Columns and Other Things
on the Same Lines

Or move to the left
in file, right turn

Regulations and Tactics: Russia

by John Cook, U.K.

I have deliberately left the subject of the Russians until last for the simple reason that, other than modern authors' interpretations, I have never seen any Russian Napoleonic infantry regulations. Not that it would be much help if I had since my knowl-edge of modern Russian, let alone early 19th Century Russian, could be inscribed on the fly button of a cossack's long johns. I do not even know what they were called properly although I have seen reference made to the Military Code Concerning the Field Service of Infantry 1796 and Tactical Rules for Military Evolutions 1797 in the Men at Arms booklet by Phillip Haythornthwaite. These are said to have been the responsibility of Tsar Paul I and consisted of "Prussian-style linear tactics" but more that he does not say.

Of the later regulations, Zweguintsov quotes the Regulation for Recruits and Company School 1811, whilst Rothenberg, another, more recent, secondary source refers to Barclay de Tolly's Code on the Conduct of Major Military Operations. Unfortunately neither of these authors examine the regulations in question in any detail.

The nearest, as far as I know, that any modern author has come to finding a set of Napoleonic Russian regulations is George Nafziger, who produced those of 1837, called the 1837 Drill Regulation, School of Battalion, in Part IV of a quite superb comparative time and motion study of all the major regulations of the period in Empires, Eagles and Lions some eight years ago. These are, to all intents and purposes, virtually identical to the Prussian Exerzir-Reglement 1812 with the addition of columns of divisions formed on a flank as found in the French Règlement of 1791, and open squares. Conversions were carried out at between 100 and 110 paces per minute.

As far as early Russian regulations are concerned, the only clue I can offer is that as the 1837 Regulations use an identical method of deploying a column of platoons, to that prescribed for a zug colonne under the Prussian Reglement of 1788. It may well be, therefore, that early Russian regulations were also similar to the Prussian; it will be remembered that the Prussians re-tained this method from the Reglement of 1788 in their Exerzir- Reglement 1812. Any conclusions on my part in this context must, nevertheless, remain conjecture.

What modern authors are agreed upon is that prior to about 1810 the Russians fought in the 18th Century Prussian style and after that date with neo-Napoleonic regulations, including the attack column formed in divisional frontage on the centre. This would appear to be confirmed by the evidence of the 1837 Regulations. Modern commentators are also agreed, to one degree or another, that Russian tactics remained somewhat 'conservative', Paret quoting Wittgenstein's deployment at Grossgörschen in 1813 as an example of what he describes as "antiquated concepts". This must be something of a generalisation for elsewhere, Borodino for example, the Russians used columns, lines and skirmishers in a tactical fashion which, although hardly subtle, was a complete departure from the rigid linear tactics of the 18th Century. Russian skirmishing tactics have also been the subject of consid-erable criticism by many authors, yet the Prussians who fought them in 1812 considered that they skirmished competently and at Borodino, and at Bautzen in 1813, they were able to deploy grenadiers as skirmishers.

All this of course is very generalised, but it seems reasonable to infer that the Russians followed the tactical trends developing elsewhere.

SUMMARY

Although one frequently finds columns in a tactical environment, a phenomenon not by any means unique to the French, they were not intended for combat, only movement. The principal innovation in the use of columns by the French was that they were used for movement during the advance to contact, under fire, through the zone of artillery fire and into the musketry zone where they were supposed to deploy. That, at least is the theory of it. The 18th Century linear school required columns to deploy beyond the range of effective fire, the advance to contact being conducted entirely in line.

Columns, nevertheless, were not formations, by their very nature, in which soldiers could fight. When column met line in normal circumstances, there were only three possible scenarios.

1. The column deploys into line and a fire fight follows until one side or the other has had enough.

2. The enemy are intimidated into flight, in which case the column has no need to deploy and the unit takes its objective in that formation.

3. The column is surprised and cannot deploy or attempts to fight as it is and is, invariably, defeated.

Although it is perfectly true that columns could be used as a tactical formation, and doubtless they were, this was a reflection of the difference between the theory, implied, in regulations and tactical doctrine, the latter being further modified in tactical practice. The difficulty here, as I hope is already abundantly clear, that neither tactical doctrine nor, especially, tactical practice get much coverage, in comparison to the mechanics of drill, in any of the official manuals or regulations of the period. Indeed, tactical practice gets no cover whatsoever.

It has been accepted, primarily, it would seem, as a result of Peninsular analysis, that the column was only used tactically in the shock role which, apparently, was the only possible option open to it by virtue of its configuration, in other words it could not develop musketry to a useful degree is certainly true, which is patently obvious.

Except, however, where terrain or buildings prevented the use of lines, where the enemy was already in flight or unsteady, or where the training of one's own troops was suspect, there was no sensible use of the column as a tactical formation. All the evidence is that against steady formed troops in line, the like-lihood of success of a column as an instrument of shock, was hardly better than that of cavalry charging infantry squares.

The concept of its use as an intimidatory tactic is another matter, but here a gamble had to be made on the enemy being persuaded into flight. If he did not all the evidence is that the column, if it could not or did not deploy, would be defeated. Be all that as it may, the fact remains that columns were neither designed nor intended for a tactical role in normal circumstances.

The flexibility of French formations, adaptable to every contin-gency, and their speed of conversion from one formation to another under fire, particularly in the context of grand tactics, that is to say regimental and Brigade level and above, allowed fire and movement throughout the zones of effective enemy fire, to an unprecedented degree. It was this remarkable ability, the result of training combined with accumulated battlefield experience, and nothing whatever to do with columnar tactics intrinsically, that gave the French their tactical superiority so particularly marked at Austerlitz, Jena and Auerstedt. It is also true that it was never to be repeated to the same degree.

From a peak when it marched east from the camps along the Channel coast in 1805 and during the campaigns of that year and 1806, it is generally accepted that the tactical skill of the French infantry started to decline as less experienced and well trained conscripts, ever increasingly replaced the veterans of those years. By as early as 1807 the performance against the Russians was already markedly less good. The French infantry that fought the decisive campaigns of 1813 in Germany was largely unrecog-nisable in comparison. Be that as it may, the concept that the French always fought in column of one kind or another is as false as the concept that the British could only fight in line.

Despite efforts in recent years to denigrate the achievements of the British infantry, there is no avoiding the fact that the British Army never had to fight the Grande Armée in its hey-day, commanded by Napoleon himself. Nevertheless, from 1809 onwards, under Wellington, there is also no avoiding the fact that it consistently defeated, with what were essentially 18th Century Prussian linear regulations, soldiers of what was then the most formidable army in Europe. The British, far from adopting French doctrine, were unique in not doing so. British infantry fought under regulations firmly rooted in the linear concepts of the previous century but, retaining and adapting them, found their own unique solution to the tactical problem.

Maximilien Foy, commanding the French 1st Division at Salamanca, said of the Wellington's conduct the battle, "He kept his dispositions concealed for almost the whole day, he waited until we were committed to our movements before he developed his own, he played a safe game, he fought in the oblique order - it was a battle in the style of Frederick the Great".

It is received wisdom that the defeats inflicted on the Austri-ans, Russians and Prussians between 1805 and 1806, the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz and Jena respectively, resulted, principally, from the inability of infantry trained under 18th Century linear regulations to compete on equal terms with those trained in the allegedly columnar regulations of the French Réglement of 1791. This cannot be right.

Let Colonel F.N. Maude, writing in 1909 of the 18th and 19th Century tactical experience as a whole, have nearly the last word. "It is now clearly established that in all essentials the training and tactical methods of the old pre-Jena period - ie, from 1800 to 1806 - was identical in spirit with those in use in the British Army at the same date and for many subsequent years, and our ample experience in the Peninsula, at Waterloo, and in India, is there as sufficient justification both for ourselves and the Prussians".

What he seems to be saying in so many words is that Hohenlohe, because his conduct of the battle was flawed, would have fared no better had he commanded British infantry at Jena. Similarly, Wellington would have been just as successful in his Peninsular battles had he commanded an army of Prussians. The causes for those Prussian, and other, reverses must be sought not in the infantry regulations, not even, perhaps, in the infantry tactics, but the higher levels of grand-tactical command, organisation and leadership.

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