(from the response letter to Mr. Pond) by Rick Blankenship

I too got out my copy of Operations #1 as soon as I hung up the telephone. I also remembered an article is issue number 2 and I got it also. You can find it on page 6. My intent was as yours: to find out why The Gamers did not include a terrain modifier for woods in fire combat. Before I continue, let me first say that I found your letter very compelling, a very hard thing to accomplish with words alone. You are very articulate in your writing and should be proud of yourself.

Although your letter is sure to convince some that something is awry, it did not completely convince me. Let's begin with Richard Berg. His designs are without a doubt some of the best, and I will not dispute his theory of game design. However, it is unfair to compare his games with those of The Garners. Berg's games are on a totally different scale, and this is what most critics of the CWB system, for some reason, fail to grasp. For instance, there have been several reviews in which the absence of opportunity fire has been criticized. [Ed. Note: If memory serves, there was only one.] I can recall no one blasting TSS for the lack of opportunity fire, which on the regimental scale makes far greater sense. My point is that we must look at the CWB as a series on the brigade scale, not the regimental scale! In other words, how did woods affect entire brigades.

What were the tactics of the time? From everything I've read on the American Civil War, the woods were not the terrain of choice for most commanders at the time. The woods compounded the problem of command control-one of the most important, if not the most important aspects of battlefield theory. One of the first things you said, of which I disagree, was that Mr. Powell waited until after wargamers complained before he "developed his rationale." In fact, he said that a TEM was considered while the game was under development.. There is also a small and somewhat weak explanation in the designer's notes of Thunder at the Crossroads.

"Combat at 10 to 30 yards was common in the woods, a range which was all but suicidal (and almost unheard of) in the open." Your conclusion is correct, the trees probably did give enough protection for the troops to close. And yes, I do think that line of sight is, at the least, a much larger factor than you do. I challenge you to go out to your nearest undisturbed woods, mark several trees, and step off 90 feet-you may be surprised. But let us take this one step further, once this range was acquired, what, if anything, was different? Did the troops seek out their own individual tree, or did they maintain their ranks as much as physically possible? What comes to mind is the scene in the movie Glory (which was overseen by Civil War re-enactors) in which the troops on both sides stood shoulder to shoulder and fired on one another for several rounds before engaging in hand to hand. We are talking about some of the bravest men in recorded history. It is, therefore, not totally absurd to think this to be the case. More on this in my conclusion...

It is indeed ludicrous to characterize the 20th Maine counterattack as fire combat, if indeed that was what Mr. Powell was doing, I think that if you were to read that again you would see that what he was doing was merely describing the end of the particular battle. You and I both know that the 20th Maine was involved in two or three separate assaults by the boys from Alabama, and only after these firefights took place did Chamberlain see no other recourse but to charge with the bayonet. I'm sure you're also aware that the 20th did not "seek their own personal tree", but rather took up position along a small rock wall.

You say he ignores the case where one unit is in the trees and the enemy is in the open. I see no reason to doubt whether he could find an instance where this occurred. I myself can recall no instance in my own reading of the period where this occurred although my reading is somewhat limited to the major battles.

However, I wholeheartedly agree with your assessment that his sample was pathetically to small, and would make any qualified statistician burst into hysterical laughter. On the other hand, his observation, that in the battles of Chickamauga and the Wilderness the casualties seemed not much different (percentage wise, I assume) than those of other battles, certainly does merit further thought.

As for your last paragraph, you will have to read the rules, which I know you have already realized as per our phone conversation, The Gamers do indeed give a modifier for combat at ranges closer than 15 yards, and it is deadly!!! [Ed. Note: 100 yards or less is more precise] In effect when units conduct close combat their fire strengths are doubled.

To summarize, let's start with tactics. The most devastating shooting tactic of the time was, in my opinion, the volley shot. The commanders certainly realized this. In order to deliver this type of fire you had to maintain some kind of formation. With this in mind, if an infantry unit took position on the edge of the woods with a clearing to their front (so as to deliver their best shot) they themselves would be exposed to the same fire as the enemy. Conversely, if the same infantry unit deployed deep enough into the woods to gain some benefit, and still maintain their best shooting formation, they would either lose sight of the clearing or any enemy unit they could still see would gain the same benefit from the intervening trees.

Again we are talking about brigades here and I will not deny that some regiments would not physically be able to deploy in this type of formation in every woods ever fought in, but certainly the commanders in these locations would try to find an area where they could deploy. It appears to me that most instances where troops were deployed in the woods, they were so that the flank anchored and to deny the area's screening of enemy troop movements-not because they offered some sort of defensive benefit.

I do think that Mr. Powell failed miserably in his attempt to try to explain the rationale behind his theory. I myself found it hard to put my thoughts into a logical sequence in order for others to see how I view this problem-and I'm not sure I did any better than he did. One last thing, deploying in the woods was not foreseen as a defensive advantage. Of this I am certain, so I totally agree with Mr. Essig when he states "If the advantage of woods was perceived as less than the problem of managing troops in them, why should we corrupt the game system by giving players encouragement- a reward-for behaving in a way that is incorrect, ahistorical, and the opposite of the way their "on map" commanders would have handled their troops?"

I've enjoyed this debate immensely Lewis, as always you have challenged me to look deeper into something that interests me. I only hope that someday, I will be able to express my thoughts as well as you express yours.

Letters

Letters: Introduction
Con: The CWB's Forest Treatment
Pro: The CWB's Forest Treatment
In Self Defense: Reply