What Madison and his Cabinet failed to do at the national level was left for Brown and Chauncey to make up on the spot. Brown and Brigadier General Winfield Scott, and to a lesser degree New York Militia Brigadier General Peter B. Porter, made tremendous efforts to gather and prepare a land force and no one can doubt Chauncey's single-minded efforts to outbuild Yeo. The problem was to coordinate the land and naval effort. Chauncey and General Henry Dearborn cooperated in 1813 in the raid on York and the attack upon Fort George, but after the near-loss of Sackett’s Harbor, his base, Chauncey was reluctant to pursue further joint operations. Brown, of course, was instrumental in saving Sackett's Harbor in May 1813. However, Brown was irritated the following April when Chauncey sought his help to defend the base from an attack which never came. The Army defended the naval guns at Oswego and Brown, before he departed Sackett's Harbor, allocated his most experienced regiment, the riflemen, to ensure that the guns reached Chauncey's shipyard. Upon his return to Buffalo in June, Brown sent a confidential note to Armstrong in which he complained of the one-sided nature of this relationship. He believed that the Ontario fleet was "under great obligations to the Army for its preservation and support...." However, he had "not seen in this navy, a magnanimous expression of the obligation...." Brown concluded by professing his personal friendship for Chauncey and his continued support for the Navy. In June, Brown's worry was whether or not Chauncey would appear at the head of the lake when Brown approached from the south. Throughout June, Chauncey proclaimed his willingness to sail by 1 July if he had sufficient numbers of sailors to crew his fleet. The Secretary of the Navy assured Madison and Armstrong that seamen were on the way. Brown analyzed the strengths of the competing fleets and was satisfied that Chauncey's fleet was the stronger and that Yeo would refuse to accept battle. What Brown lacked was Chauncey's promise to meet him with his fleet. Brown confessed this uncertainty to Brigadier Edmund P. Gaines, his subordinate commander at Sackett’s Harbor, probably hoping that his subordinate might coax a commitment from the commodore. “I do not know that I am to be supported by the Fleet of either Lake but I intend to enter the Enemy's Country about the first of July and shall hope not to be disgraced. If Commodore Chauncey can meet me between Burlington and Fort George by the 15th of July I do not doubt but that with the assistance he can give, Fort George and Niagara will be in our power.” On 3 July, the ever-aggressive Brown launched his invasion. American Strategy for 1814 Introduction The President’s Plan and Brown’s Action Finally, a Strategy Critique The Campaign Plan for the Niagara Frontier Back to Table of Contents -- War of 1812 #3 Back to War of 1812 List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Rich Barbuto. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com