In forming the plan of a campaign, it is requisite to foresee everything the enemy may do, and to be prepared with the necessary means to counteract it. Plans of campaign may be modified ad infinitum; according to circumstances, the genius of the general, the character of the troops, and the features of the country. [II]

The Operations Plan depends upon the strategic goals dictated by the situation of troops, terrain, and overall geopolitical goals. Once strategic goals are set, the Operations Plan is established to further those goals. In order to implement the Operations Plan, a controlling hierarchy and a logistical support must be set in place. Depots and Supply Bases must be established in the proper relation to forces and goals before operations can be completed. Forces and Leaders have to be collected in starting locations chosen to protect supply lines.

The theatre of operations has to be selected and defined. In the Napoleonic Era and for centuries before, theatres were of two basic kinds: linear corridors and "overall." When one traces the movement of troops through a linear corridor, the lines of movement appear clear and mirror the evolution of the campaign timeline.

In "overall" theatres, the lines of march overlap each other like cooked spaghetti. These differences are given in the nature of the geography in the theatre. For example, the first phase of the Russian campaign took place in an "overall" theatre, while the second stage and the retreat were strictly linear. A theatre tends to be linear if there is a clearly defined strategic objective, like an enemy capital, while it tends to be all-over if there are several separate armies operating on each side.

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

It is impossible to discuss Napoleon's system of operations without a mention of Berthier, his tireless Chief of Staff

To know the country thoroughly; to be able to conduct a reconnaissance with skill; to superintend the transmission of orders promptly; to lay down the most complicated movements intelligibly, but in few words and with simplicity: these are the leading qualifications which should distinguish an officer selected for the head of the staff. [LC]

In order to implement the plan, there has to be a chief of staff and a headquarters capable of issuing the necessary orders in a timely fashion and effectively enforcing their implementation by lower echelons. This requires first and foremost, that the theatre of war be not so far-flung that orders are out of date by the time they arrive at subordinate HQs. This means that the general headquarters must not attempt to control events beyond a certain distance, a distance that can vary somewhat depending upon the pace of operations.

Limited Staff resources may create delays in the order cycle (the 'C3' loop), which is the time it takes for an order to be drafted, copied, dispatched, delivered to the recipient, acted upon, and the results conveyed back to headquarters. 'The loss of time is irreparable in war," said the Emperor.

The C3 Loop was normally one or two days. In Russia in 1812, by contrast, the C3 loop at Imperial Headquarters was stretched to about 2.5 days. Forces at the outside end of a rider's 5-day return-trip (about 280 miles) were beyond effective control of Napoleon. Any leader beyond that is largely operating on his own initiative.

The first duty to claim Napoleon's attention was the arrangement of the Supply Service.

--F.L. Petre

If the choice were between fighting a battle and feeding the troops, Napoleon always sought battle. But with his typical thoroughness he often delayed the commencement of an operation in order to arrange the movement of supplies.

All that his commissaries usually had to offer was bread or biscuit, normally 28 ounces per man each day. The absolute minimum necessary to avoid mass starvation during active campaigning was 21 ounces. During lulls in the campaign the troops received a more balanced diet.

Once an operation was under way, Napoleon no longer concerned himself with provisions for the troops beyond the few days supply of bread in their knapsacks and the caissons of the artillery. While on campaign the soldiers regularly foraged to provide for their needs at the expense of the civilians along their route. On the eve of battle, however, every effort was made to feed the troops.

Foraging soldiers always found supply randomly, perhaps arriving in a village where there was nothing or hearing from patrolling cavalry that there was plenty of bread in another town. A supply party was formed to go there and retrieve whatever was available. Supply was often well prepared at the beginning of each campaign, but tended to erode quickly because of the difficulties inherent in following a moving army. Of course, weather often interfered.

TRANSPORT

Bread rations were baked locally in gigantic field ovenscapable of handling 6,000 rations per day-set up by the masons attached to each corps. Civilian vehicles, including all types of light carts, were confiscated and pressed into service to haul biscuit behind the advancing corps. Up until 1807, a private contractor provided horses and drivers, and built the wagons it sold to the French government. Its convoys moved slowly and lost many wagons due to negligence.

It is not only necessary to collect large quantities of supplies, but it is indispensable to have the means of conveying them with or after the army; and this is the greatest difficulty, particularly on rapid expeditions. To facilitate the transportation, the rations should consist of the most portable articles-as biscuit, rice, &c: the wagons should be both light and strong, so as to pass over all kinds of roads. It will be necessary to collect all the vehicles of the country ... and these vehicles should be arranged in parks [depots] at different points.

--Jomini (Ae Art of War, Phila: 1862, pp. 131-32)

The problem in nourishing the troops came not with finding supplies, but with transporting them. In the first weeks of a campaign, the French outran their supply wagons. The supplies were there, they just could not reach the troops. In one instance, wagons that left Saxony in June, 1812, reached the Saxon Corps during November.

In national wars where the inhabitants fly and destroy everything in their path, as was the case in Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Turkey, it is impossible to advance unless attended by trains of provisions and without having a sure base of supply near the front of operations. Under these circumstances a war of invasion becomes very difficult, if not impossible.

--Jomini (p. 131)

In most armies of the Napoleonic Wars, the total of all artillery and supply wagons together averaged about one wagon per 72 men. The artillery normally had one train company (22 wagons and 59 drivers) for each battery.

In 1815 the French had far more drivers (3029 with the line and 1409 attached to the Guard) assigned fewer wagons (700). This number of wagons was far below the intended figure. The Army had four squadrons, each of four companies. The establishment of each company called for 3 officers and 199 men with 16 saddle and 170 draft horses pulling 42 wagons (six of which went to the ambulance service). The best horses went to the first squadron, which had three companies assigned to the artillery because of the shortage of caissons, and to the second squadron which was then divided between the IV and V Corps of the army. The horses remaining to the third and fourth squadrons were pitiably feeble.

To remedy this weakness in transport, a decree called for the raising of 26 auxiliary companies probably impressed farmers with their farm wagons. Those called out in the northern provinces did not report for service or escaped at the first opportunity. A few of these auxiliary companies from the departments of the Marne and Aisne were ready by the commencement of the campaign.

At that time the Army had about 504 supply wagons (in 11 regular and 3 auxiliary companies), of which 216 were serving the Line of Communications back to Paris. The difficulties of the French army were as bad as ever; most of their food had to be found by the troops themselves.

If food was difficult to supply to men, fodder was many times more so. War is more dangerous for a horse than for a man. The fragility of the cavalry arm caused Napoleon to husband his mounts, assigning them to quarter alongside rivers. Nonetheless, an officer who did much riding probably went through three mounts in the course of a campaign. And if life was hard for an officer's mount, things were much worse for the beasts hauling wagons and cannon.

In 1815, a total of 33,200 horses served with the French Army. The 348 guns required 3,384 horses and the artillery caissons added a further 1800. The cavalry had about 23,700 horses and the infantry officers and staff about 200. The engineer park had about 1725 horses and the transport park 2352.

THE SUPPLY BASE

The Supply Base is a city or large town with the necessary warehouses and workforce already in business-a secure location free from marauding enemy troops, the most forward point reached by civilian contractors in the ordinary course of trade.

The supply base had better be garrisoned with an experienced general in command. In 1812, in occupied Prussia, Napoleon ordered the creation of the four-division XI Corps to guard the fortresses on the Oder and to maintain a mobile corps in Berlin.

THE CENTER OF OPERATIONS

The Center of Operations was the location of hospitals, reserves of ammunition and main field parks. Napoleon generally kept the Center of Operations no more than six days march behind the army (102 to 120 miles). On June 16th 1815--the eve of the Waterloo campaign--as soon as the town was safely occupied, Charleroi was turned into the French Army's Center of Operations. Here resided the Army Park, some 5600 strong, as well as the hospitals, the offices of the Chief of Staff, the General Staff, and-the staff of the General commissary of Army Stores.

LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

With the consideration of Lines of Communications, the boundary between Strategy and Operations begins to be approached. There is no distinct cut-off between the Strategic and Operational Levels but with this consideration the two levels to merge into each other. [4]

The maintenance of the Lines of Communications will be an important goal of all Operations. Communications prior to the advent of the railroad and telegraph implied a road- or waterway. It is important to remember that in this era, all communications had to be carried by a mounted officer, who was a part of the headquarters. He carried written orders to the subordinate units in the chain of command, and delivered reports to the higher echelons. The term 'Communications' therefore has a different meaning than it has taken on in the 'information age.' Anyone with a computer and a modem today has a resource that makes him potentially more powerful than Napoleon, who had secretaries taking dictation from him night and day, gallopers standing by to carry any message anywhere, clerks prepared to file information for easy retrieval, etc.

This system had its limits. Forces in contact with the enemy often had to respond to unforseen circumstances without waiting for orders from IHQ. For example, in 'friendly' Lithuania at the opening of the 1812 campaign, it took 32 hours for a message to get from Davout in Vishneva (W2323) to Napoleon, a distance of only 50 miles (corr. 18896). By the time a reply could reach Davout at the front, the situation would be completely changed. The hundreds of wagons bringing supplies forward from the supply base to the army at the front were organized through the selection and maintenance of clearly defined Lines of Communication. [5]

The Line of Communications was generally a primary road that connected an Army's Center of Operations with its Supply Base. Such a link was vulnerable to enemy interruption, and therefore had to be protected. All replacement soldiers, supplies and equipment traveled on this line. At stages depots were established under military authority, with garrisons and defensive preparations to meet the possibility of an enemy foray. The maintenance of this line was among the very greatest of strategic concerns. For this reason, the line of communications was limited to a single route.

An army ought to have only one line of communication. This should be preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity. [XII]

Within a week of crossing the Niemen, Napoleon reexamined his Line of Communications into Russia and concluded that a single route would not suffice for an army of such great mass. His prior practice of maintaining but a single line of communications would be inadequate for the massive army he wielded.

The line of communications should not be abandoned; but it is one of the most skillful maneuvres in war to know how to change it, when circumstances authorise or render this necessary. An army which changes skillfully its line of communication deceives the enemy, who becomes ignorant where to look for its rear, or upon what weak points it is assailable. [XX]

Napoleon always had a primary and an alternate Line of Communications, so that he could switch to the alternate if the primary was threatened. During the retreat from Russia, just prior to the Berezina crossing, Napoleon switched his main line through Grodno to Warsaw. In 1814, the Prussian Marshal Blacher demonstrated his grasp of this technique by switching his LOC through Reims for the final advance on Paris.

An army which undertakes the conquest of a country has its two wings either resting upon neutral territories, or upon great natural obstacles, such as rivers or chains of mountains. It happens in some cases that only one wing is so supported, and in others that both are exposed. Where both wings are protected, a general has only to guard against being penetrated in front, and the line of communication may tend indifferently to the right or to the left. Where one wing only is supported, he should rest upon the supported wing. The line of communication should be directed towards the wing in support. Where both wings are exposed, he should depend upon a central formation, [i.e., of his corps] and never allow the different corps under his command to depart from this; and his line should be perpendicular to the centre of the army's line of march. [III]

The last phrase is a bit garbelled. The 1815 Campaign is an example-neither the right nor left flank was supported: both wings were in the air. Therefore Napoleon adapted the strategic central position and his LOC ran away perpendicular from the front.

When the conquest of a country is undertaken by two or three armies, which each have their separate line of communications until they arrive at a point fixed upon for their concentration, ... the junction should never take place near the enemy, because, in uniting his forces, the enemy may not only prevent it, but beat the armies in detail. [IV]

One principle used to great effect by Napoleon was sending his separate corps along parallel axes of advance. Then, when the enemy was discovered, and his direction fixed, the separate corps would 'unite to fight.'

In the opening days of the Russian Campaign, we see the central army group under Napoleon, about 220,000, all traveling by the same road from Kovno to Vilna, and suffering over 10% attrition on that march of 70 miles. By the time the French army reached Borodino, it had been reduced to only about 131,000, while the Russians would field 103,500 [6] at Borodinodown 43% from their original 175,000 fielded at start.

It is contrary to all true principles to make corps which have no communication act separately against a central force whose communication lines are open. [XXVI]

This in an injunction against the strategic of the concentric attack. In 1813 the Coalition used this strategy to devastating effect, benefiting however, from unchallenged communications.

To act upon lines far removed from each other, and without communications, is to commit a fault which always gives birth to a second. The detached column has its orders for the first day only. Its operations on the following day depend upon what may have happened to the main body. Thus the column either loses time upon emergency, in waiting for orders, or acts without them and at hazard. ... An army should always keep its columns united so as to prevent the enemyfrom passing between them with impunity. Whenever, for particular reasons, this principle is departed from, the detached corps should be independent in their operations. They should move towards a point fixed upon for their future junction. They should advance without hesitating, and without waiting for fresh orders. [XI]

The Trachtenberg plan employed by the Coalition in 1813 elaborated upon this by enjoining the separate armies from attacking Napoleon by themselves. At the outset of a campaign, Napoleon issued detailed instructions providing for the organization of communications between the town at which his army had just crossed into enemy territory and the location of Imperial Headquarters and also of the Center of Operations. (See the article "Napoleon in Vilna" in issue 6 for complete details.)

The Administration was to provide centralized commands for the artillery, engineers, administration, and police along the LOC and was charged with stocking the depots and organizing hospitals. Two or three 'chefs de bataillon' (or majors) were supposed to be detached by IHQ to act as inspectors on these routes.

At intervals of about 20 miles along this line were established small garrisons of 25 men, including one or two gendarmes to protect the posts and provide regular news; to work on the roads and bridges and repair the foundries.

DEPOTS

In addition to the small garrisons, depots were established in the larger towns. The Maxim states this distance as about five or six days march, between 80 and 120 miles.

It is necessary every five or six days to have a strong post, or an entrenched position, upon the line of march, in order to collect stores and provisions, to organise convoys, to form a center of operations, and establish a point of defence, to shorten the line of operations. [III]

The practical limit on the distance supplies could be carried by methods of the time was normally about 90 miles, due to the diminishing quantities of goods (less than half a load) beyond that distance. At 180 miles the entire wagonload must be devoted to fodder for the teams of horses. The, horses have consumed a load equal to what they have pulled-perfectly meaningless exercise. However, that is not an absolute limit, and it can be surpassed, utilizing a system of depots at which fodder is collected from the countryside in advance of the moving wagons.

Keeping a store of fodder at each depot is the key to the whole operation. An ever-increasing number of wagons had to be devoted to collecting fodder, as they have to travel farther to find it. The administration was unable to extend the line of communications beyond Smolensk in 1812. During the retreat, the trains, all gathered in that area, were allowed to fall into the hands of the Cossacks. The Russians also captured four million further rations in Vilna.

Working together with Supply Bases and the Center of Operations, Depots are the middle links in the supply chain. Called "magazines" in Napoleon's time ("supply dumps" in American parlance), each corps might have its own depot (when in quarters or when spread over a wide zone), but the Center of Operations was also a depot, and the primary one, toward which wagons of the corps shuttled to and fro.

At depots resources were collected, whether from friend or foe. Wagons were also collected there to return to the Supply Base, or to range far and wide in search of fodder and forage. Provisions loaded on wagons were consumed last as loading and unloading had to be done by soldiers of the garrison.

In January 1807, each corps had a depot containing magazines, hospitals, transport, repair shops, bakeries, and other facilities. These towns had good dock facilities for unloading barges and boats, always the most economical form of transport.

Ordinarily the establishment of the Corps Depot is not specially mentioned. However, on the rare instance that an enemy raid reached the depot, some details come out, as happened during the opening Russian offensive of the Eylau Campaign in late January of 1807. Dolgoruld arrived in Mohrungen, encountering Bernadotte's baggage and supply column guarded by a handful of soldiers.

Dolgoruki attacked immediately and captured the town; his troops set about to plunder the baggage and slaughter the wounded. On this raid they captured some 360 French prisoners, 200 released Russian and Prussian prisoners, and 12,500 ducats in gold "contributions" levied in Elbing. Later in that same campaign, the French returned the favor, when, at Guttstadt Guyot captured Bennigsen's Supply Depot, with quantities of enemy baggage as well as 1100 sick and wounded, and a battalion of 500 men left to guard the trains. The captured resources, though "not very considerable," were of great value to the French marching far ahead of their own trains. [7]

Despite the occasional windfall, during the campaign troops always went hungry, as on the night before Eylau. Provision trains couln't follow such a massive concentration of men. Even the store-wagons of the staff remained at Landsberg, and so on this occasion the headquarters too went completely hungry. The staff was lucky to have a little bread. In Eylau, there was nothing but potatoes. Soult's men, who had lived for several days only on potatoes and melted snow, had hoped for more. The 14th Line in Augereau's corps had no time to prepare even this wretched meal.

After the inconclusive battle, the French army prepared to retire behind the Passarge, where supply was easier. Napoleon "had neither sufficient provisions nor ammunition to attempt an operation of any duration." [8]

As a result, in 1807 Napoleon found himself unable to subsist the army in Poland, and therefore ordered a return to the depot system. He told Daru, his Intendant in chief of Adminstration, "The force of circumstances has compelled me to return to the magazine (depot) system," a system for feeding the army on the march. He was more concerned for the safety of his communications than he ever had been, and was more dependent upon them.

Depots on the French line of communication had a commandant and a commissary-of-war. They contained ammunition, magazines for bread ovens, flour, and a hospital. In these depots were left sick and tired men, regimental registers, papers, and everything that the soldier could not carry. In Russia there was a fortified base every 160-200 miles.

In 1815, the line of communications leading back from Avennes to Paris was made up of depots established in echelons about 20 miles apart, so arranged that as supplies were taken from the forward depot, they could be replaced from the next in the chain. The echelons-Guise, Laon, Soissons, La Ferte Milon, and Meaux-contained enough food and fodder for ten days (one million bread rations and 14,000 hectares of oats). A reserve provision of 16 days stood ready in Paris. Six equipage companies (216 wagons) were ordered to Laon to move supplies forward along the Line of Communications. The office of the Director-inChief of administration of the army was established at Avesnes.

From Avesnes provisions would be distributed directly to the soldiers in Maubeuge, Avesnes, Capelle, Cambrai, Bavay, Philippeville, Beaumont and other points in the immediate environs.

Napoleonic Operations From Castiglione to Waterloo

Definitions and Weather
Planning and Preparation: Logistics, Liaison, Administration
Command and Organization
Maneuver
Attack and Pursuit