After repeated failures to capture Canada, the United States was faced with a formidable strategic challenge. With the final defeat of Napoleon expected at any time, the British government could release thousands of hardened, experienced veterans for operations in the Western Hemisphere. While some of these forces would no doubt reinforce Canada, certainly many would be used in attacks upon the cities of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Up to this time, the Americans defended their coastal cities with small regular garrisons which could be supported by deep but untrained, inexperienced militia formations. Of course, British army forces, carried by the unchallenged Royal Navy, could choose the time and place of their attack. The Americans had to be strong everywhere along the coast. It was also clear that the war would not be won by defending territory but by capturing Quebec and establishing a choke hold on the Saint Lawrence. Thus, a window of opportunity was opened. If the Americans could launch a successful invasion at a decisive point in the Central Theater of Operations prior to the arrival of this formidable British army, then maybe a negotiated settlement was yet possible. However, in 1814 President Madison was extremely slow in coordinating a strategy between the army and navy. Secretary of War John Armstrong, without waiting for the president’s approval, started forces moving in the Ninth Military Department. He split up the force coming out of winter quarters at French Mills. He sent Major General Jacob Brown westward toward the Niagara Frontier with a small brigade while Major General George Izard returned to the Lake Champlain area with the bulk of forces. Armstrong inexcusably failed to unify command in the Ninth District. Izard outranked Brown but Armstrong treated both as equals. He sent guidance and orders directly to Brown without going through Izard. In fact, he never assigned geographical responsibilities to his two commanders. They were both division commanders, commanding all the soldiers of the regiments assigned to their respective divisions. Perceiving that Armstrong had given him broad discretionary powers to plan a campaign, Brown focused his efforts on the operational possibilities on the Niagara Peninsula and in gathering a force adequate to his goals. Persuaded that he could not count on friendly control of Lake Ontario, Armstrong recommended Brown's concept to Madison on 30 April. Madison, convinced that he must retake Mackinac in order to secure the west from native attack, sent Armstrong's note to the Secretary of the Navy for study. However, it was not until a cabinet meeting on 7 June that Madison approved a coordinated plan in the Western and Central Theaters of Operations. American Strategy for 1814 Introduction The President’s Plan and Brown’s Action Finally, a Strategy Critique The Campaign Plan for the Niagara Frontier Back to Table of Contents -- War of 1812 #3 Back to War of 1812 List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Rich Barbuto. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com