The Napoleonic Wars didn't have continuous front lines. If anything they resemble a naval operation, where you have task forces moving independently across the sea. This sort of image is more appropriate to Napoleonic operations. In 1812, however, this notion of maneuver was abandoned.

MOVEMENT COMMANDS

A march order, issued by IHQ, was usually written in duplicate or triplicate and delivered by estafettes. The March orders for the Armee du Nord issued on the 14th of June, 1815 provide examples of the scouting, intelligence, and marching requirements set by Headquarters.

The orders called for the Army to be on the move toward Charleroi at 3 a.m. Light cavalry preceeded the army, sending patrols in every direction to reconnoitre the country and capture the enemy's advanced posts. Each cavalry patrols was ordered to comprise not less than 50 men provided with small-arms ammunition.

Each Corps, accompanied by its artillery caissons and ambulance wagons, was ordered to follow toward Charleroi. The Corps baggage was placed under the orders of the Director- General of Transport, General Neigre, and ordered to remain behind until the entire army had passed. So that the army could maneuver better, any baggage wagons attempting to accompany the column of troops were ordered to be burned, and a patrol of 50 Military Police were placed under Neigre's orders.

The Corps officers were ordered to interrogate the inhabitants to get the latest news of the enemy's situation, and seize the letters in the post officers, forwarding any information thus gained to the Emperor. The Corps officers were ordered to contact one another frequently by patrols, and to time their advance to keep in line with each other, so that they would arrive before the enemy at the same time.

The task of coordinating the daily movements of the corps d'armee, moving along several paralell routes, and ensuring that each corps is within one or two days march of its neighbors, was the work of Berthier and his HQ staff.

The Engineers belonging to the Corps, provided with all the materials necessary for the repair of bridges, marched in rear of their Corps' leading Light Infantry Regiment. The Emperor accompanied the Advanced Guard, and instructed his Corps officers to send information of their movements and other intelligence.

When Movement orders arrived too late, his subordinates had to make their own judgements, and yet he always chastised them for doing so.

INITIATIVE

When a Force Leader acts in the absence of up-to date Movement Commands, he has to use his own judgement. If he makes the right move, we say he has passed his Initiative test, and if he fails to act in accord with sound strategy, we show that in the game as simply sitting still. in reality it was more complicated than that, for he might make things worse by going off in the wrong direction. Weather and/or adjacent Enemy Forces may things even more difficult.

By the time of the Russian campaign, Napoleon's personal Initiative was as vast as ever, but his army, and, therefore his task, was greater than ever. This was the classic 'defeat from past triumphs' that made the Emperor attempt too much.

MARCH ATTRITION

March Attrition represents a non-combat loss of manpower, which will increase the farther a unit marches over a given time. The numbers of men who were lost to non-combat causes is much higher than those lost in combat.

Logistical difficulties in practice would undermine the most brilliant plans. In Russia Napoleon underestimated the state of the roads and overestimated his own troops' abilities to range over them.

When Napoleon began the drive on Moscow his operational planning was as good as ever, but it was ineffective in the absence of good roads and abundant crops. During the French offensive the Russians removed or destroyed all supplies as they withdrew, leaving nothing for the conquering troops but abandoned towns and scorched earth. This partially explains why fewer than 10% of French soldiers who entered Russia came out alive.

Napoleon seemed to ignore the law that says 'the larger a concentration of troops, the larger the percentage lost.' He seemed to accept the fact of attrition without worrying too much about it. He showed a callous disregard for the welfare of the Polish troops, and he is only considerate of the needs of his own Army Group. The Guard and Davout , s corps received the lion's share of his reserves.

BRIDGING

Bridge Trains were always scarce in the French Army. These trains were nothing more than small boats with a low center of gravity transported by wagon. The boats were then strapped together with planks to permit the passage of wagons and guns. Engineers were required to place the incendiary devises that would render bridges temporarily unusable and were also needed to mend damaged bridges. The pilings almost always remained for future reconstruction. The Austrians were always hesitant to destroy a bridge and waited until the last minute. At Leipzig, the premature destruction of the bridge out of town cost the French thousands of men.

MARCHES

This security of marching infantry columns depends upon the presence of vedettes to their front. If the front of a column should run into an enemy attack the lead formation will endeavor to fall back on troops marching up from behind.

Troops can normally cover 8 miles of road in six hours. When a force leaves road march to prepare for battle, its men must leave the road, to form a front perpendicular to their line of march. The road column must be envisioned as several miles long. First regiment in line is able to deploy immediately. For a defending unit drawing back upon its reserves, this change of formation can happen more quickly than for an attacking unit.

Marching forces are spread out over a large area. Troops are ahead of that (vedettes, light infantry), to the left and right (some troops spread 2 or more miles on either side of the road), and behind (if in road march, quite a long column). If the center of mass of two forces are really within 2 miles of each other, orders can be given that specify one corps to forage to the left, and the other to the right of the road. In practice it doesn't always work.

In effect, the two forces are sharing the same resources, stealing each other's wagons, etc. The troops in the rear are coming up empty.

Actually there would be a "super-road-march" column of as few as 1,000 men per mile for a force moving administratively with no fear of encountering the enemy.

Let's look at mileage. The pas ordinaire was a steady 76 steps per minute. This could be increased to a route march between 85 and 90 paces a minute. If we call a pace one yard, 76 yards per minute is 4560 yards (2.59 miles) per hour; 88 yards per minute is 3.00 miles per hour. However, the troops were granted a five-minute halt every hour, and one hour after every four. A route march over a nine-hour period would make 22 miles.

Provided with a pair of dividers opened to a distance in the scale of from seventeen to 20 miles in a straight line (which made from 22 to 25 miles, taking into account the windings of the roads).

On average, of every two days in the field, one eight-hour day was spent marching while another day was spent on administrative stuff (baking, waiting for wagons and stragglers)-- either that, or else Forced March on the second day. In the opening of the Russian campaign, Napoleon expected his troops to make this distance day after day with barely a day's rest in a month. The French forces under Davout in the opening month of this campaign were moving at Forced March rates all the time.

They may have had bread on their wagons for 8 or ten days, but up until Napoleon ordered Davout's headquarters- administration, bakers, bake-oven builders, engineers, and artillery-to depart from Vilna, to rejoin him in Minsk Davout's corps had for the last three to five days only what they could obtain from the countryside.

The forces on the northern and southern flanks did not have to march as fast as the Central Army Group. For instance, the IV Corps marched 288 miles between July 1 and July 29, 1812 (at which time it rested for 10 days). The corps also rested on the 9th, 13th, and 19th of July and fought an engagement at Ostowno on the 26th. That's 288 miles in 29 days or 20 miles every two days (including the three rest days in July).

FORCED MARCH

Normally troops marched for about 8 hours per day, from 4 a.m. to noon, foraging in the afternoon, and they frequently rested for whole days at a time. In a Forced March troops marched for up to 12 hours per day for days at a time.

Napoleon drove his army faster and farther in Russia, the most thinly-settled and poorest of all the landscapes he ever invaded. Past experience did not provide sufficient knowledge of the new and different kind of campaign Napoleon embarked upon.

During a Forced March, a formation is necessarily more spread-out along the road. [The faster the march, the more road space the formation takes up.] Even following a normal march, a big Force usually needs a night to get arrayed for battle. Napoleon often employed the first Corps on the scene to provide cover for the concentration and deployment of the rest of the Force. Again, the larger the force, the longer this change would take.

A single regiment arriving in road column could deploy as quickly as the men arrived. In a fairly rapid march, 1,000 men could take up one mile of roadway, which means the last man would arrive at a given point 24 minutes after the first But a Corps of 30,000 men on a single road could make a column up to 30 miles long. During a Forced march, the troops are marching longer into the evening, and the leading elements do not stop to wait around for the troops delayed for whatever reason. Such a column would take even more road-space.

So what happens when this column encounters the enemy? In a normal march, there would be a cavalry vedette marching ahead of the column to provide a warning, but in a Forced March this would be less likely, meaning the lead elements might well walk into a trap (as happened repeatedly in Russia). Now, instead of repulsing the enemy, the enemy has repulsed them, and the lead regiment has been knocked-out. Now there is no protective screen for the following units, and they are subject to the same treatment should they arrive piecemeal. So they are going to have to stop and deploy further back. This stopping to deploy from a Forced March takes more time than from a regular march.

On the other hand, in either a regular or a Forced March, the repulsing side really has only a small proportion of its force available to repulse the enemy, normally just a light infantry regiment, plus some engineers, a few guns, and light cavalry. All to say, that if the enemy force being repulsed is no stronger than a light infantry regiment reinforced, then the repulse has a chance to succeed. When Ney was approaching battle at Bautzen, Napoleon intended him to arrive somewhat further in the enemy rear than the actual line of advance he chose. His approach to Eylau, as well as Davout's, does illustrate the same thing. The first priority of these "Forced Marching" force leaders seems to have been to link up with the main force under Napoleon, and then extend their line to envelop the enemy. The leader's concern has to be that his arrival may not come at exactly the right moment; he may feel that he has been delayed and perhaps Napoleon's diversionary attack, timed for his intended arrival on the flank, may have already gone in and spent itself against an undivided Russian command.

ADVANCE AND RETREAT

At the commencement of a campaign, to advance or not to advance is a matter for grave consideration, but when once the offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skilful the manoeuvres, a retreat will always weaken the morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats cost always more men and materiel than the most bloody engagements, with this difference, that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only. [VI]

This is an argument for a French attack upon the Russian Army at the start of the retreat from Moscow, as actually occurred at Malo-Yaroslavets. However, another inconclusive battle meant the doom of the army. Napoleon should have pressed on against the Russians with desperation, knowing that his army was doomed as explained in the Maxim above.

The transition from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations in war. [XIX]

Napoleonic Operations From Castiglione to Waterloo

Definitions and Weather
Planning and Preparation: Logistics, Liaison, Administration
Command and Organization
Maneuver
Attack and Pursuit