1.4.3 Campaigns

Hunnic campaigns had a number of characteristic features, features which I will describe in isolation below. Of course, some or all these elements would be combined during a campaign to create an effective and powerful military operation.

Speed

A Hunnic warband could cover great distances in a day. Sixty miles twenty four hours was achievable(l9). Half this distance in a day would've been considered excellent by most standards. Extreme speeds obviously would not be maintained for long, but fast speeds were maintained. Raiding parties of all cavalry armies could cover a considerable range during the year. They were everywhere; when they were least expected, and their speed "stripped the rumour of the approach" (20). Such speeds would also strip military communications. The element of surprise would be complete, generating terror and panic at the sudden arrival of the raiders outside a village, town, or fortification.

Thompson points out the significant and disruptive impact that even all raiding bands of Huns would have on military and civilian morale, communications, and general willingness and preparedness to fight. In today's world of instant communications and global media coverage it is easy to underestimate or dismiss the impact of rumour and uncertainty on military resolve and civilian confidence. A raid by a few hundred mounted horsemen, maneuvering significant distances, would soon grow into stories of thousands of blood drinking, flesh eating satyr-like horsemen scouring the province. A large raid, spreading out into smaller groups once the frontiers were penetrated, must have had a blitzkrieg-like effect; the Hunnic "wolves of the North" generating wild rumour, spreading panic, clogging roads with fleeing refugees, and rendering intelligence gathering difficult.

What did slow down a Hun raid was, ironically, success. Success meant loot, which was often piled high in the wagons, or driven before the raiders in the form of cattle or prisoners. Priscus quotes us an instance where a city, Asenus, after successfully resisting some raiders, launches a counter-attack as the Huns withdraw, their pace hampered by their booty. Incidently, the wagons used on campaign were not the heavy, four wheel wagons, but rather light, two wheeled wains, so even the baggage would start light and highly mobile (21).

Ammianus details examples of these Hunnic tactics. Athanarichus, the chief of the Theruingi, was determined to resist the Huns. He sent some trusted subordinates and troops "to a distance of twenty miles in advance, to observe the advance of the enemy, while he himself in the meantime, disturbed by no one, was preparing his army for battle. But the results were far other than he expected. For the Huns, who are shrewd in arriving at conclusions, suspecting that there was some large force further off, disregarded the troops which they had seen, and who had disposed themselves to rest, as lf there was nothing to disturb them; then, when the moon broke into the darkness of night, they chose what seemed to be the best course, crossed the river by a ford, and fearing lest some informer should get ahead of them and frighten off the enemy who were at a distance, they made a swift attack on Athanaricus himself.

As he was stunned by their first onset, they forced him to take speedy refuge in the steep mountains, after losing a few of their own men. Athanaricus, troubled by this unexpected attack and still more through fear of what might come, had walls built high, skirting the lands of the Taifali from the banks of the river Gerasus as far as the Danube, thinking that by this hastily but diligently constructed barrier his security and safety would be assured. But while this well-planned work was being pushed on, the Huns swiftly fell upon him, and would have crushed him at once on their arrival had they not been so loaded down with booty that they gave up the attempt." (22)

There are a number of points of interest:

• Athanarlchus obviously thought twenty miles separation between his forward post and himself gave him enough safety margin.
• The Huns had effective scouting/intelligence, and were able to draw the right conclusions.
• The ability and willingness of the Huns to take the initiative and to speedily and efficiently carry out the night attack; and again to forestall Athanaricus by attacking him before his earthwork defences were complete.
• The booty available got the better of the Huns.

Distance

Hunnic armies were prepared to cover great distances in one campaign. An example of this was seen in the summer of 395. Large hordes of Huns, starting around central Europe, invaded Asia, splitting into three groups. One group devastated the country south and west of the Anti-Taurus. When they crossed the Euphrates, the Romans attacked and destroyed them by cutting off the bridge across which the Huns crossed the river. A second group rode down the Tigris and Euphrates valley as far as Ctesiphon, well inside Persia. On a report that a Persian army was marching against them, the Huns turned back but were overtaken. One band was cut down, the other abandoned their prisoners, fled through Azerbaijan, and returned over the Caspian Gates to the steppes. A third group ravaged eastern Asia Minor and Syria.

The invasion of 395 is said to have been triggered by famine in the steppes. It is interesting to note that the Huns drove away as many herds of cattle as they could, as well as collecting thousands of prisoners - the raid became a gigantic slave hunt. It was undoubtedly the prisoners and cattle that allowed the Persians to overtake the Hunnic raiders; but the group that abandoned lts pclsoners was able to (or allowed to) outstrip Persian pursuit.

Outflanks and Encirclements

Hun armies regularIy employed outflanking to bypass fixed defences, and encircling tactics to trap the enemy, usually with devastating effect. They also understood the principles of threatening lines of communications. There is evidence to suggest that in 377, when the Goths were hemmed in the Balkans by the Romans, the Romans were compelled to retreat because of a Hunnic threat to the Roman's rear and lines of communication (23).

Stilicho, in 405, turned to Uldin the Hun for help in containing the Goths who were invading Italy. Near Faesulae the Hunnic auxiliaries circled and captured or destroyed a large part of the Gothic hordes.

Rivers: The Danube

The Danube was a mayor obstacle to the Huns, but they were capable of dealing with it. Priscus himself describes his river crossing, assisted by, and in company with, Huns.

"Barbarian ferrymen received us, and in single-log boats which they themselves bullt, cutting and hollowing out the tree, they ferried us across the Danube River. They had not made these preparations for our sake, but had just ferried across a barbarian band which had met us on the road, because Attlla was desirous of crossing to Roman territory as if to hunt. But the Royal Scythian really had the intention of doing this as a preparation for war" (24).

Rivers were also crossed "on rafts which the barbarians carry on wagons use in the marshy places" (25).

In general however, Attila had found an effective solution to the problem of the Danube. During the Hunnic raid on the Balklans in 477, the Hun army was defeated and the Huns fought their way to the walls of Constantinople and Theodosius was forced to beg for terms. Apart from vast quantities of gold, the Romans were forced to abandon a large territory south of the Danube, a belt five days journey wide, from Pannonia to Novae. This meant that the Danube frontier defences were forced completely. The old defences and the river cost the Huns much blood to penetrate. Any new defence could never be as strong.

More Huns

The Huns Part 1: Introduction, Sources, At War
The Huns Part 1: On Campaign
The Huns Part 2: Fortifications and Sieges
The Huns Part 2: In Battle
The Huns Part 3: Equipment and Wargaming
The Huns Part 3: Battle of Naissus
The Huns Part 3: Wargaming Campaign