On 7 June Madison met with the cabinet to determine an overall strategy for the Western and Central Theaters. The two military secretaries reported the strength and locations of their respective forces. Armstrong reported that eight thousand regulars guarded the American coast and twenty-one hundred were in the Western Theater. Fully eight thousand were in the 9th Military District; of these, Izard had five thousand and Brown the rest. Armstrong believed that over seven thousand recruits were at rendezvous points throughout the country and available for commitment. Unfortunately, Armstrong's hopes to convince Madison to cancel the expedition into the upper lakes were dashed. Madison approved a strategic plan of four components. On 9 June Armstrong sent Brown the results of that session which came to Brown on 21 June. First, one thousand troops and the bulk of the Lake Erie squadron would clear the British from the upper Great Lakes. Second, the boatwrights at Sackett's Harbor would construct fifteen gunboats, each seventy-five feet long. These boats would be sailed into the St. Lawrence and cut the river line of communication between Montreal and Kingston. Izard would build and garrison a fortification on the river to secure the gunboats. Third, Izard would make a demonstration toward Montreal to divert British attention from Brown's operation. Fourth, Brown was to make the main attack and seize Burlington Heights. If Chauncey defeated Yeo, Brown, in cooperation with Chauncey, would continue the attack eastward to York and perhaps Kingston. The actual wording of the record was somewhat ambiguous as to whether Brown was cleared to act immediately to take Burlington Heights without waiting for the results of a naval battle. Armstrong, in detailed instructions to Brown, discussed the issue. Making a rough calculation of supply requirements and the considerable problem of moving food and equipment from Lake Erie to Burlington Heights, he advised Brown "...though the Expedition be approved, its execution must be suspended 'till Chauncey shall have gained the command of the Lake." According to Armstrong, this would allow time for reinforcements to reach Buffalo. Secretary of the Navy Jones told Armstrong that Chauncey was expected on the lake no later than 15 July. Apparently as an afterthought, Armstrong introduced a new idea - a concept which probably had not been discussed at the Cabinet meeting two days earlier. "To give immediate occupation to your troops and to prevent their blood from stagnating," Armstrong suggested that Brown consider an attack upon Fort Erie and perhaps following up that action by clearing the west bank of the Niagara River all the way to Fort George. To an aggressive soldier like Brown, impatient at the foot dragging of his superiors and their staffs, this was all the authority he needed. A few days before receiving these instructions, Brown had despaired of the active assistance of the residue of the Lake Erie squadron and he decided to cross the Niagara River near Fort Erie instead. Armstrong's afterthought matched perfectly with the plan developing in Brown's mind. In a letter to the quartermaster at Albany in which he requested that equipment be hurried to Buffalo, Brown wrote: "I have this day received a letter from him [Armstrong] permitting me to be governed by circumstances. Circumstances it appears to me render it proper that I should cross and it is my intention to take possession of the opposite shore of the streight [sic] before the 4th of July." American Strategy for 1814 Introduction The President’s Plan and Brown’s Action Finally, a Strategy Critique The Campaign Plan for the Niagara Frontier Back to Table of Contents -- War of 1812 #3 Back to War of 1812 List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Rich Barbuto. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com