Connections 2000

The Modeling of Intangibles

Lecture by Col. A.G. Jannarome (ret)


It is the nature of decisions to be time-sensitive choices that are made in a context.

Exactly who decides? What's in their minds? Do they appreciate the strategic opportunities or challenges available? Trying to merge all these intangibles into a static equation is exasperating. So far, it seems largely probabalistic trying to model the act of decision making. "History is the ultimate sanity check on decision models."

Yet, we can try. Two components interact in the mind of the decision maker: the structural and the sitauational. The structural includes aspects such as religion, culture, education, occupation, and operative language (mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic). The situational includes the accuracy and timeliness of information availability, the particular issue at hand, mood, the novelty of the situation, and the perception of the role to be played.

Piled on top of that are a number of intangibles.

  • Individuals: morale, expertise, and logic support
  • Groups: cohesion, leadership, and training
  • Culture: values, victimization, mobilization, and "stressors" (i.e. injection of Western culture into the third world, climate changes, or resource scarcity).
  • Politics: power, control, and crisis handling ability.
  • Other: ethics, legacy, and reputation.

That is a tall order to incorporate the above into an algorithm-derived simulation. You can compensate by managing the information in a smarter way, for example, select the volume and speed at which information appears. You can incorporate secrecy and concealment of information. You can limit the application of new modeling tools versus proven processes.

Much would be slugged under the broad topic of "Psyops." For example, you can manipulate the presentation of "truth" and make appeals or challenges to pride, fear, and other emotions. For modelling such things, use real simulations in real time. You can, by delving into events' histories, measure the effect. For example, take the idea of dropping surrender pamphlets on Iraqi troops during the Gulf War in an effort to get them to surrender. You can measure the number of pamphlets dropped versus the total number of troops in the drop zone versus how many soldiers actually used them to surrender. This body of information can then be modelled into a simulation, although whetherthe same parameters hold in another situation is unknown.

As that is a more tactical example, never underestimate how tactical problems (i.e. your troops surrendering in droves) affect operational and strategic decisions. Leadership changes can provide feedback to the model, but must be incorporated with a focused, planned approach. In other words, after a tactical change, should you continue a Psyops deception and "lie like hell," or, report the truth? If the former, is the enemy decived? If the latter, would it have been better to deceive or were the results satisfactory?

The more variables, the more difficult the model, but it can be done. In the future, non-linear models will allow for rapid changes and consequences, intangibles such as morale and ethics will be incorporated, and "co-evolving landscapes" of inserting guessing games and enemy psyops will be built into the model. The more intangibles, the greater the difficulty of modeling, but ultimately, the more accurate the model.

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© Copyright 2001 Hal Thinglum
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