion? Certainly not. There is a statement in the Règlement that addresses the
grenadier company's role."
and elsewhere,
"To be complete. let us mention that the Règlement does not sanction the use of skirmishers or detached grenadiers".
The question of skirmishers notwith-standing for the moment, a degree of 'deconfliction' in Jean Lochet's various statements appears appropriate. Either the grenadiers could manoeuvre
with their parent battalion or they were excluded. Which is it to be?
Letter to Editor Response: FE#35
[1] The Memoirs of Marshal Ney. Vol II.
London, 1833. Instructions for the Troops Composing the Left Corps.
pp367. Facsimile edition, First Empire, 1995.
[10] Histoire de l'infanterie en France.
This is a well known 4 volume secondary work dating from the turn
of the century. I only know it by reputation.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Footnotes:
[2] Nafziger, G. A Guide to Napoleonic
Warfare. Ist Ed. p107. West Chester, nd.
[3] OED.
[4] Scharnhorst. On Infantry Tactics 1811.
Second Essay. Order of battle and Reciprocal Use of Battalions
in Close Formation and Riflemen in Open Formation or Tirailleurs.
Reproduced in Paret, P. Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815.
Princeton, 1966. p260.
[5] The Memoirs of Marshal Ney. Vol II.
pp367.
[6] Elting, John R. Swords Around a Throne.
p209. London, 1988.
[7] Riehn, RK. 1812, Napoleon's Russian
Campaign. p133. New York, 1990. This book contains as good a summary
of Napoleonic tactical doctrine as can be found anywhere.
[8] EEL Vol 1 93. March 1986. Wargame
Problems. p50
[9] EEL Vol 1 73. July 1983. J Lochet.
"Some Consequences of the 1808-1809 Reorganization of the French
Infantry." p45.
[11] EEL Vol 1 93. p51.
[12] EEL Vol 1 86. March 1985. John E.
Koontz. "French Battalion Columns by Divisions." p23.
[13] Schwarz, H. Gefechtsformen der Infanterie
in Europa durch 800 Jahre. 2 Vols. München, 1977. p351.
[14] The diagrams in FE 17 illustrating
the colonne par division with a six peleton battalion were taken
from Herbert Schwarz's work, in which Chapter XIII, Die neue Taktik,
investigates French columnar doctrine in depth. In addition to
regulations themselves, the author of this privately published
work deploys 24 primary and secondary sources in support of this
particular chapter. Unfortunately he does not footnote his findings
and, therefore, it is not easy to determine where each particular
conclusion is drawn from.
[15] Paret, P. Yorck and the Era of Prussian
Reform 1807-1815. Princeton, 1966. p279.
[16] Jähns, M. Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaften
vornehmlich in Deutchland. 3 Vols. Munich-Leipzig, 1889-1891.
I have not seen this work.
[17] Règlement concernant l'exercise
et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie du premier août 1791.
Formation d'un Régiment en Bataille.
[18] Ney. p383.
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