Madison's strategic plan was open to considerable criticism. First, Madison articulated his overarching plan so very late in the season that he was constrained by the current position of the forces. Had he promulgated a strategy three months earlier, the troops could have moved to their jump-off positions and still have had time for adequate training. The President's tardiness was inexcusable considering that it was common knowledge that Napoleon's defeat would release thousands of British veterans and the Americans would have to strike fast before these reinforcements arrived in strength. Second, Madison allocated to the main attack only a fraction of the forces available. Brown had fewer than four thousand regulars and he was required to defend Sackett's Harbor as well as to seize Burlington Heights. Madison gave Izard a secondary mission although he had more men than Brown. Third, Madison did not order Chauncey to leave port and seek decisive battle with Yeo or to support Brown. Apparently he satisfied himself with Jones' assertion of Chauncey's willingness to do so. The day prior to the Cabinet meeting, Jones wrote to the President that "the Naval Force is at all times, ready to cooperate with the Military, and, I presume, there can be no doubt of a cheerful reciprocation." Lulled with these words, Madison failed to give positive orders to his naval commander. Fourth, Madison erroneously approved the campaign to clear the British from the upper Great Lakes in spite of Armstrong's well-reasoned counter-argument that the seizure of Burlington Heights and York would have the same result. Madison's decision deprived Brown's invasion of one thousand troops and the Erie squadron. Madison never grasped the key strategic principle that severing the line of communication would slowly but surely result in the capture of everything west of the cut. Sending gunboats east of Kingston was a step in the right direction, but the summer offensive would likely run its course before this slender gunboat flotilla achieved decisive results. A century afterwards, J.W. Fortescue, historian of the British Army, examined Madison's decision to make the main attack on the Niagara and a decidedly secondary effort to stop traffic on the St. Lawrence and pronounced: "Thus the object which should have been primary was made secondary, and that which should have been secondary was made primary, according to the approved practice of the amateur strategist." Fortescue's judgment was, if anything, too gentle; the Commander-in-Chief and his Secretary of War had designated the main invasion effort and through neglect had neither given it sufficient resources nor supported it. American Strategy for 1814 Introduction The President’s Plan and Brown’s Action Finally, a Strategy Critique The Campaign Plan for the Niagara Frontier Back to Table of Contents -- War of 1812 #3 Back to War of 1812 List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Rich Barbuto. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com