As early as 10 July, Generals Hester and Wing were far from pleased with the performance of all units and commanders. On 10 July Wing, who had visited the command post of the 3d Battalion, 169th Infantry, on 8 July, directly ordered the regimental commander to relieve the 3d Battalion's commander and put Colonel Reincke in his place.
Three days prior to this relief, the 145th Infantry Regiment (less the 3d Battalion, serving under Liversedge) of the 37th Division, which had been standing by on Guadalcanal in area reserve, had been dispatched to Rendova. The first echelon sailed on 7 July, the second two days later. The regimental commander, Colonel Holland, had hardly arrived on Rendova when Hester relieved the commander of the 169th Infantry and ordered Colonel Holland to take over the regiment temporarily. Also relieved were the executive, intelligence, and operations officers of the 169th. Leaving Lt. Col. Theodore L. Parker in command of his old regiment, Holland took his own executive, intelligence, and operations officers and eighteen enlisted men from the 145th to headquarters of the 169th.
Meanwhile problems of higher command for New Georgia had not ceased to concern Admirals Halsey and Turner and especially General Harmon. On 5 July Harmon was on Guadalcanal, as were Turner and General Griswold. After informing Turner and Griswold of his views, he radioed to Halsey a recommendation that the forward echelon of the XIV Corps staff be sent to New Georgia about 8 July to prepare, under Hester, to take over supply, administration, and planning.
Once Munda airfield fell, Harmon urged, Griswold should become commander of the New Georgia Occupation Force. This would free Hester to reorganize his main striking force and directly command the attack against Vila in Kolombangara. Such a change was necessary, Harmon explained, because Hester's small staff was not capable of bearing the responsibilities that would soon be thrust on it. (Rad, Harmon to COMSOPAC, 5 Jul 43, Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia Material, OCMH.)
Admiral Turner was not a man given to avoiding responsibility or yielding authority. Harmon wrote later, in explaining his reasons for urging a change in command, that Turner was "inclined more and more to take active control of land operations." (Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 15 Jul 43, quoted in part in Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia Material, OCMH.)
In his message to Halsey, he did not make this point. The South Pacific commander replied to Harmon the next day, telling him to augment Hester's 43d Division staff as he saw fit. Halsey wished to discuss with Harmon the recommendations on superseding Hester before reaching a decision. On the same day Halsey directed Turner to prepare plans for Kolombangara in consultation with Hester. (Rad, COMSOPAC to Harmon, 6 Jul 43, Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia Material, OCMH; COMSOPAC War Diary, 6 Jul 43.)
The next day the irascible Turner presented his views to Halsey in very mild terms. Expressing regret over the necessity for disagreeing with Harmon, he strongly urged that Hester retain command of the New Georgia Occupation Force. Griswold and his staff were excellent, Turner agreed, but Hester was conducting operations "in a manner much to be admired." Superseding him would hamper the operation "by inducing a severe blow to morale." (Rad, CTF 31 to COMSOPAC, 7 Jul 43, Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia Material, OCMH.)
At this point Harmon, a peppery, wiry man, grew impatient. He boarded his B-17 and flew to Halsey in Noumea. "...before nightfall," he later related, "Admiral Halsey approved the course of procedure I had recommended." (Ltr, Harmon to Handy, 15 Jul 43, quoted in part in Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia Material, OCMH; COMSCIPAC War Diary, 9 Jul 43.)
Griswold received instructions on 10 July to take six officers from his staff and fly to New Georgia on 11 July in an amphibian plane. The remainder of the XIV Corps staff would follow by water on 12 July. On orders from Halsey, which the admiral expected to issue after the capture of Munda airfield, Griswold would assume command of the New Georgia Occupation Force. Turner's authority over the Occupation Force would cease, but he was to continue to support the operation. Halsey repeated to Turner his instructions regarding plans for taking Kolombangara, and told him that, if Griswold approved the idea, Hester would command the ground forces in the attack. (Rad, COMSOPAC to CTF 31, 9 Jul 43; and Rad, COMGENSOPAC to CC, XIV Corps, 10 Jul 43, in Hq SOPACBACOM File, Suppl New Georgia Material, OCMH; XIV Corps G-3 Jul, 10-11 Jul 43.)
Griswold arrived at Rendova on ii July just as Hester and Wing were changing their plan of attack against Munda and sending the 172d Infantry to seize the Laiana beachhead. The XIV Corps commander was not long in reaching a judgment regarding operations to date.
General Harmon, at his headquarters in Noumea, wrote an optimistic letter to Washington on the morning of 13 July. He reported that operations in New Georgia seemed to be progressing favorably. He did not send the letter, for later in the morning he received a radiogram from General Griswold, who said, "From an observer point of view things are going badly." Griswold urged that the 25th Division and the remainder of the 37th Division be sent into the battle at once. Although he reported, "Enemy resistance to date not great," he did not think the 43d Division would ever take Munda. It was, he declared, "about to fold up." (Rad, Griswold to Harmon, 13 Jul 43, quoted in SOPACBACOM, History of the New Georgia Campaign, Vol. L Ch. III, P. 39, OCMH.)
This message had an immediate effect. Halsey met with Harmon and informally appointed him as his deputy. He ordered Harmon to "assume full charge of and responsibility for ground operations in New Georgia," and "to take whatever steps were deemed necessary to facilitate the capture of the airfield." (Harmon, The Army in the South Pacific, p. 8; Halsey, Narrative Account of the South Pacific Campaign, P. 7. Both in OCMH.)
Before leaving for Koli Point on Guadalcanal to be nearer the scene of action, Harmon ordered Griswold to hasten his preparations for assuming command on New Georgia. All ground forces assigned for the operation, he told Griswold, would be available by the time he assumed command. Harmon promised to alert one regimental combat team of the veteran 25th Division for movement, but it would be dispatched to New Georgia only if he specifically approved.
Of the assigned 37th Division forces the 145th Infantry, like the 136th Field Artillery Battalion, was already on hand in New Georgia, the 1st and 2d Battalions at Rendova and the 3d Battalion under Liversedge along with 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry. Admiral Turner at once ordered Col. Stuart A. Baxter, commanding the 148th Infantry in the Russell Islands, to alert Headquarters, the 1st and 2d Battalions, and the Antitank Company of his regiment for immediate movement to New Georgia. These movements would put two full infantry regiments of the 37th Division in New Georgia.
On the 16th, Griswold proposed that the 37th Division units operate under control of their division commander, Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler, and that Beightler and his senior staff officers fly to New Georgia for conferences and personal reconnaissance. Harmon agreed, and Beightler left for New Georgia in a PBY on ig July.
On arriving at Guadalcanal, Harmon ordered Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, commanding the 25th Division, to get one regimental combat team ready for transfer to New Georgia. Collins, who on Griswold's departure had become island commander and as such responsible for Guadalcanal's defense, decided that the 161st Regimental Combat Team could most easily be spared from its defense missions. On 14 July he directed Col. James L. Dalton, II, regimental and combat team commander, to be ready to move on twelve hours' notice. (The regimental combat team consisted of the 161st Infantry; the 89th Field Artillery Battalion; A Company, 65th Engineer Battalion; and A Company, 25th Medical Battalion.)
The next day Admiral Turner was relieved of his posts of Commander, South Pacific Amphibious Force (III Amphibious Force and Task Force 32), and Commander, New Georgia Attack Force (Task Force 31). This relief apparently had nothing to do with recent events on New Georgia. Admiral Nimitz, then preparing for the great Central Pacific drive that was to start with the invasion of the Gilberts in November 1943, had directed Halsey to send Turner to Hawaii.
Turner departed on the 15th, and during the next two years commanded the V Amphibious Force in the invasions of the Gilberts, the Marshalls, the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. His posts in the South Pacific were taken over by Admiral Wilkinson, until then Halsey's deputy commander.
REAR ADM. THEODORE S. WILKINSON (left) and Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon in
the chart room of the transport McCawley.
On the day Turner left, Harmon ordered Griswold to assume command of the New Georgia Occupation Force at midnight of 15-16 July, and to seize Munda and join forces with Liversedge as soon as possible. Griswold took over command as ordered. Hester reverted to command of the 43d Division.
Thus by mid-July Turner and Hester, the two officers most responsible for the execution of the New Georgia tactical plans, had been replaced. With the offensive stalling, General Griswold was facing his first experience in commanding a corps in combat. His problems were formidable, although some progress had been made. Liversedge's three battalions were behind schedule but had taken Enogai and were preparing to attack Bairoko.
On the Munda front the 169th and 172d Infantry Regiments, also behind their schedule, had laboriously made their way from Zanana across the Barike to Laiana and the vicinity of Reincke Ridge and were in contact with the main Japanese defenses. These forces were obviously not adequate to break through and capture the airfield, but additional regiments were on their way. Aside from the difficulties presented by the enemy and the terrain, Griswold was confronted by an abnormally high rate of mental illness, and by the need to improve the Occupation Force supply system so that the regiments would be taken care of in the normal manner instead of by emergency air drop. Obviously, it was a case calling for generalship of a high order.
More The Offensive Stalls
- Japanese Plans
Operations of Northern Landing Group
Operations of Southern Landing Group
Casualties
Command and Re-inforcements
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