Two letters on: Prussian Command; NA Safety; Threat to Re-enacters; Hessian Garde du Corps; Madin's Sabre; Waterloo Museums; Naval Museums and Shako; and 9th and Cranleigh plug.

More on the Prussian Command

Dear David,

Re. Peter Hofschröer: Modern Wars in Perspective (FE 31): Lest we go overboard in the "de-bunking of myths" to the point where the catastrophic Prussian defeat of 1806 – the most disgraceful suffered by any major army of the time – is mystified into an unfortunate, almost inexplicable accident, let's not forget a few things. First, about the ages of Prussian generals in 1806 and 1870 (which, by the way, avoids the more obvious comparison with the French general officers' ages): Granted, there were a number of "old codgers" among the Prussian generals of Bismarck's wars, but there were important differences (even leaving aside that on average a 60-year-old in 1870 may very well have been more physically fit than a 60-year-old in 1806). For one thing, Prussian army command had become much better organised and elderly generals in 1864-71 were complemented or offset by younger chiefs of staff (whose position was much stronger than that of their 1806 counterparts). Secondly, officers who had outlived their usefulness were systematically weeded out, something which did not really happen 1791-1806, when even near-invalids were kept on the active list in a misguided economy drive.

Peter Hofschröer's reference to the fact that "certain Prussian generals of 1806 vintage again held field command in the campaigns of 1813-15" in all honesty only applies to Blücher and Tauentzien (although a total of 21 generals of 1806 were reckoned participants in the Wars of Liberation).

Let us examine (incomplete) statistics in 1806. Das preußische Offizierskorps und die Untersuchung der Kriegsereignisse (Herausgegeben vom GroßenGeneralstab, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II) (Berlin 1906) pp.86, 104-107: Of the 142 Prussian generals on the 1806 army list, 22 were still listed as active in 1808, 17 were cashiered and 86 received an honourable discharge before the Wars of Liberation. Of these 125 generals 55 (including four from the active list) had died (not one as a war casualty) by the beginning of the Wars of Liberation, i.e. over two-fifths did not live out the next seven years. In fact, even during the War of 1806/07, more of the original 142 died of old age and other natural causes (at least 10) than of combat-related ones (6). The picture does not improve much even if you assume that all 11 inactive (but not discharged) generals survived until 1813. With this kind of figures the statement that the Prussian generals were over-aged is only too justified.

The advanced age of large parts of the 1806 Prussian officer corps also extended to the lower ranks. Thus of 142 generals 4 were over 80, 13 ages 71 to 80, and 62 ages 61 to 70; of 885 active staff officers, 12 were over 70 and 163 were 61-70; of 1306 active captains 2 were over 70, 21 were 61-70 and 168 were 51-60; finally, of 261 active artillery lieutenants, one was over 70, 5 were 61-70, 9 were 51-60 and 7 were 41-50.

As for the "myths" about the French Revolutionary army, maybe one should be wary of measuring it against an ideal so abstract that it prevents a realistic analysis. The way in which Esdaile comments about the low representation of the lower classes among the 2248 Revolutionary and Napoleonic French generals makes as much sense as complaining about there being no women among them. It may tell of something about what sets some present-day societies and ideals apart from the French society of 1789-1815, but can only cloud one's view to the fundamental changes compared to the ancien régime and the powers opposed to the Revolution, especially as perceived by contem-poraries. There you really risk misinterpreting the aims of the French Revolution the abolition of legal privilege was more or less on the agenda of all Revolutionaries, but that of economically based ones only on that of the more radical Jacobins (who were responsible for the temporary introduction of universal male franchise, while the other constitutions of the era disenfranchised the poor) and only small groups attacked inequality based on race or sex.

The few early socialists who wanted to remove socio-economic inequalities were really almost negligible. Yes, the French Revolution realised a classical liberal equality by which, in Anatole France's phrase, the law prevents rich and poor alike from sleeping under bridges. But that does not mean that the French Revolutionary army did not come closer to making the idea of an egalitarian "Nation in Arms" a reality than most other modern armies, especially in its officer corps. Esdaile and his reviewer seem to blame the leaders French Revolution for not enacting a social program that was not theirs -which is a bit unfair, especially considering that we haven't really made that much headway in eroding socially based inequalities in the military in the two centuries since.

Please let's be realistic: what could you expect other than that the ranks of the army would reflect the stratifications of society? Especially in the early phase it was hard enough to find generals who were reasonably competent and politically loyal, so the Revolutionary governments could not have experimented in social engineering (18th century "affirmative action" and "minority quotas") even if they had wanted to. There was a war on and they could not afford to send home the officers and NCOs from the royal army who had sworn allegiance to the Revolution and let this pool of experts go to waste (even Trotsky was forced to fall back on ex-Tsarist officers during the Russian Civil War). These evidently possessed a distinct advantage in experience and what military education then existed, thus barring bad luck or wrong political affiliations they could expect to succeed faster than revolutionary volunteers of equal or even slightly better talent.

Meanwhile, the officers of the National Guard were at first elected by the men, who were more likely to be swayed towards "distinguished citizens" or those who were most fluent in Revolutionary rhetoric (i.e. members of the politically and economically dominating classes, plus well-read intellectuals and maybe a printer like Brune), not a sub-literate comparative nobody whom many if not most comrades would regard as a social inferior. On the other hand, is it not likely that more than a few of the "proletarian" officers would have sympathised with the Jacobins and thus would have been at risk of being "purged" under the Directorate and Napoleon?

Also one has to consider that once the time of la patrie en danger had passed, education again became important for would-be officers (no matter what von der Marwitz and other Prussian officers of the pre-Reform school have said, lack of formal education does not make you a good officer), and like other forms of higher education, that at a military academy was mostly closed to the lower classes. I am not sure where Esdaile got his figures – Napoleon's marshals are pretty well documented and according to the literature at my fingertips, not three, but 15 of them started their careers as private soldiers (Augereau, Bernadotte, Bessières, Jourdan, Lefebvre, Masséna, Moncey, Murat, Ney, Oudinot, Saint-Cyr, Sérurier, Soult, Suchet, and Victor). 3 ex-privates among 26 top-rankers would not have been that bad a ratio for any modern army (how many former privates were among the top-ranking officers of the American Civil War or the two World Wars?), but the actual figure seems to have been at least 57 to 69 percent, depending on how you feel about Brune, Lannes and Mortier (who – like Moreau – had been elected officers by their men as soon as they had enlisted).

I could not find every marshal's social background, but Augereau was the son of a a fruiterer, Bessières' father, a barber-surgeon and Jourdan's, a surgeon, were both described as poor, Lannes' father was an ostler, Lefebvre's a miller, Murat's an innkeeper, Ney's a cooper, and Soult's a peasant. These examples too seem to indicate a somewhat higher degree of social mobility than Esdaile is willing to admit (the 2248 also must include Toussaint-L'Ouverture, Alexandre Dumas and maybe Dessalines, who were sons of slaves, so even the lowest possible social stratum was represented). Another point: many French peasants had a big material stake in the French Revolution e.g. because it had freed them of feudal duties and enabled a not insignificant part of them to become economically self-sufficient by acquiring confiscated church and émigré land. One should not underestimate the very real improvement of the French peasantry's economic situation because of the Revolution and that the peasants in the army were also fighting to prevent the return of the landlords of the ancien régime.

Re. John Cook's review of Uffindell/Corum:

I guess the Goon Show connection John was looking for occurred in The Battle of Spion Kop, where the British government decides to restage the battle of Waterloo to overcome the bad reviews about the Boer War. Moriarty was cast as Napoleon and Eccles as Wellington and, to Ned Seagoon's horror, the French won! There also was Napoleon's Piano about an attempt to steal the musical instrument Boney had played at Waterloo.

Related: Letter to Editor #33

More Prussian Higher Command and Dutch matters

Dear Sirs,

It is a shame that Tilman Stieve did not properly understand the issue in question before making certain comments in his letter in FE No. 31.

To explain the matter to Tilman, the issue arose when Peter Gibbs quoted from a work in a letter published in FE No. 29. The extract he cited contained the sentence: "Its [the artillery's] officers were kept out of the [Prussian] higher commands which Napoleon said was 'idiotic'."

My comment on this, as in my letter published in FE No. 30 was: "The writer Peter [Gibbs] has referred to has made a most fundamental error of fact".

As Peter Gibbs' author gives no source for the statement apparently made by Napoleon, then one must question its reliability. Moreover, as I pointed out in my letter as in FE No. 30, Scharnhorst, himself an artillery officer, was the Prussian chief-of-staff. Tilman is, of course, entitled to hold the opinion that the second in command in the Prussian army does not "really qualify as what Napoleon meant by 'higher command'," but as mentioned above, Peter Gibbs did not establish that such a statement was ever made by Napoleon. Furthermore, if he did, then it was patent nonsense anyway.

In short, Tilman's accusation is without foundation.

I read Albert van Ee's contribution to FE 31 with some interest.

I sympathise with the views expressed by him on the attitude of certain British historians to the role played by the Netherlands troops in the campaign of 1815 in their homeland. One should not forget that it was the initiative shown by Constant Rebeque, the Netherlands chief-of-staff, and the German Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar in not implementing Wellington's orders that made it possible for the Allies to hold the vital road junction at Quatre Bras. If they had obeyed their commander, then this position would have been abandoned without resistance, and the Allied plan to defend Brussels seriously jeopardised. That this significant contribution to the Allied success in this campaign, and the result period of peace and prosperity in Europe has been repaid with such denigration by certain British historians is a sad reflection of the attitude of the 'Little Islanders' to the rest of the world.

As the Dutch archives on the campaign of 1815 were destroyed by Allied bombing in the Second World War, original research into the campaign from the point of view of the 'host country' is handicapped. Although historians such as De Bas and T'Serclaes de Wommersom provided much material based on these archives, there is a need for a good monograph in the English language based on Netherlands source material; Boulger's work, nearly a century old, is somewhat one sided.

It is also a shame that despite the relatively easy access to as yet unused archive material on the subject in Britain, no British historian appears either willing or able to make this material available to the current reader. It is surprising that one of the few battles in history that the British army played any significant role in winning has been so poorly covered by its historians.

Related: Letter to Editor #33

Related: Letter to Editor #37

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On NA Safety

Dear Mr Watkins,

I received today the latest edition of your esteemed magazine, as usual I turned to the "Dispatches" page for the latest dose of what's going on in this daft hobby of ours. I was pleased to read John Tower's letter, he's quite right, the hobby is there for all of us, those who like a good scrap as much as those who don't, and I'm glad he took Rob Martin's comments in good part. I frequently (Too frequently?) share a pint with Rob and would gladly do so with John, if he's in it for fun he's in it for the same reasons as me and most of my friends, Cheers John!

Sadly the same cannot be said for one of your other correspondents. Is it just me, or is it impossible to pick up a military history magazine these days without reading the name of Richard Moore?

OK he's done very well for himself and good luck to him professionally, but I somewhat resent the, tone of his letter, viz; that He, Richard Moore knows best and that we should all knuckle under in the manner of his Ukrainian extras and do what he says. I refer in particular to his remarks about the safety hazard presented by being approached by a cavalryman, armed (not unnaturally!) with a '1796':

Firstly he alleges that the unfortunate dragoon had "No apparent reason other than a wish to join in the general excitement".... Sorry Richard but isn't that what people do at re-enactment events? If not I dread to think what other agenda they may be following. Secondly, I know the dragoon in question and as his NCO I would like to point out that all members of our unit are trained at some length in the correct and safe use, both on foot as well as from horse, of swords. The weapons are blunted and have the tips milled down to further prevent injury. Indeed the execution of realistic but safe sabre duelling is a recognised part of our living history display.

That in 3 years and hundreds of fights both on foot and mounted we have had no injuries beyond the odd skinned knuckle is testament to this. Of course Mr Moore was not to know that, But then he didn't ask did he? OK he may not want to mix it up with a Baker Rifle which is a both delicate and expensive piece of kit, but surely as a fully equipped rifleman he carries a 30" sword bayonet for just such an eventuality? Does he not feel confident to wield this weapon safely in combat? Has he not had extensive training in safe drill with it? Surely...Otherwise he would not be allowed to carry it on the field? Under his own rules anyway.

I note that when he expressed a wish not to engage the man in question, by his own admission he was smiled at and no further action was taken. Try that at a medieval or ECWS event then count your bruises in the beer tent later.

In short, he does not have a monopoly on safety-conscience, or common sense, merely apparently an exalted view of his own opinions. As cavalry in many respects we are at greatest risk during battles and no-one is more aware of the potential for disaster than us, but rather than cop out by presenting an easy but uninspiring show we train hard to fight hard, but in safety, and for fun.

"... Buck your ideas up!".....?? Who DO you think you are?

Editor:

I think that Mr Kenyon has slightly missed the point of Richard's letter. I do not believe that he was trying to establish himself as some all powerful "safety guru" or trying to have a go at XVLD, but trying to forcefully point out that if safety is not tightened up, the next accident that results in injury will add fuel to the fire to ban such events, either directly or indirectly. Already ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers) is hitching itself to the Labour party firearms band wagon and suggesting that shot guns should be reclassified as class 1 firearms. Should a ramrod stray into the crowd at some future point for example, it will be time to take up dominoes or some such similarly dangerous past time!

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Seeing the Dangers ...

Dear Mr. Watkins,

At Last! At the eleventh hour is some sign from the NA that our hobby is under threat. I applaud Garth Rose, Mike Freeman and Richard Moore for their letters in First Empire and the October Adjutant enclosed therein. Please, everyone out there wake up. The issue is almost cut and dried, write to your MP, write to the Home Secretary and Shadow Home Secretary, tell them in a reasonable and non aggressive way that what we do is lawful and not a threat to anyone.

Please keep in mind that should the Labour minority recommendation be adopted most NA members will not be able to own a shotgun certificate and all of the arms, uniform and equipment bought and paid for over the years will be rendered useless overnight, and this will apply to almost all re-enactment groups not just the NA. This is a free country, you can express your opinion to elected representatives. Please think about what might happen if we keep quiet about these issues.

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Hessian Garde du Corps

Dear David,

The following is provided in answer to the inquiry regarding the Garde du Corps of Hesse-Darmstädt.

Campaign History: in short, none. Although individual members of the Garde du Corps served as adjutants and staff officers in various campaigns (Rittmeister von Weichs, for example, was badly wounded while serving as General-Major Schaeffer's adjutant in Spain), the organisation as such never marched to war.

Uniform: The four officers and c. 55 men of the Garde du Corps indeed wore buff coats in the early years of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era, but switched to dark blue coats in June 1809. These had poppy-red distinctions (collars, cuffs and trim), seven white or silver lace battens across the front, a similar batten (Litze) on the collar and red shoulder straps trimmed in white (men) or red/silver (NCOs). Leather gear was white, including the cartridge box, and cords and tassels were silver. The four trumpeters and lone drummer did not receive their new uniforms until 1810: their dark blue coats were richly trimmed with silver and featured silver and red swallow's nests, silver sword knots and silver trumpet cords mixed with crimson silk. All members of the unit wore a tall, anachronistic black bicorne with a black plume tipped in red. Breeches were dark blue for normal wear and white for parades. Overcoats were grey until 1814 when a blue model was introduced.

Incidentally, the Hessian contingent in 1812 consisted of the Chevaulegers Regiment (3 squadrons), the Leib Regiment, the Leib-Garde Regiment, the Garde-Fusilier Battalion, the Leib-Fusilier Battalion and a battery of six guns. The two fusilier battalions were soon joined into a Provisional Fusilier Regiment.

Sources : Karl C. Freiherr Roeder von Diersburg, Geschichte der Grossherzoglich Hessischen Garde-Unteroffiziers-Companie, Darmstadt, 1857.
Klaus Schaefer et al, Die Achenbacher-Bilderhandschrift 1813/14, Darmstadt, 1994.

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Madin's Sabre

Dear Dave,

In response to Mike Madin's Letter (and photograph) in FE30, I can at least shed some light on that sabre of his.

It does appear, from that photograph, that he has a Light Cavalry sabre of the type instituted into the British Army as the 1796 pattern, and subsequently (due to large quantities of war-aid supplied weapons to Prussia) adopted and manufactured in Prussia as the 1811 "Bluchersabel".

Although these two models are essentially identical, there are minor discrepancies which tell them apart, although the photograph is not particularly suited to reveal them. One that I have noticed, is that the hilt furniture is that bit thicker and robust on the Prussian examples I have seen, than the fittings to the British ones. From the picture, though, It certainly appears that the scabbard is Prussian, as the terminal on it differs from the more commonly seen British variants, in a style I have seen on some Prussian examples. Furthermore, the markings are in keeping with similar marks in the same positions that 1 recently saw on two examples I came across in Berlin. (As to what exactly they read, I have no idea, and would be keen to hear myself from anyone with such knowledge.)

Consequently, without viewing the sabre, I tentatively offer the judgement of it being one such Prussian made Bluchersabel, for use by Hussar, Ulan or other Light Dragoon regiments (or even mounted Artillery personnel). Unfortunately, the popularity of this design made the Prussians manufacture it well into the 1850)'s, and I would believe the blade date of 1831 to be the date of manufacture, unless there is any really damning evidence of a re-dating practice, or two conflicting dates on one weapon, or something to cast such a doubt. However, due to the quantity and effectiveness of the model, it is still possible that your piece did see active service, as many such Bluchersabel sabres were dragged from storage to equip Landwehr cavalry units in the Franco-Prussian War.

If Mr Madin wishes to contact me through the 15th Hussars Re-enactment society, I would be pleased to inspect the item at an NA event, if only to confirm my thoughts.

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Waterloo Museums

Dear Sir,

In reply to Mr. Newman's request in First Empire 30 concerning the opening times of the Waterloo museums, the following data.

The Wellington Museum in Waterloo and the Visitor's Centre on the battlefield are both open from 9.30 to 18.30 every day. The Caillou Museum is open from 10.30 to 18.30 every day except Monday.

Might I also suggest a visit to the Army Museum in Brussels, which next to a splendid collection of Belgian uniforms and decorations, presents several Napoleonic items, including British and French tunics and head-dress and objects found on the battlefield of Waterloo. Also to be seen are a number of early Austrian items from about 1789, date of the "Brabantse Omwenteling", a revolt against the Habsburg emperor Joseph II which resulted in the founding of the "United Belgian States", but which was suppressed the following year. The Army Museum is situated in the Jubelpark or Parc du Cinquantenaire and is open from 10.00 to 17.00 every day except Monday; entrance, is free.

Hoping to have been of any help, I remain,

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More on Naval Museums and Shako

Dear Dave:

I enjoyed First Empire 31, and thought I'd pen the following comments to you.

Paul Chamberlain did not refer to the Hartlepool Historic Dock. This is a modern development consisting of an audio-visual visitor attraction simulating a tour around an 1800 Royal Navy Frigate during a battle. You see waxwork sailors working the guns, experience the sight and sound of life between decks etc., and afterwards, you emerge in the dock area. This has a number of buildings which simulate the buildings of the Napoleonic period, with authentic exhibits - a naval outfitters, a chandler's shop, a sword makers etc. There are also two films. One is a dramatised story of two press-ganged brothers, and the other is a potted history of British sea-power. My son particularly enjoyed the play area, which consisted of deck games from the era quoits with ropes, fishing for Frenchies etc.

The whole site is very atmospheric, and although it may not convey a lot of hitherto unknown information to the experienced historian, it provides an enjoyable family day out. When I visited the museum in 1995, they were restoring HMS Trincomalee, an 1816 Frigate built for the East India Company. The ship may be open for visits from the public by now. I would be interested to know Ian Barstow's sources on Eugene de Beauhar-nais, so that I could read them myself. The only biography I have read is by Carola Oman, which wallowed in the family and court aspects of Eugene's life, but was practically useless from the military point of view. When, for example, the author states that Jerome Bonaparte commanded a wing of the French army with distinction at Waterloo, you don't feel too confident about her reliability as a military historian.

I read Dave Commerford's article with interest. I bought a set of Shako rules last year, but after a few play-tests, when battalions rapidly disappear like melting snow, I decided they needed revamping. Shako, flawed as it is, contains some very good ideas and features, which are reflected in my home made rules. These were tested with reasonable success on the lads of the Pinner wargames club, and my rules try to combine the speed and ease of play of Shako with some of the better aspects of Napoleon's Battles. Two players can easily fight a battalion scale division sized action to conclusion in two hours. Shako deserve credit for inspiring me to design fast play rules which don't skimp too much on realism. I'm not writing this to plug my own rules, which will probably never see publication, but rather to put Shako rules in perspective.

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Well done the 9th

Dear David:

I am writing to express my gratitude to all those soldiers who fought at Cranleigh as this was my first full battle weekend and I have never enjoyed myself so much.

Having been an American Civil War re-enactor for many years, the change was for the better as I didn't realise you could have such good clean fun without all the politics involved, and being a member of the 9th East Norfolk's, it's certainly a pleasure to be involved with such an historic regiment.

Cranleigh was superb in it's scenario and all that took part, including the cavalry were truly professional. Congrat-ulations go the the Projects and Battle scene Officers.

Letters to the editor are always welcome on any relevant topic. However, please when sending hand-written letters please make sure that they are legible. If, like myself, your calligraphy is performed by a troop of drunken spiders, then please type or print out your missive. It makes my life easier and usually ensures publication.--DW

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