Battle Command and Initiative

Leadership During the Battles of Chippawa and Lundy's Lane

by Major Michael J. Daniels, US Army

Battle command applies the leadership element of combat power. It is principally an art that employs skills developed by professional study, constant practice, and considered judgment. Commanders, assisted by the staff, visualize the operation, describe it in terms of intent and guidance, and direct the actions of subordinates within their intent.

    --U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0

Possession of the initiative allows a commander to continually seek vulnerable spots and shift his decisive operation when opportunities occur. A commander never surrenders the initiative once he gains it. He presses the fight tenaciously and aggressively. He accepts risk while leading soldiers and pushing systems to their limits.

    --U.S. Army Field Manual 3-90

Introduction

The U.S. Army has recently begun a concerted effort to reorganize and rewrite its doctrine to address both the contemporary environment as well as future contingencies. Many of these concepts just introduced are new. The framework by which the Army expects to fight and win tomorrow’s battle has changed, or at a minimum is at least adapting to new uncertainties and threats. However, there are some essential themes and principles that have not changed significantly in quite some time. The exercise of command, or as current U.S. Army doctrine as noted above terms “battle command,” remains in its essence the same as it has throughout the nation’s history. So too has the importance and exercise of initiative. The relationship between command in battle and the exercise of initiative are closely entwined.

Success in battle often depends on having leaders at every echelon who understand this relationship, and can maximize its impacts to their favor. Even battles as distant past as those from the War of 1812 can serve to instruct today’s leaders and students of the military art. This paper will present two such small, set-piece battles from that war, specifically the Battle of Chippawa and the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, both occurring in the month of July 1814, on what is commonly referred to as the Niagara peninsula. These battles can be fairly characterized as the two key battles of the American campaign of 1814, and as such provide a number of still-relevant lessons. By looking at these battles, and at some of the key leaders on each side of the fight (leaders at different echelons of command), the impact of the interrelationship between battle command and initiative can be portrayed and thus better understood.

Campaign Overview

Secretary of War John Armstrong ushered in 1814 by sending General Brown to Sacketts Harbor, New York to “secure the fleet.” The following month (February), Armstrong directed Brown to attack Kingston by crossing frozen Lake Ontario. A series of miscommunications between Armstrong and Brown, coupled with a lake not frozen enough to support an assault crossing, led to Brown sending some of his force westward to the Niagara frontier. These soldiers, after long marching to and fro due to conflicting orders, would spend almost two months training and drilling just outside Buffalo (Williamsville) under the tutelage of newly-promoted Brigadier General Winfield Scott.

Scott was known as a stern disciplinarian and a demanding trainer. He was also well read, and incorporated his deep knowledge of foreign military studies into his leadership and command style, as well as his training methodology. Scott drilled the soldiers an average of ten hours a day, sometimes breaking only for meals. Scott was accused of being a martinet, but he realized that if this army were to have any chance of success, it had to be highly disciplined and well drilled--it was Scott’s belief that this was the only way to quickly change the army’s character.

This emphasis on discipline and training, coupled with administrative talents that stressed uniformity and sanitation, quickly transformed the Left Division soldiers under his charge. Scott was so confident of his abilities that he boasted to a friend in May 1814 that “If …I do not make the best army now in service, by the 1st of June, I will agree to be dismissed [from] the service.” This was a strong boast that he would prove very close to achieving.

While Scott was drilling his soldiers in Williamsville, British soldiers, natives and militia of Major General Phineas Riall’s Right Division were preparing for war. The British leadership in Canada recognized the strategic value of the Niagara peninsula, both due to its locale at the convergence of two Great Lakes, but also due to the fertile lands that helped feed both Upper and Lower Canada. The British defenses were tied to four fortified positions along the Niagara River. Fort Erie was located at the head of the Niagara on Lake Erie (across from Buffalo), with Forts George and Mississauga located downstream on the Niagara, where it joined Lake Ontario.

Across from these two forts, and on the American side of the mouth of the Niagara, stood Fort Niagara. This fort was also currently under British control, having been taken the previous winter. British leaders expected this fort to be a target of Scott’s (and Brown’s) forces, with the likely subsequent objectives of Forts George and Mississauga. The British were at varied degrees of readiness, with troop morale and logistical support waning as summer 1814 began.

Jumbo Map of Campaign Area (very slow: 305K)

Battle Command and Initiative Leadership During the Battles of Chippawa and Lundy's Lane

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