Rounds of Battle

Battles often developed a certain pacing, with periods of effort interspersed with lulls punctuated with just artillery fire. Between rounds of battle reserves were often committed to the front line.

A. Organize and form-up the attacking Force.
B. Designate the places to be attacked.
C. Decide upon Pitched battle (closed formation) or Pursuit (defense in depth).
D. The first clash usually involves Cavalry.
E. Artillery fire will mark the commencement of the battle and will fill lulls in the action.
F. By this time the opposing generals can see the formations arrayed against them.
G. The battle itself. The history of a battle is multifaceted; everyone sees a different event.

Most of a division is in reserve at start of battle, at least 75%. Only about one-quarter of the troops begin any battle engaged with the enemy. If Reserves are fed into battle as losses occur, the front line firepower of a given unit remains unchanged. In a "high-stakes" attack you commit your reserves to clinch the battle. Problem is, your defenses are also more brittle if the attack fails.

No unit could continue to fight in the face of 40% casualties, depending on its morale condition.

If the losing side chose to stand and fight ('Pitched Battle'), their forces will suffer more heavily. They will also be obliged to counter-attack. A certain core group will be formed for the purpose.

It was always very difficult to coordinate attacks between a force cut-off inside a fortification and the relief force outside, for the simple reason that, in the absence of communications the force inside is unable to plan for a concerted attack with the outside force.

If the force inside a fort attacks six hours late, the defenders can shift their strength to deal with the new threat in its turn. Such an attack would have no additional effect.

Pursuit

At Pursuit, Napoleon's cavalry were mediocre. Several explanations have been suggested-lack of horses at various times, a lack of natural horsemanship in the French character-but the real reason may have been a lack of emphasis placed on this aspect of battle by the Emperor himself and on his cavalry commander, Joachim Murat. Many French victories on the battlefield failed to be clinched in the pursuit.

Battlefield losses in Pitched Battles were usually rather equal, until one side retreated. In the inevitable disorganization entailed by the change of orientation from an assault to a retreat, there was an opportunity to pick up stragglers whose formations had become disordered once the retreat began. However, if prepared for at the outset of battle with a defense in depth ("Pursuit Battle type'), a force could expect to make a successful retreat, which did not generate into a rout.

Morale

Morale is the key to victory. Morale in the armies will change depending upon what they achieved in the preceding battle. Ultimately, the Morale of the Grande Arm6e gave out in Russia. Morale was destroyed during the wait in Moscow. The last straw was Napoleon's abandonment (at Smorgoni) of those who had struggled to stay together. The Emperor's departure removed his troops main reason to continue the fight.

Conclusion

The Campaigns of Napoleon series of games attempt to provide a model true to the inherently complex facets of Napoleonic warfare. Some of these elements have been considered in this article (with more or less detail, as needed). The period is interesting, since it was clearly a time in which varied tactical and strategic transformations occurred in the art of war. The games are driven by the historical realities discussed here.

Hopefully, this course has supplied players with some context and perhaps some ideas for their own campaigning. Enjoy!

Footnotes

[1] Correspondance, Vol. XVIII, No. 14707, p. 218
[2] The term 'Operational Level' was only used for the first time by military theorists decades after Napoleon's death.
[3] David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p. 154.
[4] We will find the same transition zone between Operations and Tactics, a most interesting area for investigation.
[5] 'Napoleon always used the words route de l'armee." -F.N. Maude.
[6] not including 10,000 fresh militia and 7,000 kossacks.
[7] Thiers, p. 419.
[8] Thiers, p. 443.

Napoleonic Operations From Castiglione to Waterloo

Definitions and Weather
Planning and Preparation: Logistics, Liaison, Administration
Command and Organization
Maneuver
Attack and Pursuit