Over the years a great deal has been written about the performance of different troops in battle, a very large proportion of this containing no more than generalisations of supposed 'national characteristics'. Apparently the main reason for units performing differently are their upbringing, social status, and whether they were fed on potatoes, breadsticks or fried onions. Yet this type of argument rapidly falls down with some simple comparisons from history.

The KGL raised from the German states but organised and trained by the British, were some of the firmest and best troops in Europe, as good as and occasionally better than their mentors. The French and British - the behaviour of the French cavalry generally matched the behaviour of the British infantry, whereas the British cavalry behaved more like the French infantry. Quite clearly there is sufficient contradiction here to cast grave doubt on sociological theories that 'inherent national characteristics' are the essential basis of a units performance in combat.

It is now generally written into most tabletop rules that the early organisation and creation of command staff at Division, Corps and Army level gave the French a control and flexibility on the battlefield rarely matched by their opponents. The absence of structure and staff in most other armies frequently resulted in having troops blunder to their doom with orders unchanged and no longer matching their circumstances. With newer sets of rules this is often as true on the tabletop as it was on the battlefield.

We now accept that adequate command and control at higher levels allows better flexibility and consequent better performance from the troops at a grand tactical level. So what about the lower level, at battalion, company and squadron level ? If command or control is lacking at that level then surely the troops will be unable to react in a disciplined effective manner to events at the tactical level.

Thankfully the hardest work of digging out these structures from different languages and libraries has already been done by George Nafziger in his book "Imperial Bayonets". (Which also provided the inspiration and basic idea for this analysis).

Numbers

The numbers given in the tables below are for the total of officers and sergeants (or their equivalent) in the front, middle and rear of a company or squadron formation. They are adjusted for the number of troopers in the formation, which differs between countries, to give a comparison of the command and control level per 100 soldiers.

Now let us apply command and control theory to these structures. The total number and especially officers should indicate the overall degree of control whilst the distribution will determine the effects. Frontal command will determine the tactical flexibility in attack and rallying after. Central command will determine unit cohesion and control of manoeuvre. Rear command will determine the 'willingness' to attack, steadiness in defence and resistance to enemy fire picking off the control at the front. (A notable tactic of French skirmish fire). With these tables and criteria we can attempt to draw some conclusions.

French organised cavalry should be the best with tactical flexibility, quick to rally and good cohesion, even multi-unit co-ordination may be possible, but probably more prone to rout. British organised cavalry should be reasonably good, but lacking control in attack and rally. Prussian organised cavalry would lack tactical flexibility and be prone to rout; after 1808 they would be less prone to flight than any other troops, though unit cohesion is now weaker.

Austrian and Russian organised cavalry would be generally less effective, though the Russian cavalry may have been capable of some tactical flexibility in attack. In straight squadron to squadron the issue of who should win is only clear against pre-1808 Prussian cavalry, but in more complicated situations the French should generally come out on top against anyone. British organised Infantry should be the best, steadfast in defence and reacting effectively during attack.

Manoeuvre cohesion would also be good. French organised Infantry should be generally good, steady in defence and aggressive, though less flexible to changed circumstances in attack. Cohesion in manoeuvre will be poorer. All other infantry would be less effective and perform worse, being unstable in defence and more vulnerable to the effects of skirmish fire. Manoeuvre cohesion however should be good. Prussian performance should improve dramatically after 1808, though still not comparable overall to French or British organised troops.

The use of conscript units for Russia and Austria, (also Prussia until 1808), would be particularly pointless due to the lack of rear control. French, British and later Prussian conscript units however, would be relatively effective if given experienced command. In one on one the French would generally beat everyone except British organised troops, if the British use more than one tactic during the same engagement they would generally win more of the time.

These conclusions are drawn directly from the command structures without reference to historical events or nationalistic bias. The acid test is if these conclusions are verified by the actual historical events and the generalisations about troop performance in different armies. The overwhelming majority of troop, battle, and campaign descriptions in my library match the above conclusions; the command control level and distribution from Commander-in-Chief right down to Sergeant is the decisive factor in combat performance.

British Infantry

The 'stiff upper lip' of British infantry. The 'élan' of French infantry. The 'weak-kneed' Prussian and Austrian infantry. The 'one shot' British cavalry. The 'nationalistic fervour' of Prussian organised infantry in 1813-1815. These stereotyped and apparently inexplicable 'inherent national characteristics' are actually 100% predictable resulting from just one fact COMMAND CONTROL.

Cavalry	France	Britain	Prussia 1808 and after	Prussia before 1808	Austria	Russia
Front	3	1	1	1	0	2
Ranks	14	8	5	8	6	6
Rear	4	6	11	3	7	5
Total	21	15	17	12	13	13
Officers	5	5	7	5	4	2
Infantry	France	Britain	Prussia 1808 and after	Prussia before 1808	Russia	Austria
1st rank	2	1	2	3	3	2
Ranks	2	1	0	1	1	0
Rear	4	5	3	0	0	1
Total	8	7	5	4	4	3