by Old Duffer
Matthew Strickland for CUP Medieval warfare is coming under the academic microscope increasingly since, (a) I spy Revisionism, and (b) the likes of me are around to bolster the market for this stuff. The Revisionism is the counter-blast to Oman and his sneers about medieval commanders being idiots. Sadly, this message has still not percolated the skulls of certain hobby persons, but then their mouths are occupying such a large part of their heads finding the brain may be difficult. The upthrust is the realisation that medieval warfare may have been unpleasant (what warfare is not), rough on the civilians (not that we in the 20th Century can comment here either) and fought by men to whom liberty was more valuable than obedience (a feeling still deep in the British and American psyche), but it was subjected to rational analysis by its proponents. This is not to say that all its practitioners were rational, but then even that most non-traditional force the IDF charged Saggers from an excess of contempt. The books of Gillingham, Strickland, Verbruggen, Morillo, Kapelle (more political) and others are showing us something of the logic and reading this book and John Lynn's will show you how little the basics had changed. This book is not about particular campaigns or battles but the impact of the theory of chivalry on warfare and how warfare was waged in practice. I was interested to note that even the brawling barons of King Stephen's reign (while Christ and his saints slept) were less brutal than the torque-wearing Anglo-Saxon kings they had replaced, but more of that later. We start off with an examination of the theory of chivalry and its enthronement in "statute". Immediately Strickland confronts the question of whether the opinions of clerics like Orderic Vitalis on the motives and mores of knights can stand. He moves into the match between piety and war. The Peace of God's efforts to reduce combat and to ameliorate its worst features are discussed. Many examples are adduced of how sanctuary was broken or churches pillaged in times of "need" but that the plunderer then felt obliged to make recompense. One has the feeling of religious establishments acting as banks from which warriors drew in times of need and (if they survived) paid back to late. The concepts of honour, shame and reputation are examined. When was it proper to behave like a cad (in tourneys the answer from the life of William Marshal is "often")? The proper practice of boasting and the effect of cowardice. The move from slaughter of fellow knights in discussed, together with the times when it was felt proper to do so. The treatment of peasants and infantry continued to be poor, but no worse (it is argued) than was their lot in Anglo-Saxon or Celtic warfare. The proper practice of ransoming (and its practical effect on battles) and of respites and the conventions of siege warfare are examined. Respites were the arrangements whereby besiegers would compound with the besieged to agree that if they were not relieved by a certain date they would surrender. It transpires that hardly any such respiters were rescued, but the method provided a face-saving formula for everyone. It also is argued that some leaders, like William the Lion, were so keen on the chivalric reputation that was achieved by respites that they were willing to sacrifice the military results of their campaigns in order to make a fine show. All of these (to us) difficult points come together in a discussion of how rebellion was treated. This is an attempt to deal with the wide range of punishment inflicted for rebellion, from the honourable surrender (a vassal of a rebel perhaps who has done just enough for honour's sake) to beheading or other mutilations. Finally, there are two excellent chapters on the policy and practice of ravaging both as military necessity and military strategy. The two worst practitioners - the Scots (and Welsh) and the routiers are singled out for more detailed treatment. Strickland argues that both the Scots and the Welsh fought under an older more bloody tradition whereby warfare routinely involved slaughtering prisoners and enslaving the populace. The routiers were just as rapacious but with the firm view in mind of extorting funds from their victims, the chapter on the Tax of Violence in John Lynn's book applies here. A very well written analysis, full of application from the history of the period. More Book Reviews
Giant of the Grand Siécle After The Deluge: Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War Tactics and The Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon War and Chivalry Fontenoy The Campaign of Koniggratz 1886 Hannibal's War Letters on Cavalry Fuzzy Wuzzy Back to Perfidious Albion #97 Table of Contents Back to Perfidious Albion List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 1998 by Charles and Teresa Vasey. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |