Although enemy resistance had been ineffective, and casualties in TOENAILS were relatively few, the Japanese were not finished. They planned to hold New Georgia. The New Georgia Occupation Force had had difficulties, but greater troubles were in store for it. (Unless otherwise indicated this chapter is based on SOPACBACOM, History of the New Georgia Campaign, Vol. I, Ch. III, OCMH; the jnls, diaries, and after action rpts of COMSOPAC, CTF 31, 'NGOF, XIV Corps, 43d Div, 43d Div Arty, 1st Mar Raider Regt, 145th Inf, 148th Inf, 169th Inf, and 172d Inf; 8th Area Army Operations, Japanese Monogr No. 110 (OCMH); 17th Army Operations, Vol. II, Japanese Monogr NO. 40 (OCMH); Southeast Area Naval Operations, Vol. II, Japanese Monogr No. 49 (OCMH); Outline of Southeast Area Naval Air Operations, Pt. IV, Japanese Monogr No. 108 (OCMH); Operations of the 1st Battalion, 169th Infantry (43d Infantry Division) in the New Georgia Campaign: 30 June-18 July 1943 (Northern Solomons Campaign), a monograph relating the personal experience of a battalion Intelligence officer, prepared by Maj. Jack Swaim; Ltr, Lt Col Marvin D. Girardeau to Chief of Military History, sub: Comments Re Hist Monogr, Marines in Central Solomons, 6 Feb 57, with inclosures, OCMH.) Japanese Plans On 2 July, with the Americans in possession of Rendova, Segi Point, and Viru Harbor, the Japanese altered their command on New Georgia. MAJ. GEN. NOBORU SASAKI By mutual agreement Maj. Gen. Noboru Sasaki commander of the Southeastern Detachment, took over direction of all Army and Navy forces in New Georgia. This action brought Rear Adm. Minoru Ota's 8th Combined Special Naval Landing Force under Sasaki, who was under the tactical control of the 8th Fleet. Except for small detachments on Vella Lavella, Gizo, and other islands, the 10,500 men in Sasaki's joint force were about evenly divided between Kolombangara and Munda. At Kolombangara, under Col. Satoshi Tomonari, were two battalions of the 13th Infantry, most of the 3d Battalion, 229th Infantry, the Yokosuka 7th Special Naval Landing Force (less elements), and artillery and engineer units. Guarding Munda, where Sasaki and Ota maintained their headquarters, were Col. Genjiro Hirata's 229th Infantry (less two battalions) and artillery, engineer, communication, and medical units. The main body of the Kure 6th Special Naval Landing Force was concentrated at Bairoko. Sasaki was well aware that the Americans would attack Munda. He could see the troops moving from Rendova to the mainland. Munda field was receiving shellfire from the American 155's. If further proof was needed, Japanese patrols had brushed with the Allies near Zanana on 3 July, and the next day the 229th Infantry reported a clash with about five hundred Americans in the same place. Immediately after the invasion of Rendova Sasaki had instructed Tomonari to alert his units for possible transfer to Munda and directed that two 140-mm. naval guns and two mountain guns be moved from the Bairoko area to Munda. After receiving the 229th's report he brought the 3d Battalion, 229th Infantry, from Kolombangara. through Bairoko to Munda to rejoin the regiment on 4 July. On the same day, Sasaki proposed a counterlanding against Rendova. As their artillery pieces lacked the range to hit Rendova, the Japanese on Munda could not retaliate when shells from American 155's crashed on Munda field. Sasaki therefore suggested that the main body of the Munda garrison board landing craft, avoid recognition by mingling with American craft, and assault Rendova amid the resulting confusion. This interesting plan might have succeeded and caused a disaster to the Allies. More probably, by removing the Munda troops from their strong defense positions, it would have saved the Americans a lot of fighting. 8th Fleet Headquarters apparently vetoed the proposal. Also on Independence Day General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka, who wished to hold New Georgia at all costs as a key outpost for Bougainville, considered the problem of holding the island in relation to the general defense of the Southeast Area. They decided to strengthen New Georgia and to hold New Guinea with the troops already there. Imamura agreed to give four thousand more 17th Army troops to Sasaki. These, including additional units from the 13th and 229th Infantry Regiments plus artillerymen, engineers, and medical men, were to be shipped in echelons from Erventa in the Shortlands to Kolombangara. Warships would transport them. It was the first echelon of these troops that Admiral Ainsworth's task force kept from landing on the night of 4-5 July. On 5 July the Japanese naval officers' worries regarding New Georgia were increased by Hester's build-up at Zanana and Liversedge's landing at Rice Anchorage. The Japanese assigned ten destroyers to transport the second echelon, which was to be put ashore at Vila in the early morning hours of 6 July. Informed that Japanese warships were getting ready to sail from the Shortlands, Halsey ordered Ainsworth's task group to intercept, reinforced by two destroyers to replace the Strong and the damaged destroyer Chevalier. Ainsworth, retiring from the Kula Gulf, was in Indispensable Strait when Halsey's orders reached him. He reversed course and entered Kula Gulf about midnight, a few minutes behind the Japanese destroyers. In the ensuing Battle of Kula Gulf, the veteran cruiser Helena was sunk. The Japanese lost the destroyers Niizuki and Nagatsuki, but put 850 soldiers ashore at Vila. (For a full account see Morison, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, pp. 160-75) This addition of 850 men enabled Sasaki to send part of another battalion from Kolombangara to Munda that same day. Admiral Kusaka, who moved his headquarters from Rabaul to Buin "to alter the grave situation and raise the morale of all the forces," wanted still more troops for New Georgia. (Southeast Area Naval Operations, II, Japanese Monogr NO. 49 (OCMH), 32.) On 7 July he asked Imamura for 11,000 more soldiers. The general, who had just approved sending 4,000 men to New Georgia, now stated that he doubted that even Bougainville could be made secure. Although willing to consider sending another division to Bougainville, he refused to provide 11,000 more troops for New Georgia. It was well for the Americans that Imamura refused the 11,000 men. Blasting the existing garrisons out of Munda and Bairoko was to prove sufficiently difficult and bloody. More The Offensive Stalls Japanese Plans Operations of Northern Landing Group Operations of Southern Landing Group Casualties Command and Re-inforcements Back to Table of Contents -- Operation Cartwheel Back to World War Two: US Army List of Issues Back to MagWeb Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by Coalition Web, Inc. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com