OLD DUFFER'S
BOOK CORNER

The Austro-Prussian War

The Austro-Prussian War Geoffrey Wawro for CUP

Detailed military history of the type most of you will enjoy this book serves it up hot and strong. Wawro is opinion incarnate, and he does not like Feldzeugmeister Benedek one leetle bit. He perceives him to be a bourgeois Magyar promoted beyond his abilities to spite other Austrian commanders based largely on the fact that his Corps "gave good retreat" as we Californians say in 1859. Wawro himself is cordially dislike by the Hobby's Mr Austria - Mike Bennighof - and I have a feeling this a matter of honour, but laced with professional contempt. Pustules at dawn Herr Doktor!

Wawro starts his merry tale in 1859 where ill-trained Austrian troops (ghastly Slavs, I ask you, cannot imagine anyone basing a large and successful empire on Slavs can you! Well apart from Russia and Poland-Lithuania to mention but many million I cannot think of one) unable to handle the new extended fire formations linked to their new rifles are overrun by charging Frenchies armed with crappy old muskets. Overwhelmed in all senses, and by (wonderful word) Desertionlust the Austrian lose the battles and hamstrung by poor staff and the sheer size of their army they lose the campaign. Rather than train the men properly (cannot be doing with that) like clever cousin Wilhelm the Austrian elect to use storm columns as the best way of deploying their troops.

General Adolf Schonfeld observing: "Prussian troops are just too intelligent, too methodical. They lack the Austrian's moral factors: peace of mind, sang-froid, stamina and the resolve to give and take hard blows without regard for the price." Pride cometh before a fall, and an haughty spirit before destruction. Wawro thus builds up a picture of an Austrian army committed to a tactic which win or lose is definitely going to mince up its men. He neglects to mention what almost swings it for the Austrians at Sadowa - the splendid rifle-armed Austrian artillery. He also has not the slighest idea of what happened at Valmy, depth is not always accoimpanied by width.

The problems of size and supply of armies are then put into the context of the war plans. Prussia has identified the need to take out much of the Western German states quickly and then move in three columns to hit the Austrians in Bohemia. Using more routes to increase logistic capacity but risking a poor combination on the day of battle. Prussian commanders, as Wawro shows, are not all automata (indeed the reverse is the case they disobey Moltke whenever they can) so this miscombination is a real problem.

Benedek has concentrated the Austrians in Moravia rather than Bohemia - for which Wawro gives him a lashing. Under a good deal of criticism (including the Kaiser) he then moves into Bohemia even as the Prussians are moving, ensuring a real mess. No matter how stupid the original plan a muffed audible on the line of scrimmage is not a better alternative.

The encounter battles (during which the Austrians "learn" that they lose five times as many men as the Prussians) are well described though the map symbology is a little wobbly and an OB might have helped. It all then meets on the field of Sadowa where Benedek begins to resemble Bazaine at Mars-le-Tour, a brave man overwhelmed by responsibility and (?) moral cowardice. Both of them failing to attack when they have the chance, both enjoying exposing themselves to fire. To add piquancy to the whole proceeding Wawro describes the Austrian victory at Custozza in some detail and we can measure the Austrian army against two levels - the Prussian and the Italian. Very readable stuff although the contempt meter is running strong.

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© Copyright 1997 by Charles and Teresa Vasey.
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