REPLACEMENTS

Replacements are men of regiments already in the theater, as opposed to Reinforcements. In 1812 replacement strength for the French was inadequate. One third of the troops should have been kept back from the initial invasion force in comfortable quarters in Prussia, so that they could have been fed-in as needed. Each corps might have left one division in Gumbirmen. That would have reduced attrition and left a much leaner and faster main army group.

Replacements were received in one of three ways:

1. Transferring them from the Replacement Pool to units in the field

2. They were often used to create a new independent force and/or a new March Unit (a temporary formation disbanded upon its arrival at the front).

3. Transferring regiments from one Command to another.

INTELLIGENCE

To reconnoitre accurately defiles and fords of every description, to provide guides that may be depended upon, to interrogate the curg and postmaster, to establish rapidly a good understanding with the inhabitants, to send out spies, intercept public and private letters, and translate and analyze their contents- in a word, to be able to answer every question of the general-in-chief when he arrives at the head of the army-these are the qualities which distinguish a good general of advanced posts. [LXXVI]

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, intelligence on enemy forces was gathered by diplomatic missions. Once the campaign had begun, the light cavalry were supposed to provide information on the whereabouts of enemy forces, forming at the same time a mobile screen to detect and repulse enemy cavalry patrols. They were not always able to perform this mission and often lost track of their quarry.

In 1812 Napoleon had a good assessment of Russian army strength at the start of the campaign. However, his understanding of Russian internal politics was weak. He actually thought, that should the Tsar refuse to negotiate, he could still negotiate with the Boyars of Moscow. Napoleon underestimated the array of difficulties he would face in invading Russia, including the abysmal roads, torrential rains, unripe crops, and the will of the people.

LEADERSHIP

The first qualification in a general-in-chief is a cool head-that is, a head which receives just impressions, and estimates things and objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by good news, or depressed by bad. The impressions he receives, either successively or simultaneously in the course of the day, should be so classed as to take up only the exact place in his mind which they deserve to occupy since it is upon a just comparison and consideration of the weight due to different impressions that the power of reasoning and of right judgment depends.

Some men are so physically and morally constituted as to see everything through a highly coloured medium. They raise up a picture in the mind on every slight occasion, and give to every trivial occurrence a dramatic interest. But whatever knowledge, or talent, or courage, or other good qualities such men may possess, nature has not formed them for the command of armies, or the direction of great military operations. [LXXIII]

Napoleon states that a general should be in touch with his troops, sharing their hardships. By 1812 one can see he has become out of touch, ignoring his own maxim. In that year, the leadership was failing the French Army. The top echelon of commanders was no longer living up to their former performance. Macdonald did nothing against Riga (though perhaps there was nothing he could do). Jerome, Vandamme, Junot-they were all failures as military commanders. Davout was not himself, and Ney was wonderful in the retreat.

Napoleonic Operations From Castiglione to Waterloo

Definitions and Weather
Planning and Preparation: Logistics, Liaison, Administration
Command and Organization
Maneuver
Attack and Pursuit