Madison's plan reflected muddled strategic thinking and a virtual surrender of control to events, to local commanders, and to chance. The plan removed the Lake Erie squadron from supporting Brown and sent it instead to retake Mackinac. During May and June while Madison and his Cabinet thought, man-of-action Brown prepared his forces for the upcoming campaign on the Niagara Peninsula. Brown's concept consisted of several phases. In the preparatory phase, the American commander had to raise, equip, and train a sizable force, perhaps double the number then under him. He must gather supplies and information about the enemy. In the deployment phase the Navy would move Brown's division across Lake Erie to some suitable point on the south shore of the Niagara Peninsula. In the employment phase, the army would fight its way north across the Grand River and take Burlington. The final phase, the exploitation, would see the reduction of British holdings: Forts Erie, George, and Niagara. While all this was happening, Brown was required to defend Sackett's Harbor and Oswego. This plan was feasible although many issues were out of Brown's control. Could sufficient quantities of supplies, troops, and transportation be found? Would the Lake Erie squadron cooperate in moving the troops and then continue moving supplies throughout the campaign? Would not the Grand River Indians resist any attempt to cross their lands? If Brown managed to take Burlington Heights and protect his long line of communication, how could he then pry the British out of their forts? If Commodore Isaac Chauncey won his big battle on Lake Ontario, the British might evacuate the forts before Brown could trap them. If Royal navy Commodore Sir James Yeo won, Brown's army would be exceedingly vulnerable as would Sackett's Harbor itself. If no naval battle took place, Brown might be forced to lay siege to the forts, a chancy business at best. The final question concerns strategic ends. Even if Brown succeeded in clearing the Niagara Peninsula of British and native forces, how would that contribute to Madison's war goals? During May and June, Brown wrestled with these weighty issues. It is clear that the Administration exercised control over many of the factors that complicated Brown's efforts. Madison, for his part, temporized unnecessarily about forging a coordinated strategic plan. He was not forceful in reconciling the goals of the Army and Navy, and allowed a costly arms race on Lake Ontario to continue unquestioned. Armstrong should not be forgiven for effectively splitting command within the 9th Military District. His attempt to coordinate the activities of Izard's and Brown's forces himself from Washington resulted in inefficiencies and confusion. Despite the many unknowns and the U.S. government's self-inflicted wounds, Brown's army would give Britain its most serious challenge to the sovereignty of Upper Canada. That was to come in the summer. During the spring of 1814 both sides scrambled to prepare for the impending campaign American Strategy for 1814 Introduction The President’s Plan and Brown’s Action Finally, a Strategy Critique The Campaign Plan for the Niagara Frontier Back to Table of Contents -- War of 1812 #3 Back to War of 1812 List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Rich Barbuto. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com