Battle Command and Initiative

Relevancy for Today / Conclusion

by Major Michael J. Daniels, US Army

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the results of these two battles waged on the banks of the Niagara. The character and abilities of these six leaders provide a number of useful lessons for today’s student of military history, or for current leaders who want to gain insight into effects of the application of battle command and initiative on the course of battle.

In terms of battle command, it is important to remember that a commander’s perspective and emphasis changes with the echelon commanded. This is truer today than it was for the commanders of 1814. In 1814 there was no “operational art” to speak of. As Generals Brown and Drummond demonstrated, their influence was very much rooted at the tactical level once battle was joined. Army and theater level generals could easily range the field of battle, and the scale of what they could “visualize, describe and detect” was usually a short ride or a messenger away--the “centralization of command.” This great gap from the tactical to the strategic level of war meant that leaders had to visualize, describe, and direct, but direct not just subordinate commanders, but often motivate and direct soldiers by leading from the front.

This caused the greatest problems for Generals Brown and Drummond. Both of these leaders had to balance their role and duties of Army commander with that of battlefield captain. At Chippawa, Brown never achieved the right balance, and found himself absorbed into what was essentially Winfield Scott’s fight rather than coordinating the movement of the entire force in a timely and efficient manner. His failing led to a breakdown in command and control, and because Brown’s vision was limited to Scott’s battle, he failed to appreciate the greater fight. His obvious inexperience at coordinating such large number of men in combat relegated the general to the role of spectator at a crucial moment in the battle.

Drummond faced a similar quandary at Lundy’s Lane. He personally committed himself to the conduct of the immediate fight, negating the efforts of his subordinate commander, Major General Riall. Because Drummond failed to step back and gain a proper appreciation of the situation along the entire front (a failure to “visualize”), he could not properly direct the efforts of all his subordinates. As a result, the British focused their efforts almost entirely on the center of the line, conducting a series of head-long counterattacks, rather than look to the flanks and maximize the combat multiplier of the still numerous light forces under the capable leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Pearson.

Most of the subordinate leaders understood that once battle commenced, their place was with the formations of the lead echelons. The bold and brash Winfield Scott definitely personified this view, as did the others to lesser degrees. The problem with this approach is that successfully visualizing the battlefield using intuition and judgment requires a great deal of accurate and timely information. Too often during this campaign, leaders joined battle without a sound appreciation of the terrain to be fought over, and more important, without a clear read as to the strength and disposition of the enemy. At Chippawa, Riall left a well-protected defensive position to join battle with a force twice as large as his. This was due to two factors, one, because he believed the U.S. forces to be inferior soldiers who would run at first contact, and two, because Riall had not conducted a detailed reconnaissance of the enemy. He was not accurately visualizing the battlefield.

This happened a number of other times throughout these battles, but the experience of Scott at Lundy’s Lane provides yet another clear example of a failure in the proper application of battle command. Scott rushed into a battle completely unaware of the enemy’s strength and disposition. His haste may have been spurred by his thirst for glory, but he certainly had no doubt as to the predicament he faced when writing his memoirs fifty years later and remembering how angry he felt at the stupid, blundering circumstances that had brought him to this point. Scott further exacerbated his poor command decision-making later in the evening by ordering an ill-advised frontal assault in column, a maneuver never rehearsed by the unit, in the dark, by weary, frightened troops, and in dangerous proximity to friendly forces who have not been apprised of the “plan.” For all of Winfield Scott’s courage, initiative and bold action, these two actions reflect the hubris of youth, and the danger a commander faces when acting upon poorly informed intuition.

These two battles also point to the criticality of seizing and maintaining the initiative. As General Donn A. Starry has written, “By far the majority of winners in battles in which the beginning force ratios were generally within “reasonable” limits…were those who somehow seized the initiative from the enemy, and held it until battle’s end.” Each side ceded the initiative to the other at critical junctures in the campaign, often not due to any planned “operational pause” but because of command oversight. Too often key leaders on each side, particularly Brown and Riall, but Scott and Drummond too, neglected to maintain awareness as to the enemy’s disposition and intent. This neglect meant that the enemy force was afforded an opportunity to refocus and shift its efforts, an opportunity that a truly aggressive, “thinking” commander does not cede. This failure is directly related to the problem of a commander not properly “visualizing” the battlefield, and therefore not setting the necessary conditions to maintain operational momentum and retain the initiative.

Through this brief study of two battles from the nation’s distant past, there appears to be lessons still of value to the leader and student of today’s army. The technical nature of warfighting has changed significantly over the past 200 years, so too has the tactics and doctrine that put that technology to use with best effect. Principles of war and battlefield constructs aren’t immutable truths, but they only change slightly as militaries slowly evolve over time. What hasn’t changed significantly, and isn’t likely to change with any impending “revolutions in military affairs,” is the human characteristics that shape and inform our leaders. It is because the essential nature of humans remains relatively constant that a periodic review of past battles continues to be relevant.

Battle Command and Initiative Leadership During the Battles of Chippawa and Lundy's Lane

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© Copyright 2005 by Rich Barbuto.
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