Battle Command and Initiative

Key Personalities

by Major Michael J. Daniels, US Army

The stage was now set for the conduct of the Niagara campaign, and with it the third American incursion into that region of Upper Canada. This campaign would pit the U.S. Army’s Left Division, led by Major General Jacob J. Brown, against the British Right Division, led by Major General Phineas Riall. Both sides would incorporate a varied mix of regular, militia and native (Indian) forces (see Appendix B for more detailed orders of battle). It is necessary to introduce background material on some of the leaders involved in the campaign prior to relating the details of the battles.

For the purposes of this discussion, the focus will fall on three key leaders from each side. The U.S. Army leaders to be discussed include General Brown, General Scott, and Major Thomas Jesup. The focus on the British side will be on Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond, Major General Riall, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Pearson. These leaders have been selected for two reasons, one, because of the impact they had on the course of these battles, and two, because they are representative of three distinct echelons of command which provides a useful tool to compare and contrast their relative contributions.

U.S. Army Leaders

Major General Jacob J. Brown, the commander of the Left Division, was a Pennsylvania Quaker with a background as a schoolmaster, surveyor and engineer. He was commissioned in the New York State militia and by 1812 had attained the rank of brigadier general. He was commissioned a brigadier general in the regular army, based on his performance at Sacketts Harbor in 1813, and promoted to major general and division commander the following spring just prior to the commencement of the Niagara campaign.

Brown was a resourceful leader who could at one moment appear calm and orderly, while in the next aggressive and single-mindedly determined. One of his noted weaknesses was this single-minded streak that, when combined with a temper that occasionally flared, bordered dangerously at times on blinding obstinacy. One writer has said that Brown’s most dangerous trait was not his quick temper, but his “refusal to ever admit he is wrong.” Fortunately, Brown recognized his weaknesses and was imbued with a great deal of common sense. He knew to surround himself with competent, professional subordinates.

Above all it was determined that Brown was a natural, determined and capable leader. One of his regimental commanders, Major Thomas Jesup, noted that General Brown “fathomed the plans of the enemy as if by intuition and perceived all his faults in an instant; and prompt in his decisions, he never failed to strike at the proper time and with the most decisive effect.” It was also said of Brown at the time that, “He is a man of indefatigable perseverance and activity, enterprizing [sic], vigilant, and brave almost to a fault; full of strategem [sic], fertile in resources, and never disheartened….” Essentially, Brown was deemed the right man for the task at hand, though he certainly was aided by very capable subordinates.

One of these subordinates, previously mentioned, was the First Brigade commander and youngest general in the U.S. Army (just twenty-eight years old), Brigadier General Winfield Scott. Scott was a born leader and dedicated professional who combined an aggressive nature with a passion for his craft. Scott’s abilities were ably demonstrated at the division’s training camp in the spring of 1814. There was no question (then or now) that Scott was greatly responsible for what can be characterized as the “birth of a professional American army.” Scott’s failings were his ambitions and drive that sometimes bordered on inflexibility and egotism. Scott wrote, “a little arrogance, near the enemy, when an officer is ready to suit the action to the word, may be pardoned by his countrymen.” What cannot be pardoned, as will become apparent later, is when a brash, aggressive nature clouds judgment, and potentially imperils the soldiers under command.

The final U.S. Army leader to be discussed is one of Scott’s subordinates, Major Thomas S. Jesup, the newly appointed (May 1814) commander of the Twenty-Fifth Infantry. Jesup has been described as an “independent and self-reliant officer,” and a leader of demonstrated courage and initiative (he would be wounded four times at Lundy’s Lane and continue to fight on). Jesup was a leader, quite common for the period, who led from the front and expected subordinates to do likewise. He and his officers were to “promptly execute orders” through “firmness and good conduct.” Above all, Jesup was a quietly competent career army officer who knew what was expected of him, and was capable of independent action in the absence of detailed guidance and orders. His demeanor and capabilities would prove critical to any successes the U.S. Army would achieve during the course of these two battles.

British Army Leaders

The first of the three British leaders was Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond, commander of the forces in Upper Canada. A soldier for over 25 years, Drummond was born in Quebec, and joined the British Army at age seventeen. He took advantage of the British purchase system to quickly move through the ranks (he was a lieutenant colonel at twenty-one). He did have limited campaign experience in Holland and Egypt, but it was after a series of successful staff postings that he found himself appointed to his position in Canada in the fall of 1813. Drummond quickly established himself as an active, capable theater (operational) commander. He was able to pursue a mix of offensive and defensive strategies throughout Upper Canada that maximized the limited combat power available to him given the wide expanse of terrain he was forced to cover (roughly equivalent to the current province of Ontario).

Naturally aggressive, brave and resourceful, Drummond was inclined to seize the initiative from a U.S. force he believed to be inferior in both capability and fighting spirit. Much of this feeling was due to the many one-sided successes his forces achieved during the fall and winter of 1813-1814. Drummond was not thought of as a fiery or inspirational leader, but rather as an excellent staff officer and administrator. This would serve him well in dealing with the myriad logistical issues the Right Division faced, and helped in balancing Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost’s (the commander-in-chief of British North America) varying demands for some sort of mobile defense throughout the breadth of the area (only conducting limited offensive actions as necessary). This meant that Drummond would need a strong subordinate to execute his plans through capable field leadership. To this end he brought with him to Upper Canada Major General Phineas Riall, who would serve as Drummond’s primary field commander.

Riall was a thirty-eight year old Irishman and career soldier, and had also risen swiftly through the ranks greatly aided by the purchase system. However, Riall had only limited combat experience in the West Indies because of this rapid rise. One of his contemporaries described him as “a gallant man, but possessed of very little military skill, someone who had attained his rank by the purchase of all purchasable grades.” He was generally viewed as brave and aggressive, but also “impetuous to the point of rashness.” Because of his inexperience and aggressive nature Drummond kept close hold on his subordinate’s freedom of action, and allowed him only the slimmest tactical flexibility on the Niagara peninsula.

Riall was capable though, and was aware of the situation developing on the Niagara frontier. He anticipated the American attack (as did Drummond), and was greatly concerned that his forces were too dispersed and short-handed--due in varying degree to sickness, desertion and low manning/recruitment. His dire warnings led to Prevost’s considerations to replace Riall, this just a few days before the planned U.S. invasion. Drummond defended Riall to Prevost, and echoed many of Riall’s concerns, reminding the commander-in-chief that Riall was willing and capable of defending any American incursion. This issue would recede in importance in the near term once the invasion commenced.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Pearson is the final British leader for the focus of this paper. Pearson would command a 1000+ man strong force (brigade) composed of light dragoons, light infantry, and local militia. This disparate force required an experienced leader who possessed a certain flexibility of mind and attitude, someone who could operate independently over sustained periods. Pearson had over twenty years experience as a light infantry officer and was a veteran of actions in Holland, Egypt, Denmark, the West Indies and with Wellington in Spain (where he was seriously injured). Pearson was posted to Canada to recuperate, but because of his extensive experience, the combat veteran soon found himself in the middle of another war. The pain from his wound and his inability to suffer fools led to a number of verbal clashes with Canadian militia officers. Yet even though, as Donald Graves notes, “they detested him…Pearson could not have cared less.”

Battle Command and Initiative Leadership During the Battles of Chippawa and Lundy's Lane

Back to Table of Contents -- War of 1812 #4
Back to War of 1812 List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Magazine List
© Copyright 2005 by Rich Barbuto.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com