A Reply to Mr. Pond's Comments by Dave Powell

These days, it seems, every time you bite into a Big Mac you're attacking someone's sacred cow. I've just finished reading Lewis Pond's response to my "Forest for the Trees..." article published in Operations 1. Wow. I must have touched a nerve somewhere. Thankfully, he's apparently not really "peeved" at me. I shudder to think of what might follow if he were. Fortunately, Dean gets all the mail at the company address, and so will run the risk of letter bombs, drive-by shootings, etc., incurred by a "peeved" response. Good luck, partner.

Mr. Pond brought up the "Fat Lady" metaphor, but it seems to me it might be more accurately applied to his response rather than my initial effort. My article attacked no one, and discussed only one topic: the combat effects of trees. I presented four examples, all focused on the loss rates for units in both wooded and clear terrain. Where did I wander off the topic?

By contrast, Mr. Pond has attacked my respect for my fellow gamer, my honesty, my intelligence, my writing technique (the straw man gambit), and my ability to read and understand history. About the only thing he didn't accuse me of was date-rape. [Ed. Note: Dave exaggerates here intentionally. There are other things he has not been accused of .. but, indeed, most of them are felonies.]

So far the only reason offered to us for including a woods modifier is because "other games had one..." This fact still stands; stripped of its rhetoric, the central theme of Mr. Pond's letter merely restates that case, this time drawing on the GBACW system. Nowhere does he offer historical evidence of his own. If this is a straw man, it is not of my making.

Next, Mr. Pond scoffs at my examples. Not statistically significant, he sneers. Berg 'proved' that the woods effect modifier is valid and needed years ago, he says, and ridicules my lack of gaming knowledge as well. (There's yet another personal jab.)

Actually, I have all of the GBACW games, and have played them for years. That doesn't mean that I accept everything written there as knowledge divinely inspired. In fact, I know Richard Berg reasonably well from repeated contact at conventions and have discussed game design and history with him a number of times. Richard himself will freely admit to 'winging it' on occasion. If it sounds reasonable, he's not adverse to throwing it in, so to speak. The preceding statement is not in any way intended to attack Richard Berg, in fact, it shows his deep intellectual honesty. I like Richard, I like his games, and I have never discussed the 'woods controversy' as such with him specifically. My point is that Richard does not have some absolutist death-grip on "THE TRUTH", as he would be the first to admit.

The above notwithstanding, this 'fact' has already been 'proved' beyond a shadow of a doubt, contends Mr. Pond. Since he rejects my four examples as statistically ludicrous, how many separate examples would be considered statistically significant? I assume, after all, that there must be several hundred clear-cut supporting incidents which he can draw upon--ones where "proof" is involved. By all means bring them forth.

Next up is my veracity. At first I thought Mr. Pond was calling me a liar, but then I realized he was accusing me of a far worse crime: of being a sleazy lawyer who hides evidence detrimental to his case--hitting below the belt, indeed!

The truth is simpler, if less juicy for conspiracy theorists: I have yet to find an example of an action where a unit actively sought the shelter of a treeline for defensive purposes and the intention of reducing losses. I have found some cases where units concealed themselves in trees for surprise purposes, but when the action commenced, they advanced into less restrictive terrain. In short, they abandoned their "defensive advantage" almost immediately. Additionally, I have found units which entrenched just inside treelines. This was done for two reasons: concealment and easy access to building materials.

However, I contend that any reduced casualty rate was impacted far more by the resultant trenches than by the trees. Perhaps more significantly, none of the several woods effects partisans out there have yet produced a supporting example of their claim--not one. My request still stands. If anyone can discover such an instance, send it in.

One final statistical note: my four examples were meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. I can and have found more examples of woods combat which support my theory. Turchin's brigade at Chickamauga leaps to mind, as do at least five or six other actions in that battle. The Wilderness is a fertile harvestground for more. However, I'm not willing to spend yet more hours of research and writing flogging this insignificant horse. Especially, if proponents are unable to provide even one example of their contention in action. Even if I wrote a 200,000 word magnum opus, Dean would throttle me if I asked him to publish it.

[Ed. Note: Try me, Bucko, especially after leaving me holding the mail bag above ... ]

The article in question was meant to be a form of extended designer's notes, not a frustrated graduate student's obscure thesis topic.

Besides, there is a larger problem here. History is not math, and there are no definitive "Proofs". Nor is warfare akin to baseball which generates hundreds of statistics with every swing of a bat. The historical method develops theories from significant but incomplete data--simply because all the needed information just doesn't exist. Game design compounds this problem by demanding hard numbers for every aspect of combat. It is the rare battle indeed where it can be proven how many men were actually present, much less how many were killed or how they were hit. History is not hard science, nor will it ever be. Anyone who pretends otherwise is not a student of the subject.

Mr. Pond also takes me to task for my incomplete description of the 20th Maine's advance, and indeed for missclassifying forms of combat generally. I standby that description as a clear and concise outline (it was never intended to be the last word on the subject) of the course of events on Little Round Top. I assumed most of those interested would have a familiarity with at least some of the untold thousands of words expended on the subject, or know where to go in order to find such. As for calling close combat fire combat, that is what it is. There can be no question the 20th Maine engaged in an extended firefight at close range, which produced virtually all their losses. If this is not the case, how did they manage to run out of ammo? Finally, our CRT factors in losses from all causes, including captures, not just gunshot wounds. Again, we opted for simplicity and ease of play here.

In at least one respect I must plead guilt. In the article, I failed to present my conclusion in as unambiguous a manner as possible which resulted in some confusion. Certainly, Mr. Pond missed it. He claims that one need look no further than my existing examples to prove I'm an ignoramus: my own words indicate that trees do affect fire combat.

I never tried to claim that trees don't inhibit lead bullets. I quite firmly believe the reverse is true. Instead, my conclusion is that compensating factors were at work here--specifically range--which cancels out any defensive benefit. Allow me now to present my thoughts in a clear a manner as possible:

1. Trees do provide some measure of protection in fire combat, as opposed to the firefight in the clear, assuming that both firefights occur at a constant equal range.

2. Due to the dual factors of LOS (the need to get closer to engage the enemy) and fewer casualties compared to units in the open at the same range, formed units in the woods advance to ranges which would have been suicidal in the open.

3. At these much closer ranges, the proximity of the battlelines generated higher losses even for units in the woods.

4. The result is a conflicting feedback situation in which losses are being driven downward by the woods themselves, but upward by the deadly ranges.

In effect, these conflicling modifiers on the loss rate cancel each other out. One person even suggested that we use two modifiers, one positive and one negative, to more graphically represent the effects of the woods. The net effect, of course, would be a modifier of zero.

5. The important constant here is range. If two separate friendly units engage the enemy in close combat--one in the open, theother in the woods- they will sufferreasonably comparable losses. The only significant difference is that the friendly unit in the woods will engage much closer to the enemy line.

6. The overall effect of these differing pressures is to produce generally equivalent loss rates in units over Nine. These loss rates will be similar regardless of whether or not the specific terrain is wooded. Furthermore, I contend that this was a common effect and not a fluke. Hence, no woods specific modifier is needed.

Mr. Pond's two contentions (once I waded through all the character assassinations) are that: A) Berg had a modifier, and B) my own writing proved trees affected loss rates. As I stated above, I never disputed B, but instead tried to state (and apparently failed) that there were mitigating circumstances involved. All this leaves Mr. Pond to defend his point with is A. My, that's original. We aren't lemmings at The Gamers, and we do not design games based on the "follow the leader" principle. The way to prove a point is to present solid historical examples, and the good historian returns to primary sources as much as possible for these. Other games are at best tertiary sources, since they are designer's interpretations of historian's interpretations of events filtered through the mind-set of the participants.

I'm all in favor of good, rousing historical debate, But I do ask that future contenders bring something new to the issue. If all you can offer as evidence is the same old "other game" theory, you'll not convince me I'm wrong, no matter what name you call me.

Letters

Letters: Introduction
Con: The CWB's Forest Treatment
Pro: The CWB's Forest Treatment
In Self Defense: Reply