(from a letter to Mr. Blankenship) by Lewis Pond

Our telephone conversation prompted me to get out my copy of Operations #1 and read this article. My aim was to discover why The Gamers did not include a woods terrain effects modifier (TEM) in their CWB games. I could hardly believe what I read. If this article is The Gamers idea of either logic or historical research, then they have no understanding of the meaning of either of those terms. After finishing the article, I get the image of the B.C. Fat Lady blindly swinging in all directions and hitting everything but the snake. If The Gamers desire an accession of their nascent series to The Brigade Series, then they will have to overcome their pertinacity.

In my analysis that follows, I point out many errors made by the author and then go on to show why the historical situations led him to error. I then point to the correct solution to the problems he raises (I claim no credit for these solutions, Richard Berg long ago faced the same problems that the author discusses and came up with answers that make far more common sense and logic than the authors ridiculous optional rule. Mr. Berg's solutions are found in one of the most popular Civil War game systems and should have been easily discovered.)

Mr. Powell's first error is in his opening paragraph. He says "After all, the argument ran, the other games had such effects. Ergo, the CWB needed them too." This is called setting up a straw man. You state the opposing argument in such weak terms that you can easily refute it. This is a very old trick, and beneath anyone who intends to win an argument by logic and sound reasoning. You should always be fair enough to state the opposing argument in the strongest possible terms. Of course, it is possible Mr. Powell either is not smart enough to understand the opposing argument or intentionally insults our intelligence. But you can see I give him the benefit of the doubt. His opening set the tone for the speciousness that followed.

Mr. Powell goes on to say that "The Gamers' rationale in first designing the CWB was to provide a vehicle for portraying Civil War combat at the brigade level without drowning the system in complicated clutter, while providing sufficient detail to hold one's interest." I suspect that this is the most honest part of his essay. However, he does not take this to its logical conclusion. It follows from the above that the woods rule was at first considered "complicated clutter." It does not surprise me that wargamers quickly pointed out The Gamers' error. TEM is a basic design consideration, and understanding terrain is funda mental to understanding the art of war. I think if you read the opening of Mr. Powell's essay you will see that it was only after wargamers pointed this out that Mr. Powell developed his rational. Why not just admit your mistake and make the change?

The answer is found in Mr. Essig's basic philosophy. Mr. Essig believes that if he can publish a system without modifications, then he can publish several games using the same system and wargamers will buy them knowing that they don't have to learn a new system each time. His philosophy I at first applauded. It is not a new idea. Others have tried the system approach before but usually botched it by too many design changes as the system developed. I now see that Mi. Essig took a good idea too far. When the system obviously needs ameliorating you should give in and make the change. Not rationalize the error. The Gamers' believe that they have wrought the perfect design from the start. The virgin birth in the quiet fields of Homer. After seeing the display of their reasoning in this article, maybe the system was an Immaculate Conception. How else could they have done it?

Mr. Powell claims that he omitted the woods effects in the final design because the benefit was not borne out by examining historical losses. He then presents three or four examples to support his claim. In presenting his cases he contradicts his own conclusion several times.

First he says "Combat at 10 to 30 yards was common in the woods, a range which was all but suicidal (and almost unheard of) in the open." He forgets to ask the obvious question of why it would be unheard of in the open. I am not going to insult your intelligence by pretending that it takes much thinking to reach a conclusion. The woods obviously provide enough protection to allow the troops to close. Surely you are not going to agree with The Gamers that this is due to line of sight alone.

In the first example he admits the Confederate losses are guesswork and not easily determined. In the second example he admits "it is unclear which units fought in the woods and which were in the clear..." His description of the 20th Maine counterattack is very poor. The 20th Maine low or out of ammunition. Then they launched a bayonet charge. To characterize this as fire combat is ludicrous!

Note that he ignores the case where one unit is in the trees and the enemy is in the open. He later claims that he has so far "been unable to (sic) find such an action" of when this occurred. This is doubtful. It is more likely that he could not find a case where this occurred and supported his conclusion.

A much more damning point is that his sample is too small. He flipped a coin one time and concluded that it always comes up heads. His sample is simply too small. NO STATISTICALLY VALID OR LOGICAL CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN FROM IT WHATSOEVER.

But let us suppose that Mr. Powell finds more cases and that he can remove the "guesswork." What if these cases disclosed similar results? Would this be convincing? Absolutely not. We can discover Mr. Powell's errors from the examples he has given without more cases. Consider his own account of the actions he cites. In his second example he says that "the Federals clearly launched a close combat." In his third example involved "both one hex combat and close combat as well." He is compelled to admit the close combat on Little Round Top because it is so well documented and commonly known. He says "over in the woods the distance closed to 10 yards, with perhaps some hand to hand fighting." This contradicts his definition of fire combat on page one. There he defines "close combat" as combat at about " 15 yards." These accounts make it clear that what he has found is that close combat (not fire combat) amplifies losses.

I must point out that Richard Berg realized this at least 15 years ago and included fire modifiers for close combat. Mr. Berg realized that the woods provide some cover from fire and therefore decrease losses. At the same time, close combat increases firepower and increases losses. Shouldn't previous games on a similar subject be within the research on new games? If Mr. Powell were more familiar with his own hobby he would have known that this problem had long ago been considered and solved by game designers.

I hope this letter will let some light into the Forest and I hope Mr. Powell will find the TEM for the woods. Do you think this letter is good enough to send to The Gamers? I would like to disabuse Mr. Powell of his notions without sounding peevish.

Letters

Letters: Introduction
Con: The CWB's Forest Treatment
Pro: The CWB's Forest Treatment
In Self Defense: Reply